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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study concerns the ethics of journalism and virtue. I will argue that to carry out 
informative, insightful, and relevant journalism requires journalists, who could, along 
with other qualities, be described as being virtuous. 
 
To be sure, there already exists a considerable amount of work on the ethics of 
professions in general and on the ethics of journalism in particular, with virtue ethical 
foundations or aspects. However, because the otherwise remarkable work done so far 
lacks, annoyingly, a plausible theory of virtue, the issue should still be insisted upon. In 
case one argues for the superiority of her approach
1
 on grounds of its drawing on virtue 
theory and particularly on the concept of virtue, one should at least explicate what one 
considers virtue to be. This task, nonetheless, more often than not remains unaddressed in 
any instructive or comprehensive way. At the same time what is not infrequently lacking 
is also an explication of the theoretical background from which the virtue concept(s) used 
have been drawn. ”Virtue ethics” refers to such an extensive and diverse body of work, 
both traditional and modern, as to make it too vague a concept to allow without 
specifications for necessary distinctions and comprehension.
2
 Applied ethics, too, calls for 
clarity of concepts and for theoretical connectedness. 
 
Accordingly, I shall argue below for a virtue conception, which is both intuitively and 
theoretically defensible and in addition able to face the challenges issuing from within 
modern social and evolutional psychology. The virtue conception argued for is chosen 
and developed in intimate connection with the wide and many-faceted corpus of virtue-
based theory-building and the normative work based upon it, yet with clear emphasis on 
some contemporary developments which I consider both plausible in general and 
compatible with, or conducive to, the particular virtue conception which I shall defend. 
                                               
1 I use ‘her’ as a shorthand for ‘her or his’ whenever the latter might be called for. 
2Alasdair MacIntyre gives in his classic work After Virtue (1981) an instructive treatment on how difficult it 
is to find a decisive core for the concept of virtue. While making comparisons between the ”virtue lists” 
of Homer, Aristotle, New Testament, Jane Austen, and Benjamin Franklin MacIntyre e.g. asserts 
that”..(I)ts not just that each of these five writers lists different and differing kinds of items; it is also that 
each of these lists embodies, is the expression of a different theory about what a virtue is” (MacIntyre 
1981, 171; italics added). The abundance of competing virtue conceptions and lists, however, is not the 
only challenge to the theoretical and practical plausibility and potentiality of (the idea of) virtue, as will 
be discussed e.g. in section 2.4. of this study: situationist social psychology radically argues for the non-
existence of human character and subsequently of the very virtues. 
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In sum, the main task of the study is to show how the other approaches with a virtue 
ethical foundation may be found wanting on grounds either of the thinness or of the non-
existence of their theory or conception of virtue.
3
 I argue that the virtue approach, and 
particularly the virtue conception of Robert M. Adams (Adams 1999; 2006), which I shall 
defend, allows for more nuanced and more detailed deliberation and distinction in moral 
and ethical
4
 judgment than do its virtue ethical rivals; and that it also applies particularly 
well in the ethics of professions. Accordingly, I endeavor to show that the virtue (ethical) 
conception which appears in the following discussion is both helpful in making visible 
the ethical problems and subtleties distinctive to journalism, and also advisory to 
practicing journalists who wish to take care of and to maintain both their professional 





More schematically, the aims of the study are: (1) to show how a plausible and well-
defined conception of virtue gives credibility to the view that a virtue approach can also 
give good action guidance in the ethics of professions; (2) to argue that the virtue 
conception developed by Robert M. Adams carries the requisite characteristics; (3) to 
exemplify how earlier work on journalism ethics in general, and virtue-flavored or virtue-
based work in particular, would have been more accurate and more nuanced with the help 
of Adams’ insights; (4) to test in a preliminary fashion how virtue thinking in general and 
the virtue conception of Adams in particular succeed in journalistic online environments.  
One can also find below a rather comprehensive – considering the length of the study – 
summary of the recent developments both in virtue theory and normative virtue ethics. I 
consider the section in question (Part two) necessary for describing how virtue thinking 
in general – and not merely the virtue conception of Adams – is gaining in credibility and 
productivity.  
However, lying beyond the scopes and aims of this study are on the one hand the 
wholesale defense of virtue ethics against i.e. deontological or consequentialist 
                                               
3If not otherwise indicated by the context or the very phrasing I use 'or' inclusively in what follows. 
4From here on I use 'ethical' and 'moral' interchangeably. In case I use them both in the same sentence I 
purport to say that the issue under discussion concerns both concrete moral judgment or deliberation and 
ethical theorizing. By '...' I refer to the name of a word and by ”...” to the respective concept. 
5To be sure, although the virtue conception argued for in this study becomes applied in journalism, I do not 
see any decisive reasons why it would not be applicable in many other professions or occupations, too. 
Any such occupation, however, would have to qualify as a Macintyrean practice (MacIntyre 1981, 175; 
see also Interlude One, 2.). 
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approaches; or on the other hand the construction of a coherent and comprehensive virtue 
approach with the virtue conception of Adams as an element in it. In addition, I do not 
attempt to show that there is no room for consequentialism and particularly for 
deontology in the ethics of professions. I rather wish to argue for the view that in the 
ethics of professions we are worse off without the virtues and without a virtue conception 
that is unambiguous and has descriptive power. 
 
I shall proceed as follows. First, in this Introduction, I give preliminary descriptions and 
my working definitions of journalism as well as of journalism ethics and virtue ethics. 
Then, I go on to discuss, briefly, some of the moral problems which journalists have to 
face as journalists today. The latter part of the Introduction also strives to show why the 
motive for sound ethical deliberation amongst the practicing journalists of today is a 
prerequisite for accountable and legitimate professionalism within the craft, and why the 
work on journalism ethics remains a relevant scholarly undertaking. In Part two of this 
study, entitled Varieties of Virtue Ethics, I analyze some of the directions in which 
contemporary virtue ethical thinking has developed recently. In the process, I shall defend 
the conception of virtue developed by Robert Merrihew Adams (Adams 1999; 2006), in 
order to show how excellence and virtue are highly sensitive and necessary concepts in 
case one wishes to analyze and see in a clear and instructive manner both what the role of 
a journalist calls for in accountable democratic systems affected extensively by market 
logic, and how well journalists morally manage in their task. 
 
In Part two, I also summarize the skepticism that has been leveled against virtue ethics as 
an independent ethical theory or as a major way to deliberate on moral phenomena and, 
accordingly, put forth some reasons to consider that this many-faceted skepticism may be 
in many ways unwarranted. In this summary, the focus will be on two issues, which I find 
the most plausible candidates to undermine the standing of virtue ethics beside the two 
established traditions of moral theory, deontology and consequentialism. The first is the 
so-called situationist challenge as regards the very existence of human character and its 
traits. The second concerns the overall view to the effect that virtue ethics fails to be a 
moral theory at all, at least in any of the ways in which the concept is used in modern 
(deontological and consequentalist) ethical considerations and judgments. And, as stated 
above, my overall aim in this study is not to launch a full-length and comprehensive 
defense of virtue ethics against deontology and consequentialism, but to concentrate on 
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the issues which I see as central to the plausibility of the virtue conception which I 





However, virtue and character became firmly introduced into the ethics of professions 
generally, and into the ethics of journalism particularly, in the 1980's, and in some 
tentative cases even earlier. Among the first writers to lean heavily on virtues and 
character in the field of journalism ethics were Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987)
7
. Since 
then, there has been an upsurge of work upon the ethics of professions, which finds its 
inspiration in virtue ethical considerations;
8
 the ethics of journalism is no exception. To 
this tradition and literature I turn in Part three, Virtue’s Standing within the Craft. The 
rationale of this section of the study is to find out in what way and how successfully 
virtue ethics has been embraced as a plausible constituent of sound and comprehensive 
journalism ethics. 
 
The central characteristics of journalism which I begin to sketch in this Introduction are 
developed in Part three as well as in Part four, The Practice and the Virtuous Journalist. 
In third and fourth Parts I will also clarify in further detail how, in order to match the 
expectations which journalism faces as a constituent factor of democracies, journalists 
must be able both to work in a creative manner, and particularly to resist the growing 
pressures of the market-economy with its tendency to replace journalism's internal goods 
and excellences with its own. Part four is where I push further and defend my main 
challenges concerning some of the traditional tenets of the earlier work on journalism 
ethics generally and the virtue-based journalism ethics in particular.  
 
Hence, if my account of the core characteristics of journalism developed so far can be 
considered acceptable, the following should begin to seem obvious: good and effective 
organizational (re)arrangements and clear and supportive ethical codes are needed, but 
they are not adequate. It is not sufficient to write rules requiring one to be creative or 
                                               
6 “Standard texts” should not be taken to display any opposition or arrogance in the part of the writer. I 
simply seek to refer to an arguably existing phenomenon that might be called ”mainstream neo-
Aristotelianism”, within which an extensive and highly insightful defense of virtue theory already exists. 
I regard Rosalind Hursthouse (e.g. 1991, 223-246; 1996, 19-36; 2001) as one prominent representative 
of this line of thought. 
7
I will address the work of Klaidman and Beauchamp in more detail in Part three. 
8See note 37, page 27. 
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innovative, in order to develop, deepen and take advantage of one's journalistic 
imagination.  In addition there are hardly any commercial institutions which are disposed 
to compromise their profit-seeking logic in order to invest in the flourishing of 
citizenship. Absent the virtue, absent the high technical and moral performance, and there 
is no guarantee that journalism is able to remain viable and to avoid losing touch with its 
strategic role
9
 as a crucial determinant in keeping democracies alive. 
 
Finally, in Part five, Digital Future and the Conclusions, which also serves as the final 
summary of my work, I attempt to lay out the implications of the preceding discussion 
and, accordingly, to put them to the last tentative test. I do it by entering the world of 
online journalism to see whether the virtue conception developed also shows its strength 
on the Net. This kind of exploration clearly seems to be reasonable, since online work has 
its distinctive characteristics and, moreover, online is rapidly conquering the position as 
the major journalistic outlet, particularly as regards breaking news. One of the main 
conclusions I draw in this context is that there is to be found some evidence to the effect 
that the leap onto the Net actually has left the moral soundness of journalism more than 
ever dependent upon the virtues (and vices) of its practitioners. This is because the new 
communication technology has been prone to intensify the competition within the media 
branch to reach an unforeseen level, leaving the practitioners with diminishing resources 
to take care of the journalistic quality and moral integrity of their work. What is 
particularly scarce is time, even to the extent that journalists frequently are not allowed to 
wait for any real developments in the twenty-four hours’ and seven days’ -race for the 
newest version of whatever happens to be in the top ten of the journalistic agenda. 
 
1.1. Journalism as a Craft 
 
For the purposes of this study there seems to be no need to try to build a comprehensive 
(new) definition of journalism. Therefore, in what follows, I concentrate on those 
characteristics of journalistic practice which seem to be relevant to the context of this 
study. 
 
Initially, I accept the rather conventional tenet that journalism has not only an important 
                                               
9 What I mean by “strategic role” will be under detailed discussion in Interlude One. 
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but even indispensible role in the totality of social arrangements which seek to maintain 
and develop democratic habits, procedures, and institutions.
10
 Journalism, nonetheless, 
also serves readers
11
 as consumers as well as social human beings with a multiple array of 
diverse interests. This adds to the ethical complexities of the practice. Along with 
consumer information -type stories and purely entertaining pieces the probability 
increases that the practice of journalism becomes, if not invaded, at least to some extent 
tarnished by external values which contravene and muddle the key goal and logic of the 
practice as a major contributor to the citizenry's knowledge of public affairs. I will later 
argue that the whole enterprise of journalism, with its modern working procedures and 
privileges, becomes plausibly legitimized only if it convincingly succeeds in its being for 
key human goods in its democracy-sustaining role.
12
 In other words, the ethics of 
journalism indeed must be developed for the practice as it is, yet whilst keeping a sharp 
eye on the soundness of the habitually unquestioned legitimacy of the privileges and 
social role of both the practice and its practitioners. 
 
Secondly, I consider journalism to be a literary and a moral craft with a considerable 
intrinsic element of authorship.
13
 It is literary on the grounds that it was born in the act of 
writing and because the core gestalt of a piece of journalistic work – even today, in the 
days of 24-hour live news-casting and the Internet – remains a narrative, often written, 
sometimes unwritten: a report on what took place here and now. It is moral, since it 
                                               
10Yet this ”important, even indispensable role” can of course be challenged, as I myself also partly do in the 
course of this study. E.g. Doris Graber argues that neither citizens nor media are capable of performing 
the roles expected of them. And according to her also the appropriateness of these roles for life in 
modern societies is also open to question, as are”..(T)he many myths and stereotypes that obscure the 
interface between media and democracy. The fact that democracy can persist despite citizens and media 
that fall short of the expected performance suggests that political culture may be more important than 
citizen wisdom and media excellence” (Graber 2003, 139; 139-160; italics added). One factor keeping 
the myths live Graber considers to be their essential role in citizens’ larger belief systems about how our 
social systems work. Changing essential parts would call the entire system into question. Secondly, it is 
also difficult to dispel the myths because they are so entrenched and so often repeated. And thirdly, 
scholars have thus far failed to challenge them or to test most of them empirically to discover what is 
true, or partly or conditionally true, and what is false. Graber also asserts that there are vast differences 
in content, framing, and mode of presentation among various types of news venues and within each 
venue. In that way it is”..(F)oolhardy to generalize about “the media” because any generalization leads 
to overly broad, deceptive summary judgments” (Graber 2003, 140; 139-141).   
11I take the convenience of speaking of readers while actually referring to consumers of media in general. I 
dare take it for granted that in most of the cases nothing conclusive becomes lost, though broadcasting 
and online work admittedly have their own characteristics and traditions, which do not completely share 
the values and goals prominent within print journalism (see footnote 10 above). 
12This of course is by far an empirical question, which so far has not been very conclusively answered (see 
footnote 10 above). “Key human goods” will be discussed and clarified in Interlude One. 
13
A declaration of interest may be in place here. I have been and continue to be a writing journalist and 
editor in service of the Finnish press since 1990. 
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should be deeply embedded in the workings of democracy and human relationships in 
general and hence accountable for its distinctive and privileged role to its readership as 
citizens of the community and dependent human beings generally. Finally, the element or 
likeness of authorship is also there, because the products of the craftsmanship are always, 
unavoidably, unique. However small scale, however routine the writing, the choice and 
the individual touch are unavoidable.
14
 In these characterizations I draw heavily on G. 
Stuart Adam (Adam 2004, 247-257; Adam and Clark, 2006), as will be discussed below. 
Whether journalism also can be considered a profession is a question which I as well 
repeatedly attend to later, because I endeavor to gather evidence to the effect that the 
applicability of virtue approach in the ethics of journalism does not depend on whether 
journalism can be considered a profession. 
15
 What is more decisive is whether journalism 




It is of crucial importance to see that mastering the necessary technical skills and tools is 
not enough for a journalist, according to the emerging definition of the craftsmanship 
under discussion. The moral element has also to be embraced. Technical competence does 
not secure moral soundness, yet at the same time both moral excellence and the 
membership of the journalistic community call for a persisting willingness to master the 
necessary technical skills of the craft.
17
 This is an issue of considerable complexity and 
                                               
14Yet there are also admittedly reasons to think that the space for and status of authorshipness in journalism 
are diminishing. Ruusunoksa and Kunelius e.g. write on ”planned template journalism”, by which they 
want to refer to the fact that journalistic production has become increasingly planned both in terms of 
forms and contents (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008, 18-20). 
15The discussion on professionalism in general has been, to say the least, extensive and non-conclusive. 
Julia Evetts argues that it is of importance to try to understand how professionalism as a normative value 
system and ideology is now being increasingly used in modern organizations and other institutions, and 
places of work, as a mechanism to facilitate and promote occupational change. The ideology of 
professionalism that is so appealing to occupational groups and their practitioners includes aspects such 
as exclusive ownership of an area of expertise and knowledge, and the power to define the nature of 
problems in that area as well as the control of access to potential solutions. It also includes an image of 
collegial work relations of mutual assistance and support rather than hierarchical, competitive or 
managerial control. Additional aspects of the ideology of professionalism and its appeal are autonomy in 
decision-making and discretion in work practices, decision-making in the public interest, and in some 
cases even self-regulation or the occupational control of work. Evetts, however, reminds the reader that 
the reality of professionalism in most service- and knowledge-based occupational contexts is very 
different from cherished images, and even medicine and law have to face some of the social structural 
and economical changes in their environment. Fiscal crises have been features of most states and such 
crises have been explained by governments as resulting from the rising costs of welfare states and 
particularly social service professionalism (Evetts 2003, 394-415; italics added). How all this applies 
particularly in journalism see Meryl Aldridge and Julia Evetts (2003, 547-564) and Tracy Russo (1998, 
72-111). 
16 See Interlude One, section 2. 
17
 Of course, the employer also is expecting her employees to succeed in doing this, yet obviously more 
often than not for thoroughly other than moral reasons.                 
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importance and I shall reconsider it frequently.  However, how all this should become 
concrete is simply that the journalist must conduct reliable, relevant and morally sound 
investigation, reflect carefully on his findings, choose or generate an interesting and 
useful point of view on the subject and material in her hands, and finally write it down in 
a clear and inspiring manner. Of course, there are always limits to how substantially one 
can use his own discretion; to the available resources which one can invest in a single 
case; or to how long to dwell on the details of one particular article.
18
 Nonetheless, the 
embedded moral vein in the craft makes continuous and inescapable demands on its 
practitioners. 
 
Moreover, since journalism, like other practices, evolves in typical organizational 
settings, there is frequently still more pressure to be expected on the integrity of the 
practitioner. She must distinguish the goals and excellences of the practice from those of 
the organization or institution, which in this study, in the context of journalism, is called 
media. Journalism, the practice, strives for the goods of its own with the help of its 
internal excellences and virtues. Media, the institution, on the other hand, leans on the 
logic of the marketplace, which dictates its own goals and promises currency mostly for 
completely different kinds of excellences.  
 
When media prospers, there is more leeway available around the newsdesks, but even 
then the logic of keeping the shareholders happy demands greater efficiency, it is a matter 
of more output with smaller resources in fewer hours. The tension is there, arguably, and 
it is coupled with the fact that the market also is prone to curb the dissemination of 
diverse opinions and viewpoints required of a well-functioning, democratic society. This 
is so on the one hand by virtue of the rapid concentration and consolidation of the media-
branch: less independent media outlets results in less diverse articles and opinions. On the 
other hand there is also the tendency in the media-houses to navigate where the market 
preferences show the way; and this tendency, contrary to the traditional market-liberal 
tenets, has, in the course of time, diminished, rather than enhanced, the diversity of the 
viewpoints on journalistic pages (Christians, Glasser, MacQuail, Nordenstreng and White 
2009; Davis 2008; Franklin 2009, 1-12; Mäntylä 2007; O'Neill 1992, 15-32; Preston 
2009, 13-20; Ward 2004). 
                                               
18
As a matter of fact, regardless of the editorial supervision, deadline is arguably the most prominent single 
factor that structures journalists' work. 
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However, as a definitionary sketch, to be defended and deepened in the following parts of 
the study, journalism is on the macro-level: 
(a) arguably a viable factor in an effectively functioning democracy, and 
(b) a practice producing and transmitting information and opinion for and with the help of 
the public while maintained by a market-driven institution called media. 
And, respectively, on the micro-level journalism comprises: 
(1) a literary and moral craft, 
(2) a solid likeness of authorship and, finally, 
(3) diverse technical skills and procedures typical of journalism but also shared by certain 
other crafts and occupations. 
 
1.2. A Virtue Ethical Point of View 
 
As a potentially both profession- and craft-type occupation, journalism has a long 
tradition in embracing internal ethical codes of its own.
19
 In this respect it carries a strong 
resemblance and connectedness to more established professions. The codes tend to be 
national or specific to certain journalistic organizations, making direct claims primarily 
on the members only. On the other hand, as with all ethical codes, their influence is wider. 
They have an impact on what is generally regarded as acceptable methods and publishing 
policies, though not so much, presumably, within the readership as within the practice and 
media. The codes are also, in spite of their national and organizational flavors, fairly 
much in tune with each other (Laitila 1995, 527-544; Mäntylä and Karilainen 2008, 8-28; 
Himelboim and Limor 2008, 235-265). They stress the values of editorial autonomy, 
craftsmanship, and benevolence towards the informants and citizens in general. They also 
place emphasis on journalism's tasks in sustaining democracy, for example on its role as a 
watchdog of the powerful. The privacy of citizens is guaranteed to various degrees 
depending on the individuals' professional or political role or status in society, and 
furthermore, the readership has to be able to distinguish news from opinion and 
                                               
19In Finland the first national code was accepted by The Union of Journalists in Finland in 1957. Since then 
the code has been revised six times (Mäntylä 2008, in Finnish). E.g. in U.S. the history of ethical codes 
dates back to 1912 when a group of editors formed a professional association around a code of ethics. 
The association was named The American Association of Newspaper Editors. Sigma Delta Chi, a 
professional journalistic fraternity and the forerunner of The Society of Professional Journalists, was 
however founded already in 1909 and its 1926 code, which also has been revised several times, became 
one of the best known at least in America. The Canadian Association of Journalists e.g. approved its 
very first own code of ethics no earlier than April 2002. 
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commercials, flaws are to be corrected at once, and opportunity to reply has to be offered. 
 
The codes and their details abound, but typically they lack comprehensiveness and 
coherence. It seems, in most cases, that fairly little thought has gone into making the code 
well ordered with a coherent theoretical, or at least well-argued, base. There tends to be 
little attempt to state what its purpose is or ”..(T)o demonstrate that the clauses are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient to achieve whatever the aims of the code are” 
(Belsey and Chadwick 1995, 469).  One example is the last version of the code of The 
Union of Journalists in Finland which states in its preamble that “..(G)ood journalistic 
practice is based on everyone’s right to be informed in (public) matters”.
20
 There is, 
however, no explication on the origin of the “right to know” or how good journalistic 
practices are to be inferred from it. And what is also conspicuous to the aims of this study, 
is the absence of explication of any excellences or virtues in the Finnish code or many of 
the other ones. Even the obvious excellences of accuracy, objectivity, and truth-telling 
have not been documented in the Finnish or many other cases. 
 
However, in spite of the general impression of the ad hoc, and a lack of consistency, the 
codes are in no way without value, as Belsey and Chadwick (1995, 468) argue. They 
provide journalists with guidance in areas that are going to be problematic in their 
practice, and the individual requirements and prohibitions of the codes are, on the whole, 
perfectly sound. In addition, as was asserted at the beginning of this section, codes have 
the advantage of making a public declaration to maintain high ethical standards and to 
serve the public interest. Yet, internal ethical codes can also be considered a tactical 
resource in defending a profession's autonomy to define its own standards and goals, and 




In the following parts of this study I endeavor to show that one plausible and practicable 
base for the ethics of journalism resides within virtue ethics. On the other hand, I do not 
try to argue to the effect that for instance deontology and consequentalist theories are not 
at all fit for the purpose. The aim of the study is more moderate, namely, to show the 
power and the distinctiveness of at least some certain virtue-based considerations. Hence, 
                                               
20 Translation from Finnish: K.H. For the most up-to-date version of the Finnish code (in Finnish), see 
http://www.journalistiliitto.fi/pelisaannot/journalistinohjeet/. I address the codes in more detail in section 
4.2.1. 
21John Kultgen uses the notion of 'The Ideological Use of Professional Codes' (Kultgen 1998, 273-290). 
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I shall argue both against virtue-extremism and particularly against virtue skepticism. 
However, before proceeding, some clarification of the way in which I use the core 
concepts in virtue ethics is probably appropriate. 
 
First, by 'virtue theory' I refer to work on the meaning and internal relations of the virtue 
concepts and on how the moral phenomena could be (best) understood and described with 
the help of them in ethical theory. The issues and problems discussed, then, are abstract 
and at least partly meta-ethical. (Normative) virtue ethics
22
, secondly, is the project of 
placing ethics on virtue evaluation. It is on this level of research that virtue ethicists try to 
show how virtue ethics is at least as comprehensive and plausible normative theory as 
deontology or consequentialism. Applied ethics in general and the ethics of professions as 
its sub-category draw for their part on resources produced by the work in normative 
ethics. Moreover, journalism ethics is a sub-category of the ethics of professions. By 
'virtue', in the singular and without definite or indefinite article, finally, I refer to the 
holistic property of having a good moral character. To have it an agent must not only have 
a number of excellent traits, but he also must have them excellently composed into a 
whole. When I, on the other hand, discuss particular traits (of character), such as honesty 
and benevolence, I use 'virtue' in a non-collective sense, which allows for 'virtue' to be 
used in the plural and with a definite or indefinite article. 
 
Character(-traits) and virtue are, arguably, the most central concepts in virtue-ethical 
considerations, and this is why I discuss them a little lengthier already in this 
Introduction. And, as stated above, virtue in this study is perceived in the way developed 
by Robert M. Adams. Put briefly, according to Adams's definition, virtue is”..(P)ersisting 
excellence in being for the good” (Adams, 2006, 14). What the definition means will be 
clarified in greater detail in sections 2.3., 2.4.2. and 2.4.3. Here, for the introductory 
purposes, it suffices to say that according to Adams virtues are dispositions to act, or have 
intentions or attitudes to act, excellently for various goods.
23
 In other words, a virtuous 
                                               
22Or ”substantive” (virtue) ethics, as Robert M. Adams (2006, 4) chooses to call it. As regards these 
distinctions in general, I fully agree with those scholars who wish to see them as in no way mutually 
exclusive or decisive. Georg Henrik von Wright maintains:”The idea of a sharp separation of normative 
ethics and meta-ethics seems to me to rest on an oversimplified and superficial view of the first and on 
an insufficient understanding of the nature of the second” (von Wright 1996, 3; orig. 1963). 
23In Adams virtue, then, resides not only in traits of character, as is frequently the case in more traditional 
virtue conceptions, but also in other persisting inner states. What actually are the goods that a virtuous 
person is excellently for, I discuss in section 2.3. 
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person is for (morally) good things and against (morally) bad things, and what is decisive 
here, is his or her being for the good and against the bad morally excellently. 
Furthermore, excellence has to be perceived as the intrinsic quality of being for the good. 
Virtue typically is also of instrumental value: beneficial to other people, perhaps, but 
when perceived as excellences, virtues and goodness have to be seen to be worth having 
for their own sake. Being excellently for good things brings about worth and goodness to 
the life of the virtuous person, and others' lives too, regardless of the instrumental value 
which the respective virtues may have. 
 
In this way the virtue conception under discussion stands clearly apart from virtue-
consequentialism or trait-consequentialism which endorses virtues only, or at least 
mainly, as good and useful vehicles for maximizing or optimizing well-being or other 
desirable ends or consequences.
24
 How this kind of virtue conception can be seen as a 
core constituent of an ethics of a profession, and how it can outweigh in a plausible way 
theories which concentrate on optimizing the consequences of virtuous character or well-
being producing actions, is a question which I have to face. This will be done in some 
detail, first in Part two and later on in a more pragmatic manner in Parts three and four. 
However, in order to anticipate my strategy, I summarize, tentatively, some of the 
plausible reasons to rely on virtue ethics in general. As can be seen, the reasons are 
multilayered or at least multifaceted, and in the course of the study they will be put to 
test, as a result of which some of them also will become left aside and some new ones 
discovered. Accordingly, I will also give newly emphasized summaries of the reasons to 
rely on virtue in journalism ethics, for example in the end of section 4.1. and in section 
4.2.1. 
 
First, virtues are traits of (professional) character or dispositions to think and act in a 
typical, excellent way. In other words, they have been internalized to be habitual, though 
under the scrutiny of practical wisdom. This is an obvious advantage in a profession 
which often requires rushed thinking and action. 
 
Second, as a supplement to the First, rule-based codes and moral theories may be 
conducive to the habits of following the letter of the rules rather than their spirit, which a 
                                               
24See section 2.1.  
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morality based on character does not easily allow and which, of course, is to be avoided 
in an occupation whose legitimacy draws on the innovativity and practical wisdom of its 
practitioners. 
 
Third, as already stated, as a democratic, public-serving craft, journalism is a practice to 
whose excellences inherently belong also many (moral) virtues.
25
 One might say, perhaps, 
that moral virtues have been irreversibly woven into the whole of the practice of 
journalism. Why and how or whether this is so, I attempt to lay out in Parts three and 
four. However, absent the virtues, journalism as a democracy-sustaining practice may 
wither away, at least in the long run. 
 
The reasons, in turn, to rely on the virtue conception of Robert M. Adams in particular, 
are also multiple. Nonetheless, the main advantage of following Adams in the ethics of 
professions is his theory's potentiality to help productively to distinguish between 
professional and moral excellence. There is much discussion on professional virtues in 
the ethics literature, short of any specification not only of whether 'virtue' is meant to 
refer to professional excellence only, or whether it also indicates how one is managing 
morally, but also of how the complex relationship between these two categories should be 
understood. Adams's theory or conception of virtue, however, shows that the necessary 
distinctions are after all not so awkward to draw, and that at the same time one can even 
maintain sight of what all excellences have in common. Adams, then, helps us to the view 
that journalism, and particularly professionally excellent journalism may be also morally 
excellent, it is virtuous. Yet, virtue is no prerequisite for random professional excellence 
in journalism. It may happen, and indeed frequently does happen, that journalists write 
fascinating and informative articles without their being virtuous. 
 
Overall I argue, however, that only the co-existence and reciprocity of the moral virtues 
and the excellences of the practice permanently bring about the central vein in the essence 
of journalism.  A good journalist has also to consider the consequences of his work, and 
there is no reason why she should not follow the Kantian maxim not to treat human 
beings as means only. Nonetheless, even rationally plausible moral principles and ethical 
                                               
25According to Alasdair MacIntyre we have to accept as necessary components of any practice with internal 
goods and standards of excellence at least the virtues of justice, courage, and honesty (MacIntyre 1981, 
178). What ”a practice” means in MacIntyre and in this study will be under discussion in Interlude One. 
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rules, or exploring which acts bring about the best consequences, cannot guarantee the 
best choices or give an unshakable foundation for moral judgment. Unfortunately, 
however, neither could the virtues, since they are intrinsically fragile and fragmentary, as 
will be discussed in 2.4.2. Nevertheless, where excellence abound, there is more hope that 
divergences from the mean do not proliferate. 
Finally, before launching a more profound treatment of virtues and ethical theories which 
build on them, let us consider the moral challenges and problems faced by journalists in 
their occupation today, when the profession is in a state of growing flux. 
 
1.3. Change and Professional Integrity 
 
In case I had to choose one single dominant characteristic of the change which journalists 
have faced, or have been made to face, in their work recently, it would be the steadily 
growing urge to react immediately and even without a journalistic cause. The obvious 
reasons for the phenomenon are the 24-hour news-cycle practice and the online services 
whose potency for pauseless dissemination of news and other contents readily transforms 
into a (commercial) necessity to revise, as it seems, ad infinitum and ex tempore.
26
 There 
are, nevertheless, a multitude of other reasons, supporting the transformation of many of 
the practices. At a very general level of analysis there is at least in western or westernized, 
post-industrial societies a strong tendency to see the running of time as identical to 
distance: it is, as a hindrance to efficiency, to be eliminated or transcended as thoroughly 
as possible. In addition, there are for example the effects of the net-based social media 
and other online services on the expectations and attitudes of citizens as well as 
purchasing customers and, in addition, there are the more direct growing pressures issuing 
out of global market forces, especially as regards the traditional newspaper industry, 
which is facing major cut-backs as a result of declining demand. (Friend and Singer 2006, 
28-53; Singer 2006, 7-13; Nygren 2008, 27-126; Bauman 2000; 2008; Castells 1996; 
O'Sullivan and Heinonen 2009, 233-247). 
 
The challenges which journalists are facing are, then, emanating out of the process of 
rapid technological, cultural, as well as economic change, but in what respects are the 
challenges new and in what way moral? It seems that at least part of the answer lies in the 
                                               
26
For a more detailed discussion on the core characteristics and their moral and ethical implications in 
online journalism, see Part five. 
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fact, that the autonomy of the journalistic practice to define its own excellences and goals 
has been called into question in a new and possibly more forceful way than ever before.  
The Internet has altered the mass communication landscape in many ways and perhaps 
most profoundly through its inherently open, participatory nature. Clear distinctions 
between professional and popular communicators, as well as between producers, 
consumers and sources of information, merge and blend.  
 
However, in the process the autonomy of the traditional professionals to define the ethical 
standards and excellences of their work has been challenged.
27
 Bloggers require greater 
transparency and often cast doubt on the reliability of the sources or on the validity of the 
agenda-setting and gate-keeping roles of traditional news outlets. And so also does, 
increasingly, the wider public communicating through various forms of social media.
28
 
The technological change, combined with the logic of market-economy and the 
expectations of the employers and shareholders, on the other hand, also challenges 
journalists' professional integrity in a very direct way.
29
 The questions arising include 
how to be accurate and how to double-check the facts when”..(T)here is no time to think” 
(Rosenberg and Feldman 2008, 1-32, 45-66; Singer, 2007, 79-95; Friend and Singer 2006, 
12-53; 115-222; Bardoel 1996, 283-302). 
 
However, it seems certain that there is considerable pressure for the journalistic practice 
                                               
27The journalists' protective measures to hold on to their autonomy, however, also receive understanding. 
Michael Mc Devitt argues that what might appear to be a defensive orientation is, in fact, quite 
understandable, given numerous threats to autonomy originating from inside and outside the 
newsrooms. He also contends that, 
      ..(A)s a conglomerate of attitudes, autonomy is reflected in resistance to publishers, revulsion 
toward “pack journalism”,  cynicism toward politicians, defensiveness toward critics in the 
academy, and rejection of public journalism. In practice, autonomy has produced subtle narrative 
techniques, such as “disdaining the news” and the use of irony, that reflect a desire to transcend 
restrictive conventions. Autonomy is thus a powerful, adaptive, and creative phenomenon within 
the profession, and its importance to practicing journalists will endure regardless of public 
journalism critiques (McDevitt 2003, 161; 155-164). 
28This can be seen as a transformation of both society and citizenship. Accordingly Mark Bovens has 
suggested that    the information society, in which we arguably now live, also calls for the recognition of 
a fourth group of citizens’ rights in addition to the traditional civil, political, and social ones, namely the 
information rights. These rights would guarantee for citizens a constitutional right to government 
information (Bovens 2002, 317-341). 
29Tony Harcup even goes as far as to assert that ”..(T)he ethics of journalism can only be understood if 
scholars take into account the conditions under which journalism is practiced and produced” (Harcup 
2002, 101; 101-114). He continues that ethics cannot be divorced from everyday economic realities such 
as understaffing, job insecurity, casualised labor, bullying, and unconstrained management prerogative. 
Harcup also sees as ethically relevant the tension between journalists’ roles as truth-seeking 
professionals, as employees or factors of production within a marketplace, and as citizens. We discuss 
this issue later on e.g. with the help of the concepts of modularity and domain-specificity of virtue 
(section 2.4.2.). 
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to be reflectively responsive to the emerging phenomena and expectations which are 
transferring rapidly the cultural and technological environment in which journalists have 
to work. Yet at the same time the logic of practices readily allow that their goals and 
excellences develop and change in accordance with both their inner dynamics and the 
pressures from outside. What is new in the situation and causing unforeseen uncertainty, 
is possibly, even obviously, first, the speed with which the techno-cultural change is 
taking place and, second, the profundity and interminability of the ongoing renegotiation 
concerning the roles, autonomy and power relations in the field of communication and its 
subfield of journalism (Bauman 2000; 2008; Franklin 2009, 1-10; Ruusunoksa and 
Kunelius 2009, 33-49; O'Sullivan and Heinonen 2009, 233-247; Arsenault and Castells 
2008, 488-513; Bourdieu 1996; McIntyre 1981, 176-177). 
 
To sum it up once more, some of the major moral challenges which journalists seem to 
face today are: 
First, the perennial one to be accurate and insightful in producing truthful and meaningful 
journalism. This is a moral issue since not only scholars and citizens but also journalists 
themselves habitually consider the production of truthful and relevant information to be 




Second, in close connection to the first is the one to adapt to the online environment and 
to an increasingly hectic profession generally, both without losing touch with the lasting 
excellences and virtues; and, on the other hand, remaining receptive to new moral claims 
which the changing communication environment is legitimately laying on practicing 
journalists. 
Third, the one to hold on to ones professional integrity, when excellences and goods 
belonging to other practices are let loose in, or introduced to, the working environment of 
journalists. By this I refer here, among other things, to contentious issues exemplified in 
notions like carnevalization, commercialization, infotainment, and tabloidization.
31
 
Fourth, the necessity to remain professionally self-critical for example by manifesting 
sensitivity to the difference between professional expediency and moral soundness. 
 
                                               
30See section 4.2. 
31All these notions refer to the arguably ongoing commercialization and trivialization of journalism. See e.g. 
Brants (1998, 315-335) and the classic work by Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public 
Discourse in the Age of Showbusiness (1984).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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To turn it all into even more concrete terms, we may consider one simple example. In a 
middle-sized Finnish daily newspaper, the editors organize a training-session on how to 
write good online journalism.
32
 The teaching begins and the main lecturer appears to 
concentrate on headlines. He underlines once and again how the visitors to the online 
news site make their decisions on whether to stay or leave, and also whether to come 
back, on grounds of the attractiveness of the headlines. And, of course, the subject matter 
of the news story in turn contributes to the attractiveness of the headline. 
 
So far all looks good. This clearly applies in the traditional print environment, too, thinks 
the audience, the journalists. But then a minority of the audience becomes uneasy. The 
lecturer merely seems to appreciate the sum total of the ”clics” the headlines can 
generate. “What about journalism?” the traditionalists start asking themselves, does all 
this have anything at all to do with it anymore? 
And indeed, does it, and under which conditions can this kind of hunting of the clicks 
manifest journalistic excellence or virtue? Or might it even be that the excellences which 
the lecturer wanted to inculcate to his audience eventually are external to the practice of 
journalism? On the other hand, can one actually define what is internal or external to 
journalism? Nonetheless, these are some of the problems we attend to and also at least 
partly answer below. 
 
However, ahead of it and in order to develop the tentative definitions further, the time has 
come to make more explicit what I mean by virtue ethics generally and virtues and 
excellences particularly. In Part two of this study I defend a distinctive virtue conception 
which is based both on the very long tradition of virtue ethical thinking and particularly 
on the recent work by Robert M. Adams (2006). I subsequently put the conception into 
use particularly in Parts three and five when exploring, on the one hand, in which ways 
and how successfully virtue-based considerations so far have been prominent in 
journalism ethics and, on the other hand, how well they could be applied in future, i.e. in 
online journalism. In Part four I widen the whole of the virtue horizon by discussing 
some examples and new points-of-view in order to show how excellence and virtue could 
have a decisive place in the ethics of journalism, and also by defending my view against 
some of the objections it might provoke. 
                                               
32
 Here I refer to Satakunnan Kansa, a Finnish paper with an estimated circulation of 52000 and with 
125000 daily readers. 
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2. VARIETIES OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
The aim of the Part two is (1) to open a general view into contemporary virtue ethics
33
 
with its deep roots in ancient thinking, (2) to defend the way I choose to apply virtues in 
my argumentation, and (3) to open the discussion on whether there is reason to regard 
virtues or normative virtue theory as valuable parts of the ethics of professions. I begin by 
discussing, briefly, the return of virtues and virtue theory to the center of serious work in 
the field of ethical theory (2.1.). Although it is somewhat contentious whether virtues ever 
were totally absent from the conceptual arsenal of the theorists, they can at least be said to 
have been pushed into a minor role in the shadow of deontological and consequentalist 
considerations for centuries, or decades, depending on the point of view favored.  
 
However, since 1970's virtue theory has gained growing recognition and can by now be 
considered even a ”third alternative” beside Kantian deontology and Utilitarian 
consequentialism.
34
 In section 2.1., I also discuss three virtue-based approaches or broad 
views in more detail to illustrate the many directions in which virtue theory is developing 
today and also to lay the background for my argumentation in the later sections and Parts 
of this study. The approaches or theories discussed are neo-Aristotelianism, broadly 
understood, the theory-building of Michael Slote (Slote 1992; 1997; 2001; 2006) and 
virtue-consequentialism by Julia Driver (Driver 2001; 1996). Later on, in section 2.3., I 
also address the work of Robert M. Adams (Adams 2006; 1999) in more detail to show 
the merits of his virtue conception. 
 
In section 2.2., I analyze whether it really is legitimate to talk about virtue ethics as a 
”third alternative”. In this context I consult mainly the celebrated article by Gary Watson 
on ”ethics of virtue” as he chooses to call the virtue tradition, and I also refer back to 
section 2.1. (Watson 1990, 449-69). One of the conclusions I draw from that discussion is 
that it is not necessary for virtue ethics to become accepted beside consequentialism and 
deontology as an equally renowned alternative in order for it to be powerfully and 
                                               
33By ”contemporary” I mean in this context the work carried out during the last fifty years, yet with a clear 
emphasis on the very last decades of that period. 
34Deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics, each with their innumerable varieties, do not of course 
comprise all ethical theory-building. However, I follow the standard procedure in the literature to 
discuss virtue ethics in comparison with deontology and consequentialism in particular. In Part three we 
nevertheless see that also e.g. contractualism has figured and still figures high in the ethics of 
journalism. 
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legitimately used in applied ethics generally, and in the ethics of journalism particularly. 
Virtue theory and virtue ethics clearly offer a distinctive and defensible viewpoint from 
which to consider moral phenomena and are in this way also able to give theoretical 
support to the application of virtues in the ethics of professions. In 2.3. I move on to more 
detailed analyses of virtue conception(s), and here I draw heavily on Robert M. Adams, as 
anticipated in the Introduction.  
 
From the work of Adams I embrace particularly the large array of psychological 
modalities within which he allows virtue and excellence to present it, and the many 
subsequent modes of action into which it potentially leads in our lives. Accordingly, I 
shall argue in 2.4., that the emerging virtue conception corresponds to some of the deepest 
intuitions we share in our moral deliberations and justifications. Broad scope, however, 
does not entail moralization or moral elitism. On the contrary, it merely shows the moral 
point of view to be our daily bread; it is something we all share and should (and 




The main task, however, in 2.4. will be to face the major challenges from outside the 
virtue tradition. I begin by briefly outlining in 2.4.1. some of the standard objections and 
counter-objections to the plausibility of virtue ethics, particularly as a resource to guide 
effectively our actions in the morally right direction. Then I go on to address what are, in 
my opinion, the two most prominent challenges to virtues and virtue theory, namely, the 
so-called situationist challenge and the view that virtue theory is not to be regarded as an 
ethical theory at all. In the issuing discussion I aim to show that even though situationism 
succeeds in supplementing and altering the way we traditionally comprehend human 
character and virtues, it nevertheless fails to show them absent or representing misguided 
theoretical or practical thinking (2.4.2.). Likewise, I gather evidence in 2.4.3. to the effect 
that virtue-based ethics indeed deeply concerns the moral dimension of human life. A 
virtuous agent strives to further the good of others, too. As a matter of fact, virtue cannot 
even be plausibly construed absent the agent being empathetic, as becomes tentatively 
obvious already in section 2.1. 
 
In Interlude One, I finally summarize my considerations on virtue theory and virtues by 
                                               
35I.e., moral deliberation is ”but” one dimension within our daily task of practical thinking. 
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giving an example of a well-argued virtue ethical approach to the ethics of professions, 
developed by Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 39-137). I lay 
out the core elements of their approach by drawing a comparison between the position I 
embrace and the one they hold. In this way I wish to lead the reader out of the theoretical 
considerations of Part two into the more concrete concerns of Part three, where I discuss 
various, both non-virtue ethical and virtue ethical approaches, to the ethics of journalism.  
 
However, where my position seems divergent from that of Oakley and Cocking is, in the 
first place, the way in which I, loyally to Adams's approach, explicate the cohabitation of 
virtues and other excellences, both of which are certainly amply needed in every 
profession and practice. In the second place, I see reasons to believe that situationism's 
challenge to virtue theory is worth more attention than Oakley and Cocking readily allow 
to it. And, finally, although I consider virtue theory's plausibility and potentiality to be 
decisive when compared to its deontological and consequentalist rivals, I nevertheless 
endorse a more pluralistic view than Oakley and Cocking see reason to explicate. There is 
a place for obligations and rules, too, in the ethical codes of professions and there are very 
good reasons to be reflective on the consequences of the deeds of the journalists. 
However, only the virtuous practitioner can be hailed as an exemplar of a good 
professional. 
 
2.1. The Past and the Present of Virtue Theory 
 
G.E.M. Anscombe's article ”Modern Moral Philosophy”, published in 1958, was the 
parting shot of the revitalization of virtue ethics (Anscombe 1958, 1-19; Adams 2006, 4-
5; Crisp 1996, 1-2; Crisp and Slote 1997, 1-5; Darwall 2003, 4, n. 2; Oakley 1996, 128; 
Oakley and Cocking 2001, 7; Statman 1997, 3). Anscombe asserts in her paper that the 
concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, as well as moral right and wrong, should be 
abandoned by modern moral philosophy, because they belong to a law-conception of 
ethics, which does not make sense without a belief in divine commands (Anscombe 1958, 
1). Anscombe then moves on to suggest that there is, after all, an alternative way to do 
ethics, namely, to follow the example of Aristotle (Anscombe 1958, 7-8); and, of course, 
the core concepts in Aristotelian ethics are (traits of) character and virtue. 
 
Since Anscombe's brisk attack on the deontological tradition in particular, the number of 
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her followers-in-spirit has grown, in the 60's and 70's hesitatingly, but later on steadily, to 
allow for a comprehensive and detailed analysis of various directions into which virtue 
theory and virtue ethics could and should be developed (e.g. Crisp 1996, Crisp and Slote 
1997, Darwall 2003, Statman 1997). One prominent feature that characterizes these 
developments so far is that Aristotle is vital and important, time and again. Hence the 
broad term neo-Aristotelianism to refer to the work of those theorists who have left 
recognizable in their writing at least considerable parts of the structure of Aristotle's 
theory.  
 
In the second place, there is by now a tendency to rather to look after similarities than 
discrepancies between the great traditions or, on the other hand, upon plausible and 
decisive grounds, to merge one theory into another (i.e. Driver 2001, Nussbaum 1999, 
O'Neill 1996).
36
  As an exemplar of the emphasis on convergence, we address below the 
work of Julia Driver, who in this study argues as a consequentalist, but with a place in her 
theory for virtue, too (Driver 1996, 111-130; 2001). In this broad vein, there are also 
eminent philosophers, like Robert Audi, who look after thoroughly pluralist views, at 
least on the level of application (Audi 2007, 3-56; 2004). And, finally, there has been a lot 
of interest to do applied virtue ethics.
37
 Since one of the standard arguments against the 
ethics of virtue has been so far that it fails to give advice on how to act in morally 
disturbing situations, the lively activity towards application, for example in the field of 
ethics of professions at least shows that a growing number of scholars simply find it 





However, the legacy handed down by Anscombe to her followers have been taken care of 
                                               
36On the other hand, in applied ethics in general and in the ethics of professions in particular it is of course 
also   common merely to take advantage of the key conceptual resources of divergent theories, without 
pursuing any kind of theoretical merger. Some of the works we concentrate on in Part three of this study 
belong under this heading. As a rather lucid example of such work outside the confines of journalism 
ethics, see e.g. Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, Muel Kaptein and (Hans) van Oosterhout (2006, 391-411). 
37In addition to and ahead of journalism ethics virtue has figured e.g. in medical, and, maybe a little 
surprisingly, in business ethics. Instructive ”mainstream” texts in business ethics are e.g. Robert C. 
Solomon (1992, 317-339; 2004, 1021-1043) and John Dobson (2008, 43-50). For a more individual 
application see e.g. Miquel Bastons (2008, 389-400). Standard virtue ethical treatments in medical 
ethics are e.g. James Drane (1988) and Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma (1993). 
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and pushed further. For decades part of this work has been labeled neo-Aristotelianism 
(NA). To my knowledge, there is no generally accepted definition for NA, for good 
reasons, perhaps, but I use it when referring to contemporary work which leans at least 
considerably on the structure of Aristotle's theory.
38
 I also take it that work both in virtue 
theory and in normative virtue ethics can be labeled as neo-Aristotelian. Nevertheless, 
some of the essential features of NA would then be (i) that an action is considered right if 
and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances 
(e.g. Hursthouse 1996, 22; Oakley 1996, 129-138). This is a claim about the primacy of 
character in the justification of right action. In place of or in addition to 'character' we 
could also have 'motives', 'intentions', or even 'inner states'. The claim reveals, in any 
case, a central feature of virtue ethics overall (VE), but does not show the difference 
between NA and some other versions of VE. Nevertheless, (i) is also central in NA. 
 
As a more characteristic feature of NA, (ii), the content of a virtuous character is 
determined by what one is or needs in order to be a flourishing human being, living an 
eudaimonistic
39
 life; this might be contrasted with, as an example of a non-neo-
Aristotelian variety of VE, Michael Slote’s  suggestion of an approach in which virtuous 
character is grounded in our commonsense views about what character-traits we typically 
find admirable or intuitively see indispensable in modern densely populated and firmly 
connected  world (Aristotle 1975, 1-20; Hursthouse 2001, 9-10; Slote 2001, vii).
40
 
Moreover, (iii), in NA, character-traits and activity issuing from them are regarded as 
together partly constitutive of eudaimonia; i.e. virtues are components of, not (mere) 
instruments to, a good human life.  
 
In this way, the good life is not a passive external consequence of acting virtuously, but 
the eudaimonist good already constitutively resides in the virtuous activity itself. Aristotle 
thought, namely, that humans flourish by living virtuous lives, because it is only in doing 
so that they exercise the humanly characteristic activity, that is, the rational capacity of 
                                               
38Aristotle of course himself drew on an existing and lively tradition of virtue-centered thinking, but on the 
ground that his Ethics still has immense status and influence I readily allow him alone to represent the 
classical approach to virtue in this study. For a more comprehensive view see e.g. Julia Annas's The 
Morality of Happiness (1993) or Sarah Broadie's Ethics with Aristotle (1991).  
39The proper English spelling would be ”eudaemonistic”, but I prefer to follow Martha C. Nussbaum (2001, 
31, note 23) in retaining to the spelling that is closer to the original Greek one. 
40
 Alongside Hippocrates G. Apostle’s 1975 English translation I have used Simo Knuuttila’s 1989 Finnish 
and Patricio de Azcárate’s 1978 Spanish translations of The Nicomachean Ethics. 
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human beings to navigate in their lives excellently (Aristotle 1975, 21-56; Annas 1993, 
47-114; Nussbaum 1986, 322-327; 290-336). (Neo)-Aristotelian virtue is, then, active and 
grounded in rationality. As is implicit in (iii), and in order to make the notion NA 
substantial in relation to Aristotle proper, it is of importance to maintain that the virtues 
do not necessarily, however, have to be seen as constitutive of eudaimonia or grounded in 
characteristically human life, but for instance grounded simply in what is good for human 
beings as individuals or as a community, i.e. what is beneficial to them. This kind of 
approach has been developed by one of the eminent neo-Aristotelians, Philippa Foot, 
whose arguments will be introduced below (Foot 1978, 1-3; 2001, 38-51; 81-98). 
 
Even as a tentative sketch on NA, the preceding items may need some supplements. First, 
it might be useful to see as a separate feature (iv), although it is implicit in (i), that in VE 
goodness is prior to rightness. That is, the notion of rightness can be defined only in 
relation to goodness. And, further, (v), that virtues are and bring about plural, intrinsic 
good(s). What this means in detail, is under discussion in 2.3. However, to put it briefly 
here, intrinsic goodness means that virtues are valuable for their own sake, rather than 
being instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable as a means to promoting some other values. 
Finally, to conclude this descriptive sketch, (vi), acting from virtue means not only giving 
the appearances of virtue, for example by way of helping ones neighbor on the motivation 
to make one look like a good neighbor. To be virtuous one has to be disposed to act both 
for certain reasons and in a certain manner. Helping out of virtue means that one wants 
to help, without hesitation and feeling sorry when in some way barred from helping 
(Aristotle 1975, 33-34; Hursthouse 2001, 11). 
 
One important question that I have neglected so far is, whether and in what way the 
features (i) to (vi) are adequate to distinguish NA (and VE) from deontological and 
consequentalist theories. Item (i) for example might quite well be compatible with the 
Kantian virtue conception and I will address the issue at some length when addressing the 
work of Julia Driver. However, before proceeding beyond the limits of virtue theory as 
defined above, I first discuss Michael Slote who has carried out extensive and 
multifarious work within the (neo-Aristotelian) virtue tradition, although by now also he 
has taken a course that seems to have led him outside the confines of virtue theory. In 
what follows, I concentrate on how he argues, first, for his rejection of NA and, second, 
on what grounds he seems to be rejecting the whole of VE, too. In that way, we can fill in 
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our picture of NA and also widen our horizons on VE generally. 
 
2.1.2. Michael Slote and Pure Sentimentalism 
 
Originally Michael Slote could have aptly been considered one of the most prominent 
neo-Aristotelians.   His major contribution at that time, From Morality to Virtue (1992), 
works clearly in a neo-Aristotelian vein, but the following years bring about a change to 
his approach that culminates in Morals from Motives (2001), in which Slote rejects NA 
and embraces a sentimentalist account of VE (Slote 1992; 1995, 83-101; 2001). In order 
to see the crucial points of Slote's criticism of NA, and to shed in this way more light on 
the essence of NA, we have first to address how he develops new distinctions with which 
to analyze virtue ethics. Slote begins by arguing that virtue theories can be separated into 
agent-focused, agent-prior, or agent-based (Slote 1995, 83-84; 2001, 3-10). Neo-
Aristotelian ethical systems are agent-focused or agent-prior, but, in contrast to them, 
sentimentalist theories are agent-based. 
 
2.1.2.1. Slote's Agent-basing 
 
According to Slote, a theory is agent-focused if there is an emphasis in it on the moral 
importance of the moral agent and her character-traits over the importance of the 
rightness or wrongness of her actions. And, as is implicit in the above discussion on the 
characteristic features of NA/VE, all virtue theories are at least agent-focused. What, 
then, makes some of them agent-prior, is that they not only emphasize the importance of 
the moral agent's character-traits over her actions, but additionally take the moral worth of 
actions be derivative from the agent's character-traits or motivations. In a more schematic 
way, when agent-prior theories see the moral worth of an agent's actions to issue most of 
all from her motivations (or character-traits or some inner states), agent-focused theories 
can frequently see moral worth reside also, even for a considerable part, in the agent's 
very actions. Slote reminds us that Aristotle characterizes the virtuous person as someone 
who sees or perceives what is good or right to do in any given situation. And this implies 
that the virtuous individual does what is virtuous because it is a virtuous – for example a 
benevolent – thing to do, rather than its being the case that what it is virtuous to do has 
this status because the virtuous person actually has chosen it; it is virtuous because of her 
virtuous motivations (Slote 2001, 5; Aristotle 1975, 108-110; Annas 1993, 89-90; 
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Finally, agent-based theories are a sub-category of agent-prior theories. A virtue ethical 
theory is agent-based in case it ”..(T)reats the moral or ethical status of actions as entirely 
derivative from independent and fundamental ethical/aretaic facts (or claims) about the 
motives, dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals” (Slote, 2001, 7). To be sure, 
Slote's typology is somewhat awkward because on first reading it seems rather to have a 
resemblance to a continuum than that to a system with mutually exclusive categories. On 
the other hand, contrariwise to agent-focused and agent-prior theories, agent-based 
theories have a definite position on that continuum: they are situated at one of the far 
ends.  
 
However, Slote further distinguishes between two possible approaches to agent-based 
ethics, which he labels ”warm” and ”cool”. Whether a theory is warm or cool depends on 
which character-traits it hails as most admirable or virtuous. Theories advocating 
excellences like strength, health, and inner harmony Slote classifies as cool. Their origins 
are to be found particularly in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In warm agent-based 
theories, on the other hand, the central and most admirable virtues are the ones needed in 
furthering altruistic behavior, like benevolence, empathy, kindness, and an attitude of 
caring. The inspiration for warm agent-basing Slote finds in the classical tradition of great 
British moralists, especially in James Martineu and also to some extent in David Hume 
and Francis Hutcheson (Hutcheson 2003, 51-62; Hume 1998). 
 
And now, equipped with these distinctions, Slote can move on to explicate his criticism of 
NA. First, he sees agent-based theories as the purest and most theoretical forms of virtue 
ethics, because in them the virtues form ground-level, fundamental criteria for evaluating 
the moral worth of actions. Yet this is not entirely fatal to the plausibility of theory-
building in Aristotelian vein, because the cool approach to agent-basing also maintains 
the connection, as stated above. However, secondly, Slote finds it implausible that notions 
such as the harmony of the soul or the agent's health or strength can promise co-existence 
                                               
41 Slote seems to find whole persons, their motivations, as well as their acts as potentially virtuous, which 
may be regarded as somewhat inconsistent or misleading. I prefer to describe one’s moral good or worth -
producing inner states as virtues, and the one having that kind of inner states as a (potentially) virtuous 
person. Acts in turn may show virtue, yet at the same time they may not be right as will be discussed in 
section 2.4.1. 
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with such virtues as kindness, benevolence, and altruism. He contends that while Aristotle 
seems aware of the value of warm virtues, a cool virtue theory like his cannot properly 
support them. And why the warm virtues are crucial in a theory of virtue, is, thirdly, 
because ”..(A)lthough Aristotle mentions the fact that we tend to praise lovers of 
humankind, his theory of morality doesn't seem to require a concern for human beings 
generally, and for any moral philosophy seeking to deal with the increasingly connected 
world we live in, this lack is very telling” (Slote 2001, vii). Steven Darwall for example 
strongly agrees with Slote and considers Aristotle's virtue ethics not a moral but a 
perfectionist theory (Darwall 2003, 1-4). 
 
The reason for Slote to reject NA and embrace a sentimentalist variant of VE is, then, the 
fact that he finds the warm or sentimentalist approaches the only plausible ways in which 
a general humanitarianism can function as a ground-level element of moral thought and 
theory-building. By  ground-level, or ”ground-floor”, he refers to agent-basing which 
does not call for eudaimonia or other, more fundamental concepts to legitimize the status 
of altruistic virtues, of which Slote takes benevolence and caring for others to be the most 
fundamental and plausible ones, at least in a densely connected world like ours. In this 
way, it is possible to see in Slote one well-argued answer to the above-stated question as 
whether VE can realistically be considered a moral theory at all, with its substantial lack 
of emphasis on virtues having to do with altruism, empathy, and connectedness. 
 
However, we return to this possibility in greater detail in 2.4.3. Meanwhile, it seems 
reasonable – before of exploring in what way Slote has recently moved still further on in 
his theory-building – to investigate how decisive are the grounds on which his rejection of 
NA actually rests. Here we can find Eric Silverman's paper instructive (Silverman 2008, 
507-518). In it Silverman works on two fronts. First, he endeavors to show that the 
Aristotelian framework is, after all, compatible with the claim that properly functioning, 
virtuous, and flourishing human beings necessarily develop and act on warm virtues, too. 
Secondly, Silverman argues that Slote is not capable of providing detailed and nuanced 
moral evaluations, because his theory loses valuable resources when constructing its basis 
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2.1.2.2. The Problems with Agent-basing 
 
In order to show that at least a neo-Aristotelian framework can be developed to be 
responsive to, or even to show the necessity for warm virtues, Silverman refers to the 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre, and especially to his Dependent Rational Animals (1999), in 
which MacIntyre, indeed, argues for and construes warm virtues as necessary for human 
well-being (MacIntyre 1999, 119-128). In addition, and to avoid question begging, 
Silverman also finds evidence other than the testimony of writers already happily working 
in the Aristotelian vein. He points to certain concepts and results, within both empirical 
psychology and popular use of English language, which would have us find the warm 
virtues necessary for personal flourishing.  
 
Psychologists have developed diagnoses such as Antisocial Personality Disorder and 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder to describe the complete failure to care for others as 
mental illness, and, obviously, people who are mentally ill are not flourishing, Silverman 
argues. In the same line, there are colloquial expressions connecting an agent's lack of 
concern for others, even for the near and dear, with her being short of flourishing. In such 
cases the agent can be described as immature, callous, or shallow. When Silverman 
estimates his own arguments he admits that the accuracy of his claims might be 
challenged, but that ”..(I)t is indisputable that within ethics, psychology and the English 
language there are conceptions of well-being requiring an agent to possess the warm 
virtues to flourish that are widely seen as conceptually plausible” (Silverman 2008, 511). 
 
As a further reason for embracing NA, Silverman sees its ability to accommodate a 
broader range of virtues than does Slote's sentimentalist theory. Slote's theory reduces all 
of morality to some warm virtues or motivations, which makes it unable to evaluate other 
morally relevant character traits. In addition, warm agent-basing seems to lose grip of the 
details and nuances of morally relevant situations and their evaluations. I may, for 
example, have good motives to help my neighbor, but absolutely fail to accomplish 
anything useful at all. Now, according to Slote's warm agent-basing my failing does not 
amount to diminishing the worth of my benevolent motives, in spite of the clumsiness and 
sheer harmfulness of my deeds. I am to be admired because my motives were genuinely 
good and sincere. 
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However, Silverman contends that there is much more detail to attend to in case we 
consider the situation in a neo-Aristotelian framework. I may be benevolent, but short of 
practical wisdom, which is in NA frequently regarded as a major virtue. Therefore, my 
good motivation may render me virtuous but not fully virtuous. In sum, agents who lack 
practical wisdom and strength of will perhaps, to carry out good motivations effectively, 
lack excellences with significant moral relevance and ramifications.  
 
Slote, on his part, as may easily be expected, has been aware of this kind of criticism as 
predictable. He makes clear that he understands that there may seem to be something 
awfully wrong in an ethical theory which does not seem  to render morally relevant what 
one actually does, if only one's motives are admirable. Part of Slote's defense is grounded 
in his believing that someone who has genuine concern for the well-being of his neighbor 
does make every effort to find relevant and effective ways to help her, and in that way 
heedless deeds or inactivity are not to be expected. Slote says that he does not utter an 
empirical claim here, but that it is a criterion, a constitutive element of genuine concern, 
to do one's best to help, and if one does her best, she cannot be criticized for acting 
immorally, however badly things eventually turn out (Slote, 2001, 34). For now, I leave 
the dilemma but return to it in 2.4.1. where I will address the standard objections which 
VE usually has to face, particularly from the deontological and consequentalist camps. 
 
Whether or not Slote has been able to convince his neo-Aristotelian colleagues and other 
readers, he certainly has not given up his project. On the contrary, he has continued to 
embrace and develop agent-basing with the result that the theory is beginning to take a 
firm shape of an ethics of care. At the time of finishing the Morals from Motives (Slote 
2001, esp. 63-140) Slote still thought that he had two available alternatives with agent-
basing:  first, as an approach with impartialistic morality as universal benevolence and, 
second, as a partialistic ethic of caring. At the beginning of the millennium Slote 
considered impartialistic benevolence more potential and plausible, but a period of 
intensive research on some principal findings of the psychology literature on empathy and 
moral development made him believe that there is a way to (re)construct an ethics of 
caring as a total approach to ethics and political morality. 
 
Throughout The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007) Slote argues that distinctions of 
empathy seem to mark or correspond to plausible moral distinctions. By that he broadly 
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means, for example, that what we find morally worse also tends to go more against the 
flow of fully developed human empathy (Slote 2007, 8, 10-20).  In other words, it seems 
that Slote seeks forcefully to defend the position that an adequate philosophical account 
in the area of ethics also has to respond to the best work done within the discipline of 
psychology and other research, and also reacts according to this position.
42
 Whether his 
kind of ethics of care can be seen as a subcategory of ethics of virtue seems unlikely, yet 
Slote leaves the issue somewhat open in his discussion (Slote 2007). However, the issue 
can be considered highly controversial in general and there also seems to be no need to 
try to settle it within the context of this study (Okin 1996, 211-230; Halwani 2003, 161-
192; Sander-Staudt 2006, 21-39). Rather, I now turn to address Julia Driver's virtue 
conception, which clearly positions us outside the confines of both NA and VE as defined 
above (Driver 1996, 111-130; 2001). 
 
2.1.3. Julia Driver and Virtue as an Instrument 
 
Julia Driver’s argument is relevant in the context of this work for many reasons. First, it is 
time for us to start to delineate the challenges aimed by consequentialism and deontology 
at VE. Second, Driver is able to issue a comprehensive and well-argued challenge to NA 
from outside the whole of VE, yet without depriving virtues of their substantial 
importance. And, finally, Driver endeavors to attack particularly the intellectualism of 
Aristotelian systems, which gives us an opportunity to discuss practical wisdom, a central 
feature in NA, which we have so far neglected. 
 
Driver argues that in the neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue the moral excellence is 
located much too decisively in cognitive excellence. She maintains that Aristotle held that 
a central feature of virtue is correct perception. Moreover, correct perception means here 
that the virtuous agent is one who correctly sees or perceives which are the morally 
relevant features of a situation and, in addition, what, then, is the virtuous thing to do 
(Driver 2001, viii-ix; Aristotle 1975, 108-110; Annas 1993, 89-90; Broadie 1991, 179-
265; Nussbaum 1986, 303-306; Sherman 1989, 28-29; 28-44). Moreover, Driver goes on 
to argue that NA implicitly involves the idea that it is foolish to rely on rules, because it is 
always an enormously complex task to see how one should act and it is, accordingly, 
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This seems to be a view he shares with Robert M. Adams, whose virtue conception is a foundational 
element of my argumentation in this study. See sections 2.3. and 2.4. 
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It seems that here Driver also launches an indirect challenge to what I argue in the 
Introduction, namely, that it is indispensible or unavoidable to rely on an ethics of virtue 
in a profession like journalism in which rapidly changing situations and their details and, 
accordingly, the need for rushed thinking abounds. However, Driver goes on to suggest 
that we should totally abandon the highly intellectualist (neo)-Aristotelian view of virtue 
and instead adopt a consequentalist approach in which virtue is simply a character trait 
that systematically produces good consequences. Driver favors consequentialism at least 
partly because she finds some ”virtues of ignorance” to be counterexamples to accounts 
of virtue which hold that moral virtue must involve practical wisdom. 
 
Driver's approach in her Uneasy Virtue (2001) is, thus, in one way more radical but in 
another more conventional than Slote's. When Slote radicalizes virtue ethics internally by 
relying entirely on one or two foundational virtues in locating moral worth, Driver makes 
an exit from the main scene altogether. At the same time, both are highly suspicious of 
NA's intellectualism and its conception of practical wisdom. Slote has to move it from its 
central Aristotelian place to make certain that the ethical status of actions is always 
entirely derivative from fundamental aretaic facts or claims about the motives or 
dispositions of moral agents.  
 
Driver, on her part, finds evidence to the effect that there are virtues whose sheer 
existence depends on ignorance, rather than on rationality or intelligence as is normally 
maintained in relation to phronesis, i.e. to practical wisdom. And this gives her reason to 
suggest our retreating to consequentialism. Driver's interpretation of Aristotle's account of 
phronesis, indeed, is fairly well in tune with standard ones. Phronesis can, according to 
Driver, and many other theorists, be roughly characterized as practical good sense. It 
requires of the agent that he deliberates well, both in the sense that the end of the 
deliberation is good and the reasoning involved is fluent and is backed by virtues. The 
agent must be able to consider the relevant facts, weigh them, detect alternatives, and 
                                               
43Accordingly one primarily considers vocational ethics codes public relations, ideology or a way to inform 
the public on the ideals of a vocation or a profession. I already touched on the issue in Introduction and 
address it in greater detail in section 4.2. 
                                                                             37 
finally find the right decision (or at least one of them). Hence, a virtuous action is one 
performed knowingly and voluntarily, that is, it manifests a choice. (Driver 2001, 1-15, 
see also e.g. Aristotle 1975; 101-115; Sherman 1989, 4-7; 28-43; Broadie 1991, 179-265; 
Annas 1993, 87-95; McDowell 1979, 331-350). 
 
Driver takes modesty to be her paradigm virtue of ignorance. She considers three 
accounts of modesty and comes to favor the one which takes modesty to be 
underestimation. The modest person unknowingly underestimates her self-worth to some 
limited degree. She has to do it unknowingly, because otherwise she would not be modest 
but only be trying to give a modest appearance. And if she would underestimate her self-
worth dramatically, she would not be modest either but exhibit the vice of self-
deprecation (Driver 2001, 16-19). However, Driver's analysis aims to make clear that in 
order to be modest one has to think herself less deserving than she actually is, and in this 
way the virtue of modesty seems to rest upon an epistemic defect.
44
 It is ignorance, then, 
that makes modesty possible, not practical wisdom. Now, in defense of VE, it is not 
sufficient to simply argue that modesty is not a virtue after all. It is, and what is more, 
Driver has some other, though arguably not quite as valid examples of virtues of 
ignorance as is modesty. Still, I do not see that modesty as a virtue of ignorance gives a 
reason to reject VE, or even NA. 
 
One point is that the epistemic defect in modesty concerns only the modest person 
herself. It is only self-worth or self-image that is (to a minor degree) defective in her 
reasoning. It does not seem of necessity to impair her ability to be practically wise in 
other contexts. As a matter of fact, it even seems essential in exhibiting modesty that one 
is cognitively able and virtuous in general or at least in some respects. In case Driver is 
right, one cannot be modest, if there is nothing one can underestimate in oneself. This 
seems to be precisely the reason why modesty is/has been widely considered a virtue: the 
modest person gives anything and anybody else their due, maybe even according to the 
Aristotelian mean, except herself. Modesty seems to underline the sincerity of all those 
evaluations and actions of hers which do not concern herself since there obviously is no 
(cannot be any?) reason for the modest person to discredit others (i.e., at least as the 
                                               
44 One might of course argue that Driver errs in her analysis. Being modest might simply amount to not 
wanting to make a big fuss of oneself, even when people would expect it. In such a case one also might 
regard herself as modest and be right about it. Hence, modesty would not rest on self-underestimation. 
Nevertheless, in the following I opt for a strategy to try to beat Driver on her home-court. 
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modest one). Modesty enhances trust. It gives a signal to the effect that this (modest) ego 
certainly is not on the verge of self-indulgence and self-absorption. Modesty may be 
considered to exhibit a kind of supererogation in avoiding self-indulgence, a legitimate or 
even hoped-for tolerance in following the principle of the mean. 
 
The argument above does not refute Driver's argumentation. There really seem to be 
virtues of ignorance and they challenge to some degree the logic of practical wisdom and 
the force of the principle of the mean, as Aristotle laid them out. On the other hand, 
practical wisdom always comes in degrees and is frail and domain-specific as all virtue, 
as will be discussed in sections 2.3. and 2.4.2.2.  Perhaps being modest simply means that 
one carries a permanent or long-standing defectiveness in estimating her self-worth. 
According to the virtue conception I shall shortly start examining, phenomena like this 
are to be expected. Virtue is incomprehensive and inconsonant, yet real. At any rate, I 
have already addressed one strategy to avoid the implications of Driver's challenge to VE 
without rejecting it altogether, namely, the strategy of Michael Slote. It seems, 





However, what Driver's discussion amounts to in the end is, that she defines virtue as 
”..(A) character-trait that produces more good (in the actual world) than not 
systematically” (Driver, 2001, 82). Being systematic is vital for Driver, because it is her 
solution to moral luck.
46
 One is virtuous even though she fails to produce good in certain 
particular situations, perhaps due to bad luck, in case her actions are good-producing 
when considered in the long run. Driver favors objective consequentialism, too, which 
she takes to be a form of  ”evaluational externalism”. Evaluational externalism is the view 
that the moral quality or worth of actions or character of a person is determined by factors 
external to agency, such as actual consequences. A paradigmatic case of evaluational 
internalism, contrariwise, would be the agent-basing of Michael Slote, in which the moral 
                                               
45Of course, Driver is unable to accept Slote's internalism, either. And she has doubts whether in the end 
Slote can do without external indicators while determining which motivations are acceptable or 
admirable (Driver 2001, 59). 
46Luck and tragedy is included in the major issues in modern ethical theory, too. Within the confines of this 
study I, however, found it reasonable not to give any separate treatment to them. One classical and 
renowned contribution on luck is Bernard Williams' Moral Luck (1981). See also Nafsika Athanassoulis 
(2005, 265-276), who discusses moral luck as regards the theory building of Michael Slote, and Martha 
C. Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness (1986), which sheds light on how the ancients deliberated on 
moral luck and human tragedy. 
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quality of one's actions and character are determined by factors internal to agency, i.e. by 
her motives. Driver on her part takes Kant to be a good candidate for an evaluational 
internalist because Kant puts so much emphasis on will (Driver 2001, 68-69). In Kant's 
view the action has moral worth if and only if the agent consciously willed in accordance 
with the Categorical Imperative. In this way the will's goodness is intrinsic, to which 
notion and also to Kant and deontology we return in 2.3.  
 
Driver, finally, also lays stress on the objectivity of the kind of consequentialism she 
wants to embrace. This she does in order to avoid the problems generated by more 
subjective views of consequentialism. One of these is the problem of the apparently self-
defeating quality of Utilitarianism. The theory urges one to pursue the greatest overall 
amount of happiness, yet in pursuing it one seems to destroy goods that are intrinsic to 
happiness. A devotedly Utilitarian journalist might for example feel forced to tell lies and 
deceive in order to acquire and disclose information that is useful for her readership. And 
since vice is counter-productive of happiness, at least in virtue ethical terms, the journalist 




Nevertheless, I have argued that, first, there are many interesting developments going on 
in the field of virtue ethics and, secondly, that at the same time virtue theory does indeed 
not comprise a coherent and clearly demarcated, uncontroversial domain of scholarship. 
Yet, what are Julia Driver and Michael Slote rejecting, when they reject NA, and at least 
Driver also VE, as defined above? What are, fundamentally, the core elements or the 
decisive distinctions within NA and VE. This is the question we attempt to probe further 
by discussing in greater detail the structure of virtue theory in the following section. 
 
2.2. The Primacy of Character and Virtues 
 
At the time when the revival of virtue ethics had gathered some impetus, deliberations on 
the possible shortcomings of virtue theory and virtue ethics also became commonplace. In 
this vein Robert B. Louden launched a critique on virtue ethics as it was as a normative 
theory at the beginning of 1980's (Louden 1984, 227-236). Louden tracked down the most 
substantive problems in VE to be its poor ability to give guidance to action and the 
                                               
47 The issue will be developed in a more detailed manner in section 2.3. 
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epistemological problem concerning the question of who is virtuous. ”(V)irtue theory is 
not a problem-oriented or quandary approach to ethics: it speaks of rules and principles 
only in a derivative manner”, Louden summarizes his structural analyses and then goes on 
to describe how he sees it as unintelligent to ”..(S)ay things like: the virtuous person (who 
acts for the sake of the noble) is also one who recognizes that all mentally deficient eight-
month-old fetuses should (or should not) be aborted..”(Louden 1984, 232). 
 
The want of intelligence, says Louden, stems precisely from the derivative kind of oughts 
in VE. The oughts of VE seem to be frequently all too vague and unhelpful for agents 
who have not (yet) acquired the requisite moral perception and sensitivity. VE, therefore, 
cannot be expected to be ”..(O)f great use in applied ethics and casuistry”, Louden 
contends (Louden 1984, 232). Moreover, when discussing the epistemological problem 
concerning VE's ability to explicate who in fact is virtuous, Louden finds himself pouring 
skepticism over the very core of VE. While vagueness in action-guidance merely 
undermines VE's usefulness in applied ethics, indeterminateness in its ability to sort out 
who is virtuous threatens to call into question even the very existence or at least the 
theoretical independence of VE. We address these lines of thought in more detail in 
section 2.4.1. below. 
 
However, criticism accumulated during the 80's until it finally was answered in equally 
systematic ways. One of the major theorists who worked for years in this vein is Rosalind 
Hursthouse (Hursthouse 1991, 223-246; 1996, 19-36; 2001). She has concentrated 
extensively on those problems which Louden discusses. According to Hursthouse a good 
normative theory must in part be determined by premises about what is worthwhile and 
important in life, truly good and so on. She asks whether we want to seek advice from 
persons who say that they do not know anything about such matters, or who claim that 
although they had opinions about them, these were likely to be wrong but that this does 
not matter since they would not play a central role in the advice they gave (Hursthouse 
1991, 231). 
 
In this way Hursthouse seeks to show that the very premises of deontological and 
consequentialist theories (also) have difficulties in fulfilling the conditions of adequacy as 
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normative, action-guiding theories.
48
 And, as if she were reacting to Louden's exact 
argumentation (without making it explicit) she also endeavors to apply her approach to 
the ethical complexities of abortion. Hursthouse begins by noting that abortion is 
commonly discussed either as a question of the status of the fetus, whether or not it is the 
sort of thing that may or may not be justifiably killed, or in relation to women's rights. 
And in case this framework determines all there is to say on abortion, Hursthouse 
continues, no wonder, virtue theory does not seem to have much to contribute.  
 
On the other hand, if one puts all questions about the justice or injustice of laws to one 
side and supposes only that women have a moral right to do as they choose with their 
own bodies nothing follows from this supposition about the morality of abortion, 
according to virtue ethics. That is, one can be cruel or callous when exercising a moral 
right. So, Hursthouse concludes, whether women have a moral right to abortion is 
irrelevant within virtue ethics
49
, for it bears no relevancy to the question whether one is 
acting virtuously or viciously or neither when terminating her pregnancy. In this way 
Hursthouse endeavors to show that virtue theory not only has its say in applied ethics but 
can even contribute to a deeper understanding of old ethical problems (Hursthouse 1991, 
231-246). 
 
In considering the epistemology of virtues and of virtuous persons Hursthouse adopts the 
same strategy as above. She first discusses the epistemological difficulties which both 
deontology and consequentialism have with their major premises. She then points out that 
the structure of specification of right action in all of the major theories, with their 
respective weaknesses, is very much alike. Many versions of deontology, for example, 
can be laid down with first providing a specification of right action – saying that action is 
right if and only if it is in accordance with a correct moral rule or principle – and then 
moving on to specify further what are the correct rules. 
In the same vein virtue ethics first specifies an action as right if and only if it is what a 
virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. It then goes on to specify 
a virtuous agent as one who has and exercises the virtues and, finally, to specify virtues as 
certain character traits or motives or inner states. Hursthouse also maintains that, contrary 
                                               
48 Hursthouse refers to the fact that also rules and comparison of consequences may fail to give any clear-
cut advice in particular, morally problematic situations.  
49
 Note that this is Hursthouse’s view. It makes good sense to argue that, in addition to virtues, one also 
needs rights to do justice to all of our ethical intuitions e.g. as regards abortion. See section 2.4.1. 
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to what Louden and many others argue, it is simply false that incompletely virtuous 
agents would not have any knowledge at all of who are virtuous and how they opt to 
choose. One practically cannot avoid being exposed to situations in which virtue is 
displayed, discussed and taught. People are frequently considered benevolent, courageous 
or unjust in common daily parlance without it being necessary to clarify what the words 
mean or whether the meaning has a moral dimension, too (Hursthouse 1996, 19-25). 
 
2.2.1. Gary Watson’s Ethics of Virtue 
 
Hursthouse favors NA and does not address the explicit problems that for example agent-
based virtue ethics face in action-guidance (e.g. van Zyl 2009b, 50-69). I also do not 
discuss them until in 2.4.1., but instead I now wish to turn to Gary Watson's celebrated 
article in order to explore further and on a more general and abstract level, the identity 
and originality of virtue ethics, and the problems Louden and Hursthouse discuss above 
(Watson 2003, 229-250). 
 
Watson starts by first making clear that the way in which an ethics of virtue concerns him 
is as a set of abstract theses about how certain concepts are best fitted together for the 
purposes of understanding morality. In our terminology, then, Watson is concentrating on 
virtue theory, i.e., an ethics of virtue is not in his consideration a moral outlook or ideal 
but a claim that the concept of virtue is in some way theoretically dominant. Moreover, 
according to Watson, in an ethics of virtue, how it is right or proper to conduct oneself is 
explained in terms of how it is best for a human being to be. This Watson calls the claim 
of explanatory primacy or explanatory priority (Watson 2003, 231-232).  
 
The claim can also be formulated as saying that action appraisal is derivative from the 
appraisal of character. However, Watson goes on to argue that to be interesting, or even 
meaningful, the priority claim has to be included in a theory of an ethics of virtue, which 
consists, in addition to some version of the claim of explanatory primacy, of a theory of 
virtue. And what is crucial to the distinctiveness of virtue theory, according to Watson, is 
how well particularly the theory of virtue, succeeds in maintaining the distinctive identity 
of the approach. I agree with Watson and discuss in detail one plausible conception of 
virtue in 2.3.; as was argued in Introduction, the problems with the theory of virtue are in 
the focus of this study. 
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Watson moves on to explore different variations of theories of virtue. He first considers 
the possibility that virtue simply is a human trait the possession of which tends to 
promote human happiness more than the possession of (most) alternative traits. However, 
this does not clearly work, because in this way one cannot find an ethics of a third kind. 
To see this, we only have to recall the discussion on the virtue consequentialism of Julia 
Driver above. The virtues have a substantial part in her theory, yet hers is a theory of an 
ethics of outcome, as Watson calls them. All theories of ethics of outcome share the view 
that the ultimate standard of appraisal is outcome, it is, the consequences of actions or 
character-traits or some other outcome. In these terms the major problem is to find out 
how to avoid classifying also Aristotle proper and NA as species of ethics of outcome, 
since the ultimate standard of appraisal on Aristotelianism seems to be flourishing, the 
idea of living properly as a human being, from which the value of virtue is then derived.  
 
Watson sees that there are two possible ways out of the impending cul-de-sac. He first 
states that the originality or independence of an ethics of virtue must depend on the 
special character of its theory of good. He then goes on to analyze two proposed accounts 
of this speciality. On the first explanation, what distinguishes Aristotelianism from, for 
example, character Utilitarianism is its conception of virtues as constitutive of, not merely 
instrumental to flourishing. Watson finds this difference conspicuous, and we can find it 
familiar, too, due to the above discussion on NA. Yet while moving on Watson finds the 
difference deeper still. According to Watson, it is not only that an ethics of virtue employs 
a different theory of what is ultimately good from, say, that of character Utilitarianism; 
”..(I)t is that an ethics of virtue does not have that kind of theory at all” ( Watson 2003, 
237). 
 
2.2.2. The Third Alternative 
 
Watson's conclusion is that only the second account identifies a distinctive, third kind of 
moral theory. This is so because on the first reading an ethics of virtue is, nevertheless, a 
species of ethics of outcome while the second account contrasts importantly with both 
ethics of outcome and ethics of requirement (deontological theories). Moreover, on the 
second reading, there need be no appeal to the idea of a valuable state of affairs or 
outcome from which the moral significance of everything else derives. There is now no 
foundational role for the idea that living a characteristically human life is intrinsically 
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good. Watson nevertheless allows that it may follow from the theory that the virtuous 
agent will desire to live such a life, but that would be because such a desire is part of 
human excellence, it is a life in accordance with the virtues, rather than the other way 
around. One implication of this, in turn, is that the theory of ultimate good is dependant 
on the theory of virtue. In this way the theory of virtue also qualifies what kind of goals 
and ends one can cherish as parts of her life-scheme. 
 
Which character-traits, then, finally, could actually count as virtues, can at least in part be 
identified by their contribution to a characteristically human life. This can be so, because 
none of these judgments have to be mediated by any notion of the (independent or 
intrinsic) value of an agent's living a characteristically human life. The fact that virtues 
are identified as virtues by their ”heuristically instrumental” properties does not make 
them of instrumental value proper. To illustrate the developments so far, Watson sees it as 
appropriate here to take to the standard procedure of comparing a theory of human 
excellence with a nonhuman animal. The judgment that lack of speed is an imperfection 
in a lion is based on a notion of a good specimen of lion. This idea in turn depends on 
what is characteristic or average of lions. On an ethics of virtue, the same seems to apply 
to people, Watson argues. The specific excellences will be different, of course, and, as 
will be defended in section 2.3., there are grounds, although not very straightforward and 
conclusive ones, for a distinction between virtues and other human excellences (Watson 
2003, 240). In fact in section 2.3. I shall discuss how the virtue conception developed by 
Robert M. Adams (2006, 3-64) is able to give credence to the possibility of occasionally 
bridging the gap between moral and non-moral excellence. I also discuss in more detail 
the comparison itself when addressing the concept of natural normativity by Philippa Foot 
in 2.4.3. (Foot, 2001, 25-51). 
 
But did Watson, in the end, find a theory of third kind? It seems that he himself does not 
know. He thinks that ethics of virtue indeed contrasts importantly with both ethics of 
outcome and ethics of requirement, but that there are problems which must be faced 
before the prospects for an ethics of virtue can be determined. The problems which 
Watson find unsolved center around the question of human nature in virtue ethics, and 
that is why we readdress them in 2.4.3. Watson thinks, inter alia, that at best an 
objectively well-founded theory of human nature would support evaluations of the kind 
that we made about lions above, that this one is a good or bad specimen or that this 
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behavior is abnormal. According to him these judgments might justifiably be seen as part 
of a theory of health, not of ethics. ..”Such evaluational essentialism does not sit well with 
modern notions. Just as God is dead, it will be said, so the concept of human nature has 
ceased to be normative” (Watson 2003, 244).  
 
However, Watson believes that the distinctive features of virtue theory may reveal 
theoretical possibilities that help fashion something new and that is why it is important to 
clarify further its core characteristics. By taking seriously Watson's conclusions on where 
the decisive work has to be done, this study purports to concentrate upon the conception 
of virtue in particular. In other words, whether Watson is right in arguing that an ethics of 
virtue does or should not have a particular theory of ultimate good, in order to exemplify 
a third alternative, I leave open. Instead, I consider his argumentation on virtues decisive: 
in case one has no plausible and detailed conception or theory of virtue at one’s disposal, 
virtue ethics is inadequate and its potential for action guidance remains limited. 
 
2.2.3. Justin Oakley and the Characteristics of the Third Alternative 
 
However, one theorist who volunteers for the task almost immediately is Justin Oakley 
(Oakley 1996, 128-152; Oakley and Cocking 2001, 9-25). I address Oakley here because, 
first, he is able to contribute to my tentative definition of NA above and, second, because 
below in Interlude One I open to question some parts of the virtue-based conception of 
the ethics of professions which he embraces together with Dean Cocking (2001). Oakley's 
strategy is not so much to outline the exact structure of virtue theory (in the manner of 
Watson) as to find and list those characteristics of VE which help to distinguish the theory 
particularly from its deontological and consequentialist rivals. He thinks that the focus in 
outlining the characteristics of virtue ethics has all too often been on what the theory is 
not like (and what the other theories are like). This is why he endeavors to say what virtue 
theory and virtue ethics is for, rather than what it is against (Oakley 1996, 129). 
 
What, then, does he have to add to what we have already established when discussing 
NA? To repeat briefly, I outlined NA as arguing that an action is right if and only if it is 
what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances and that the 
content of a virtuous character is determined by what one is or needs in order to be a 
flourishing human being, living a eudaimonist life. Moreover, in NA character-traits and 
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activity issuing from them are regarded as together partly constitutive of eudaimonia, i.e., 
the virtues are components of, not instruments to, a good human life. Furthermore, it was 
argued that in VE, goodness is prior to rightness, that is, the notion of rightness can be 
defined only in relation to goodness, and finally, that virtues are plural, intrinsic goods. 
Now, all these are necessary, but not sufficient constituents of VE, says Oakley. In order 
to make the distinction between virtue ethics and its rivals clearer, and the distinctiveness 
of virtue ethics still more plausible, three further features have to be added to the previous 
ones. The first of them is the suggestion that virtues are objectively good, the second that 
some intrinsic goods are agent-relative and the third, finally, that acting rightly does not 
require that we maximize the good (Oakley 1996, 141-144). 
 
To be sure, all of these three new characterizations can be readily identified as being also 
distinctive features of NA, and there are, no doubt, still more which so far go 
unmentioned. But what is more essential to notice and discuss in the context of this study 
is that both Watson and Oakley are able, within their respective levels of analysis, to 
make it thoroughly meaningful and plausible to regard  virtue theory and VE as a 
distinctive way to consider moral phenomena. They are able to portray an independent 
viewpoint on morality and ethics, which marks the boundaries and core characteristics of 
moral relevancy in a new way.  There is, of course, the classical tradition on which they 
can build, but theirs is a treatment that also takes into consideration the later 
achievements in ethical theory-building. Hence, if there are reasons to decide not to do 
virtue-based applied ethics, they indeed have to do with the application, as Louden 
endeavored to show above, rather than with the absence of general theoretical background 
for application. 
 
Accordingly, in what follows, I turn particularly to questions on applicability and try to 
show that by concentrating carefully on the potentiality and ontology of virtue we can 
find it both theoretically plausible and practically useful. In section 2.4. and in Interlude 
One I try to maintain that VE can be successfully defended against many parts of the 
standard critique and that its sensitivity to contextual detail and resources for intricate 
analysis of everyday life make it commendable in the ethics of professions, although it 
may remain controversial whether virtue theory can equal the clarity and coherence of its 
rivals. My position is that the plausibility of normative VE can be shown, although there 
may be problems with virtue theory. I say “may be”, since as discussed above, there are 
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good reasons to hold virtue theory a distinctive and promising alternative for the analysis 
of moral phenomena, yet controversy as regards its autonomy and decisiveness remains 
unsettled. To quote one renowned virtue theorist,”..(P)erhaps the most persuasive 
argument in favor of studying the virtues is simply that they are the stuff of which much 
of the moralities of everyday life are made. If we are to give moral experience precedence 
over moral theorizing, we must study the rich and subtle phenomena of moral character” 
(Velazco y Trianosky 1997, 53). 
 
To sum up the core elements revealed in section 2.2., to be further developed below, let us 
ponder once more in brief those characteristics upon which the distinctiveness and 
strength of virtue ethics can be seen to draw. To begin with, there is the assertion in 
accordance with Hursthouse, that a good
50
 normative theory must in part be determined 
by premises about what is worthwhile, truly good, and important in life. This ”must” of 
course first of all exhibits our willingness to see worthwhileness and goodness as 
somehow more comprehensive or substantial than rightness. We may ask, as Hursthouse 
does, what is the point in following recommendations or rules that do not (explicitly, 
comprehensively) rely on what is good and important? When we have rules in the 
contexts of expediency or subordination, they readily render their reasons, but it seems 
that a rule also has to have its reasons when it is a moral one. Normativity has to be based 
on value(s). 
Virtue ethics, however, is not the only one of the main theories to embrace goodness over 
                                               
50Good of course is a notoriously complex attribute. In his classic treatment on the varieties of goodness 
von Wright (1996) takes the position that moral goodness is but a secondary form of goodness, having 
as its primary category the variety of goodness that has to do with beneficial intentions and actions. 
What may be the relation of a sub-form (category) to the main form of a certain variety of goodness or 
the relation of a form of goodness to its very form, or whatever ”form” in this context may mean, 
remains explicitly unanswered in von Wright's treatment. However, what is   clear are his concluding 
words of his Introduction:”I shall prefer not to talk of it (moral goodness) as a special form of goodness 
at all” (von Wright 1996, 13-18, orig. 1963; parenthesis added). When von Wright in the same context 
refers to philosophers who consider moral goodness to be indefinable, but sui generis an irreducible 
form of the good, he might well be referring e.g. to Iris Murdoch who was at the time of von Wright's 
writing his book lecturing on ”The Idea of Perfection”. This lecture became later included in her The 
Sovereignty of Good (2001, orig. 1970), which advocates a very different approach to goodness and 
good than does von Wright except what concerns the immense difficulties in defining goodness. 
Murdoch asserts that ”..(T)he scene (the human condition and excellence as part of it) remains disparate 
and complex beyond the hopes of any system, yet at the same time the concept Good stretches through 
the whole of it and gives it the only kind of shadowy unachieved unity which it can possess. The area of 
morals, and ergo of moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-and-corner matter of debts and 
promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the 
world” (Murdoch 2001, 94-95; parenthesis added). Dame Iris Murdoch of course was a highly skillful 
novelist, too, yet I find many traces of her thinking in the work of Robert M. Adams (1999; 2006), on 
whose virtue conception I heavily draw in this study. 
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rightness. Why not take consequentialism, which purports to maximize the good? The 
reason is because too much depends on what goes into the goods of the respective 
consequentialisms, and too much goodness becomes frequently lost. Potential goodness 
resides in motivations, attitudes, initiatives, persistent ways of reacting, traits of character, 
not only in actions and their consequences, which either advance or fail to advance goods 
that are worth advancing.  Now, an alternative can be suggested also by Kantians in the 
traditional form of separating ”moral” to the world of obligations, rules and duties and 
giving to the rest of morally relevant considerations the title of ”other deeply ethical 
aspects of human life”. But why do this? Why not instead take virtues wholeheartedly and 
with them a much more nuanced and broad as well as down-to-earth view of moral 
phenomena, without losing the rules or the most ground-floor obligations. Virtue ethics in 
no way excludes critical use of rules. On the contrary, a wise educator, a prominent figure 
in virtue ethical tradition, fully understands the practical worth of rules as a helpful 
device. And, moreover, Mark LeBar (2009, 642-671) below endeavors to show, that 
virtue ethics can also allow for the existence of some basic obligations (and duties). 
 
In case the argument above can be accepted to show virtues’ potentiality, we can move on 
from where Watson left us, namely, from the virtues as the ground-floor foundation of 
virtue ethics. At least the old-fashioned essentialism can indeed go, and we can instead 
partly rely on our intuitions and interpretation about the human condition, when we 
decide what moral goodness comprises and what counts as virtues and why. The next 
sections concentrate on showing what this means in detail and how it can be brought 
nearer the everyday (professional) life. 
 
2.3. Virtue and Human Excellence in the Work of Robert M. Adams 
 
A valid and firmly established point of departure for studying and analyzing virtue, I 
think, is to regard it as (a) trait(s) of character. The ancients did so, as do most of the 
present theorists. Even the most serious attack on the plausibility of virtue theory and the 
very existence of virtue depends on the explication of virtues as character-traits (see 
section 2.4.2). However, in this analysis, from the very start, I want to both widen and 
narrow our horizon on and our definition of virtue. Widening means seeing and defining 
virtue as persisting excellence in being for the good, in which ”good” is understood very 
broadly (Adams 2006, 14-23). Virtue, then, is being for the good, but not occasionally 
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and in whatever way, but excellently, and more or less permanently. The traits of 
character may be useful and acceptable, but in case they are not excellent and worthy of 
admiration, they do not count as virtues. Not every sort of excellence, however, 
constitutes a virtue, only moral excellence does. Hence, one should narrow the scope of 
the concept of virtue as a character-trait. 
 
As suggested by Watson, there are grounds for a distinction between virtues and other 
human excellences. We seem, prima facie, to be morally badly adrift, if we cannot 
distinguish moral from other excellences. In addition, we would lose grip of a useful 
analytical tool. The distinction, however, is a subtle and controversial one, as will be 
discussed shortly.  Many of the ancients either did not consider it of decisive relevance or 
did not see it at all, and there are also modern neo-Aristotelian theorists, who either lay no 
considerable emphasis on the distinction or see certain non-moral excellences as 
contextual or local virtues. However, one common way to make the distinction is to talk, 
on the one hand, of virtues and on the other on skills.  (Aristotle 1975, 40-42; 101-115; 
Annas 1993, 120-134; Broadie 1991, 185-198; Irwin 1996, 37-56; MacIntyre 1981, 169-
226; Oakley and Cocking 2001, 116-136; Wallace 1978, 15-59).  
 
In any case, to say that virtue must be excellent is not merely to say that it must be good. 
Excellence is a particular type of goodness, namely, intrinsic goodness. This in turn 
means, that excellence is not (only) usefulness or instrumental goodness, but something 
that is in itself worth having and worthy to be admired, honored or loved.
51
 A generous 
person is, then, not (only) to be admired because of the benefits her generosity is likely to 
yield to the well-being of others. It is the trait, the tendency in her to be generous when 
appropriate that renders her worthy the admiration. 
 
According to Adams, however, moral excellence is not completely independent of the 
value of its consequences.
52
 When considering anew the above mentioned example of 
helping one’s neighbor
53
, it is more admirable also to be able to really help than only to 
have a tendency or good motivation to help, as also Silverman above pointed out in 
defense of NA. Eventually there are three differing dimensions that may give rise to 
                                               
51 For a differing and more detailed approach to intrinsic value and good, see Audi (2004, 121-160). 
52
Recall the discussion above on Slote in section 2.1.2. 
53 See page 29. 
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admiration: the disposition or tendency to help, the helping activity itself and the goods 
that add to the well-being of the beneficiaries. In sum, ours is the approach to see the 
goodness of virtue as intrinsic in moderate sense. It means at least that the excellence is 
not defined in terms of the value of consequences of having a quality Q of moral 
character, and is not simply a function of their value. By ”consequences of having a 
quality Q of moral character” is meant in this context objects or states of affairs to whose 
occurrence an agent's having Q contributes or has some likelihood of contributing  
(Adams 2006, 24-25). As already discussed above, in case we allow excellence or virtue 
to be defined mainly in terms of its consequences, we are compelled to reject both NA 
and VE. In Watson’s terms we would in that case embrace an ethics of outcome. 
 
In order to be considered a virtue in an ethical theory, a trait or a disposition must be an 
enduring psychological property
54
 (Adams 2006, 32; Broadie 1991, 61). Good sight is not 
a virtue in ethics, though it may help to accomplish virtuous deeds. But not even all 
excellent psychological properties can be regarded as virtues. The will has to be involved. 
There has to be a tendency or a disposition in one to be for or against something. 
Remembering a fact, for instance, does not involve any disposition to be for or against it 
(Adams 2006, 33). A good memory, then, may be of considerable help in living 
excellently, but it does not count as a virtue. In general, we can say, that being for some 
good X ”..(I)s an intentional state, and must involve an action or attitude that means X or 
has X as an intentional object, or a tendency to such an action or attitude” (Adams 2006, 
16; cf. Aristotle 1975, 38-42; Broadie 1991, 3, 41-50, 57-58). 
 
Finally, it may also be useful to make a distinction between motivational and structural 
virtues. Some virtues are clearly defined by motives which in turn are defined by goods 
one is for in having them. Benevolence, for example, which Slote above chose to be (the 
one and the only) cardinal virtue in his theory, is defined by the motive of willing good 
for others. Patience, or continence, on the other hand, cannot be considered motivational 
in the sense that benevolence can be. They may be better described as structural features 
of our character, which can be used to organize or manage whatever motives and other 
                                               
54”..(M)oral character is largely an interconnected set of traits, such as honesty, fairness, and fidelity, which, 
in turn, are largely deep-seated dispositions to do certain things for an appropriate range of reasons...A 
trait of character, unlike an action, is not an event; it is like a state of being, something that both persists 
over time and does not entail change...A trait need not be unchanging or static, however; one can, for 
instance, become more fair, or more judiciously fair” (Robert Audi, 1997, 160; italics added). 
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inner states we have. And what renders (at least some) structural features virtues is that in 
them we excel in personal psychic strength, it is an ability or willingness to govern our 
behavior in accordance with values and ends we are for. Yet in case the aims one pursues 
and is for are not good and thoughtfully chosen ones, even excellent patience in pursuing 
them does not render one virtuous. Being patient, or courageous, reveals virtue only on 





However, what is the good or what are the goods the being for which constitutes virtue? 
When embracing broad virtue conception after the manner of Adams, we are bound to 
include in it any good that human beings can exemplify excellence in caring about. 
Moreover, not only the sphere of virtue, but also the territory of morality must likewise be 
understood very broadly. The reason why Adams opts for breadth is the perspective from 
which he sees it as most fruitful to think about character, and that is a perspective from 
which one considers what kinds of person one should admire, and not only what personal 
qualities one should be grateful to other people for having. It is a perspective, from which 
one thinks comprehensively and seriously what kind of person one should want to be and 
what kinds of values one should want to further and also what kind of persons one should 
want people one loves to be. Adams argues, that we can treat more accurately the 
complex and subtle relations among our interests in diverse goods, if we do not allow our 
theory of virtue to depend heavily on where a line is drawn between moral and non-moral 




To be sure, those lines are often difficult to draw in a clear and uncontroversial way. 
Think first of caring excellently of the good life of others. It is, indeed, a major virtue, 
and at least at first sight there seem to be no problems with the above-mentioned lines of 
thought. For many, to be benevolent and to add to others' well-being is what ”moral” 
means. But on the second account the picture becomes more indefinite, for is it not the 
case that caring for or appreciating excellently any good that can enrich the life of others 
also affects the excellence in caring of the good life of others directly? In this way for 
                                               
55Recall footnote one on page 7. Definitions as well as lists of virtues developed within philosophy and 
literature abound. An example of popular yet refined and thoughtful work in classical vein, which 
remains outside the confines of the analytical tradition, is André Comte-Sponville's Petit traité des 
grandes vertus (1995). 
56
Adams shares this view with several contemporary (virtue ethical) writers. See e.g. Martha C. Nussbaum 
(1986, 5; 25-50) and John Cottingham (1996, 67). 
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instance developing one's artistic or journalistic skills excellently might be seen virtuous. 
It is at least in no way counter-intuitive to think that in being excellently for (the good of) 
truthful and eye-opening journalism one at the same time is (excellently) for the good of 
others, too. Yet this argument, as I see it, is conditional on whether journalism can be 
considered a practice whose aims and ends are or can be considered (key) human goods. 
However, I will give this idea an important place in this study and develop it in a more 
detailed manner in section in Interlude One and in Parts 3 and 4 below. (Adams 2006, 19; 
Oakley and Cocking 2001, 74-94). 
 
For now, there is still more to say of the breadth of sphere ascribed by Adams to good and 
virtue. One point is, that the good one is for in being virtuous also includes one's own 
good. It is part of virtue to desire, for its own sake, that goods one cares about should be 
realized in one's own life, too. This approach to virtue is a classical one, but I defend it 
later on in section 2.4. and in Parts three and four also on the grounds that I want to 
subscribe in this study to an account of good (and right) which make authentic contact 
with the   commitments that deeply and pervasively inform both our professional and 
private day-to-day life (Cottingham 1996, 57-59; Annas 1993, 249-290, 322-325; Adams 
2006, 20). Of course it is not virtuous to care about one's own good only, or to have an 
exaggerated preference for it. However, to risk one's life for some goods one knows to 
have minor place in the life of others hardly ever constitutes virtue.
57
 Such behavior can, 
on the contrary, be seen as an act of folly, and folly is a vice, a serious lapse from 
excellence in being for the good. So being excellently for the good seems unavoidably 
also to include caring excellently, i.e. in right proportion, for one's own good. What the 
right proportion actually is will be discussed in the next section where I discuss various 
challenges which VE it has been made to face. 
 
In any event, secondly, there is also the aspect of the breadth of virtue's concerns that they 
are not limited to the well-being of human agents, which already was implicit in the 
discussion above. A deep concern for quality in aesthetic and intellectual pursuits for their 
own sake seems (intuitively) to be virtuous. And respect for the value of nonhuman 
animals or even life-sustaining ecological processes seems often to be considered 
                                               
57 In case one errs in estimating the significance of a certain good in another’s life one might be virtuous 
even when risking one’s life for a minor good. I thank Juha Räikkä for helping me to become aware of this 
possibility. 
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virtuous. But as Adams shows, this only holds in case we reject the thesis of the unity of 
the virtues (Adams 2006, 21; 1999, 38-41; Annas 73-84). We cannot tolerate the claim 
that an otherwise virtuous agent is not virtuous if he does not love or admire arts, or, on 
the other hand, that an agent with virtuosity in aesthetic pursuits but with otherwise bad 
moral character would be virtuous. The reason this is so becomes more visible with the 
concept of vice. Not caring of the good of others is a vice, and a grave one. However, 
though failing to appreciate or admire aesthetic pursuits is lacking in virtue, it is 
unreasonable, maybe even misleading, to call it a vice. 
 
It is hoped that the virtue conception argued for, is broad enough to be able to take into 
consideration the innumerable complexities and subtleties of the human condition and at 
least to give a promise to facilitate integration of character. It endeavors to offer a 
comprehensive ideal of excellence in valuing, caring, and choosing which will include, as 
a major part, an ideal of excellence in being for others and their good, and in being good 
to them. This very comprehensiveness may, however, arouse justifiable suspicions as to 
whether the virtues of caring for the good of others figure sufficiently prominently in the 
conception, and I will address the issue below in 2.4.3. Nonetheless, the broad view 
which Adams suggests makes illuminating allowances for treating what are commonly 
regarded as cases of moral and non-moral goodness as instances of excellence in the same 
sense, though not necessarily in the same degree (Adams 2006, 22). In this way the 
concept of excellence also offers a key conceptual framework in which narrowly moral 
goodness can be commended without circularity. ”Why be moral?” becomes ”Why aspire 
to other-regarding virtues?”, and receives the answer, ”Because they are  part of the more 
excellent way to be” (Adams 2006, 22). 
 
However, in addition to coming in degrees, excellence and virtue also tend to be 
fragmentary and frail. They are fragmentary to the extent they fail to show such 
consistency and generality across different situations, that they can be regarded as solid 
traits of character. The frailty problem, on the other hand, is whether all the otherwise 
desirable traits of character there may be are too frail or too dependent on situational 
factors to have the excellence required of virtue (Adams 2006, 129). In sum, are there any 
traits of character, and in case there are, are they sufficiently robust to count as plausible 
motivational inner states in being excellently for some goods? These are hard questions 
which I answer partly in the next section. However, this is broadly the virtue conception 
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on which I heavily draw from now on in this study.
58
 It will be put to full work from 
Interlude One onwards. Ahead of it I address some of the main challenges of VE. 
 
2.4. Are There Too Serious Vices in Virtue Ethics? 
 
As has already been noticed in the above discussions, virtue ethics has been challenged in 
various ways. In what follows, I meet with some parts of the critique in three sections. 
First, in 2.4.1. I address what I call some standard objections to VE. They include most 
importantly the application problem and the epistemological problem of ascertaining, 
who actually is virtuous, which was already briefly discussed above. Secondly, in 2.4.2. I 
return to inconsistency and frailty problems which we above left behind unsolved. I 
devote a section of their own to them because of the seriousness of their challenge to the 
plausibility of VE and especially to one of its core concepts, namely (traits of) character. 
In 2.4.3., finally, I discuss whether VE is a theory about moral phenomena at all, at least 
in the way morality is seen today. This is of course a question of outstanding importance 
for the whole of my argumentation, and that is why it receives a section of its own and a 
central place as a summary of the section 2.4. 
 
In section 2.4.3. I also return to the question of whether benevolence and the good of 
others in general occupy a distinctive and sufficiently important place in VE. In more 
specific terms I address the problem of whether there is excellence in altruism and discuss 
the challenges of partiality and moral luck, which issues will be touched on also in 2.4.2. 
It seems that the main, comprehensive idea in the massive critique of VE is that the 
question about how one should live is allowed in it a major place.
59
 However, a good life 
is an individual project and aim, not something that first of all defines our relation to 
other persons. As such, it also of course frequently affects, even adds to, others' well-
                                               
58The way Adams accounts for virtue, has by now been found attractive by other modern writers, too. E.g. 
Daniel Star writes: 
..(D)espite much recent skepticism regarding the virtues, which has its origins especially in certain 
findings in social psychology, the ideal of virtue remains attractive. I believe this skepticism is best 
construed as attacking certain traditional accounts of the virtues, rather than as undermining 
contemporary theories that do not set the bar for moral virtue either too low or too high, and that 
appreciate that the virtues are typically fragmented, fragile, and lacking in the type of unity that the 
traditional doctrine of the unity of the virtues supposes they possess (see Adams 2006, for an 
excellent example of such a theory). (Star 2010, 1, note 1). 
59 Particularly in classical VE the question about the supreme end or good and how one should live to reach 
it, constitutes the core of ethics. The answer, however, is approached by delineating what sort of character 
one should have and not so much what sort of deeds one should accomplish or avoid (see e.g. Annas, 1993, 
27-46). 
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being, but that is thoroughly contingent both on the way in which one endeavors to live 
up to one's standards of the good life, and particularly on those very standards 
themselves. On a more minute level of examination the same critique manifests itself as 
juxtaposition of rightness of action and quality of character. The first is seen as (the) 
proper (key) concern of morality and ethics, the latter either as contingently conducive to 
the first or as a thoroughly misplaced creation of folk psychology. In sum, one cannot 
avoid the impression that VE has been attacked severely and on many fronts. However, 
let us see what there remains to be done about it. 
 
2.4.1. Agent-basing Re-examined 
 
VE has often been attacked on the grounds (i) that it does not explicitly and directly 
concentrate on agents' actions or on the consequences of their actions, (ii) that at least 
some versions of VE give poor action-guidance, and (iii) that in case VE can be construed 
to give action-guidance, it is of no substantial use because of some unavoidable 
epistemological difficulties. As regards item (i), I think we need some specification in 
order to make it answerable. If (i) means that VE does concentrate more on persistent, 
characteristic patterns of motivational states or behavior, instead of discrete acts, it is true, 
nearly trivially so, because of VE's conceptual commitment to virtues and character-traits. 
When Robert Louden argues that ”..(I)t seems to me that virtue ethics is structurally 
unable to say much of anything about that issue” (i.e. about the rightness of actions or 
what people ought to do), I think he refers exactly to this commitment  (Louden 1984, 
231).  
 
On the other hand, in case (i) is meant to indicate that action and its consequences are of 
no relevance to living virtuously (i.e., in deontological terms, according to high moral 
standards) in VE, it is misguided. For, as stated in our above definition of NA, virtue 
issues in a rational and active life. Virtue partly means continuous choosing on two levels. 
First, virtues are neither rigid, innate traits of character nor some feelings which we 
simply can’t avoid having, but something into which we have been educated and which 
we have chosen and continue to choose more or less successfully in our daily practical 
life. Being benevolent one is, as it were, ”fixed” into being benevolent. It does not easily 
come into her mind not to be that way. However, one could choose otherwise, simply 
because (any particular) virtue is no locked-up, blind disposition. Secondly, virtue, when 
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one has secured herself such a thing, is being for the good, in valuing, in caring, but also 
and prominently, in action. Virtue is, or gradually becomes, a way of being and choosing. 
That is why it seems intuitively perfectly right to doubt one's benevolence if one never 
manifests it in action, when there is no legitimate reason for remaining continuously 
inactive (Adams 15-18, 24; Annas, 1993, 51). 
 
However, in order to clarify further VE’s ability in action-guidance and some related 
issues, I choose a new, but at the same time familiar point of view for our discussion. And 
I do it by returning to Michael Slote and his agent-basing, a theory, in which, as we saw 
above, the rightness of action is based fundamentally on the motive from which it 
proceeds. Now, as Liezl van Zyl argues – a point which we already touched on in 2.1. 
above – a frequent objection to agent-basing is that it does not allow us to draw the 
commonsense distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons 
(van Zyl, 2009b, 50-69). According to van Zyl, agent-basing can be defended against this 
objection, yet what is worth noticing, there is a more fundamental problem looming: 
namely, that agent-basing fails to provide adequate action-guidance. In addressing first 
agent-basing’s failure to make a distinction between act-evaluation and agent-appraisal, 
i.e. between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons, van Zyl discusses a 
standard exemplary scene of which Slote also takes advantage (Slote 2001, 13-14; van 
Zyl 2009b, 54-58). 
 
Consider a scene in which a prosecutor is motivated by malice in prosecuting a particular 
defendant. The commonsense view in this case seems to be, that he does the right thing in 
prosecuting, but that he does it from the wrong reason, namely, from malice. However, an 
agent-based view, according to which badly motivated acts are wrong, is committed to 
saying that the prosecutor acts wrongly. Slote claims, however, and van Zyl agrees, that 
this is not at all an unfortunate consequence of agent-basing (Slote, 2001, 14-15; van Zyl 
2009b, 54). What they mean is, that on grounds of the inferior motive of the prosecutor, 
the deed, the very prosecuting, cannot be held to have moral value, and maybe even less 
to be admirable, and in that way it seems intuitively right to say that the prosecutor, 
nevertheless, acted wrongly. 
 
But if the prosecutor acted wrongly, (when he did his duty out of malice), does it imply, 
that he should not have prosecuted at all? No, says Slote, too, in addition to many other 
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philosophers and the commonsense view. He argues that if the prosecutor decides not to 
prosecute, his motivation will also be bad, because in such a case he fails to show real 
concern for doing his job and playing the contributing social role that that involves. 
Hence, Slote concludes, agent-basing does not have implausible results, and it does allow 
us to make (something like) the distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for 
the right reason (Slote 2001, 15; van Zyl 2009b, 56). This is the idea, according to van 
Zyl, on which we can draw in order to revise agent-basing to be adequately action-
guiding.  
 
We, first, have to ask: how is it possible for an agent to act wrongly despite doing what he 
ought to have done, i.e., despite making the right decision? The answer, then, lies in 
realizing that there is no reason to suppose that a criterion of right action should also 
serve as a practical action-guiding tool. Slote's original principle says that a decision is 
right if (and because) it exhibits or expresses a virtuous motive, or at least does not 
exhibit or express a vicious motive. And it serves both as a principle of action appraisal 
and as a principle of action-guiding. There simply are no other principles to appeal to. 
Van Zyl, however, is able to give rather convincing evidence that even Slote himself 
implicitly draws on two different principles when discussing some practical cases. Slote 
notes among other things, that while one is judging in relation to an inner factor 
(motivation) she is actually judging according to an entity that makes reference to and 
takes account of facts about people in the world (Slote 2001, 38-39). Hence, Slote 
actually seems to draw on an independent action-guiding principle. 
 
In this way van Zyl ends up embracing a version of agent-basing with two core principles, 
one for deciding the rightness of actions, another for action-guiding (van Zyl 2009b, 64). 
To put it in a more detailed manner, the proposed agent-basing version distinguishes 
between making a right decision and performing a right action. Accordingly, a decision is 
right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would characteristically choose in the 
circumstances, while the rightness of action depends on whether it is well-motivated, as 
also Slote originally argues. As van Zyl points out, traditional deontological and 
consequentialist approaches also make a distinction between acts that are right and acts 
that are praiseworthy. Yet their focus is on the first, which is providing an account of the 
rightness in terms of principles or consequences. In agent-basing, and in other versions of 
VE, by contrast, the focus is on the latter, for an agent can make the right decision for the 
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wrong reasons or for no reasons at all. 
 
In my view, the major advantage of van Zyl's version of agent-basing is that it provides an 
account of right action in terms of the actual motives from which the act proceeds and 
which are manifest in the act. In that way it is able, first, to explain why an action is right, 
and, secondly, by focusing on motivational and other inner states in defining moral worth, 
it seems to be at least tentatively compatible with the virtue conception we have been 
embracing. NA, on the other hand, is not able to specify in a noncontroversial way what 
exactly makes an action right. That is because of its criterion of right action:”..(A)n action 
is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances” 
(Hursthouse 1999, 18). It tells how to choose the right action but fails to tell why the right 
action is right. In that way NA can be objected to as relying on an unexplained or 
indefinite concept of right action (van Zyl 2009b, 68). 
 
Now, when discussing right action above, I deliberately also used certain other terms, 
such as “duty” and “ought to”. But are they totally out of place when used in VE-based 
considerations? Above we made the distinction between making a right decision and 
performing a right action. The latter means acting virtuously, admirably, being excellently 
for some good. Right action, in fact, then, means good action. But when an agent makes a 
right decision yet does not act virtuously, what does he in fact do and why? He can be 
seen to do what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances, and in this way to make 
a right decision, but what does this 'right' stand for? It cannot stand for 'good' (or any 
derivative of goodness), because for 'right' to be in some plausible sense 'good' in this 
context would mean that our distinction between right action (virtuous action) and 
making right decisions would at least become ill-defined or even collapse. We would be 
back to the way in which NA both defines right action and gives action-guidance in the 
form of only one, by now familiar principle:  ”An action is right if it is what a virtuous 
agent would characteristically do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse 1999, 18). 
  
According to van Zyl the problem with the concept of right means that VE needs an 
account of moral obligation (van Zyl 2009a, 91-104). She argues that an account of what 
is right, just or morally obligatory is actually also presupposed by the practice of 
assigning moral praise and blame. An act is unjust, not because of what motivates it, but 
because it does not give moral agents what they are due, or violates an obligation to an 
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agent.”..(A) moral theory that focuses only on the goodness (or otherwise) of actions is 
unable to account for the fact that others have claims against us, or conversely, that we 
owe it to them to treat them in certain ways. And such a theory is incomplete.” (van Zyl 
2009a, 102). 
 
Van Zyl believes that there are a number of ways in which this shortcoming of VE can be 
remedied. She prefers the strategy of looking at justice as a set of rules or conventions 
stating which rights and obligations people have, and which are adopted by a community 
to make it possible for members of that community to live the best life possible (van Zyl 
2009a,102). In my view, van Zyl's strategy is thoroughly plausible, but I prefer the way 
Mark LeBar endeavors to solve the problem (LeBar 2009, 642-671). He begins by 
addressing the familiar objection that VE is unable to account for the wrongness of wrong 
action in terms of the effects of the action on its victims, because of its commitment to 
virtue and character as fundamental concepts. However, as LeBar argues, at least an 
account of egregious forms of wrongdoing, say murder or rape, must give central place to 
the effect on the victim. To account of the wrongness of a murder (merely) in terms of a 
lack of virtue seems gravely misplaced. 
  
In any event, LeBar argues that NA and the classical forms of VE can maintain that virtue 
requires that we regard others in just the ways that the objection suggests we should. In 
his argumentation LeBar draws heavily on recent work by Stephen Darwall on the 
”second-person standpoint”, in which others are seen as sources of claims on us. LeBar 
refers to those sources of claims as ”deontic constraints” (Darwall 2006; 2007, 52-69; 
Korsgaard 2007, 8-23; LeBar 2009, 642-43). However, what his argumentation eventually 
comes to is that at least eudaimonist virtue ethical theories provide a framework for 
maintaining that we have the same reason for occupying the second-person standpoint 
that we do for being virtuous generally: doing so is of crucial importance for living 
excellently and well. Put another way, occupying the second-person standpoint is part of 
being virtuous, so we have reason to do so. And, in this vein of thought, the use of the 
deontic 'right', which preoccupied us in van Zyl's version of agent-basing above, also 
becomes legitimate and accounted for (LeBar 2009, 650). 
 
There is much more to say to make a case for LeBar's approach. In this section of the 
study, however, my aim has been merely to try to show, first, that there is serious work 
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going on in VE to reveal its potential to give action guidance and, second, that this work 
also has yielded plausible considerations and results. In addition I have wanted to 
demonstrate how the challenges to or problems of VE do very much combine. We started 
above by first discussing whether and in what degree VE allows us to lay stress on (the 
importance of) an agent's actions and the consequences of her actions. We then moved on 
to address the problem of action-guidance and embraced a principle according to which a 
decision is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would characteristically choose 
in the circumstances (as was also suggested by Hursthouse above).  
 
Nevertheless, we did not attend to the possible epistemological problems in identifying 
virtuous agents and their choices, and to the fact that there obviously are situations in 
which at least a completely virtuous agent would never find herself and would not 
accordingly be in a position to provide any examples for the less virtuous.
60
 Instead, we 
ended up considering whether VE is in need of a theory of obligation. And it seems to me 
that at this point we came very near addressing the subject of section 2.4.3.: is VE really a 
theory of morality at all? Or, in a somewhat more considerate fashion, does the well-
being and good of others figure sufficiently prominently in VE? However, the challenges 
to and misgivings about VE all seem to be due to its commitment to character, virtue and 
goodness as its foundational concepts. That is why I now address the question of whether 
there may be any plausibility in the recent situationist challenge to the very existence of 
character-(traits) and virtue. 
 
2.4.2. Inner States vs. Outer Situations 
 
Virtues and vices are typically classified as character-traits. Recently some moral 
philosophers have argued that situationist social psychology has radical implications for 
moral philosophy. For example, Gilbert Harman suggests that psychological research 
calls into question not only folk psychology about character and character traits but also 
virtue ethics (Harman 1999, 315-331; 2000, 223-226; 2002, 87-94; 2007). In his 
argumentation Harman takes character traits to be relatively stable and long-term 
dispositions to (re)act in distinctive ways. He then maintains that”..(E)mpirical studies 
designed to test whether people behave differently in ways that might reflect their having 
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 One may also consider whether there are situations in which a non-virtuous person should not do what a 
virtuous person would characteristically do. See e.g. van Zyl (2011, 80-92). 
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different character traits have failed to find relevant differences” (Harman 2000, 165-
178). So, argues Harman, in this way”..(O)rdinary attributions of character traits to people 
may be deeply misguided, and it may even be the case that there is no such thing as 
character” (Harman 2000, 165). 
 
The features of situations in which people find themselves explain the differences in their 
behavior. Occasionally some of the influential features seem to be surprisingly subtle or 
even (in advance) seem quite trivial. Here is one standard example. A member of a team 
of experimenters drops a folder-full of papers in a shopping plaza, in front of a stranger 
who is emerging from a telephone booth (once upon a time there were such things). Now, 
will the stranger stop to help pick up the papers? She did help in fourteen of sixteen cases 
in which she found a dime planted by the experimenter in the phone's coin return, but in 
only one of twenty-five cases in which no coin was to be found (Isen and Levin 1972, 
384-388; cited e.g. in Adams 2006, 117-118, Doris 2002, 30-32 and Kamtekar 2004, 465). 
Isen and Levin suggest that finding the dime led agents to feel in a good mood and that 
feeling good leads to helping. But would we not expect benevolent persons to help 
whether or not they are feeling good? I think we frequently would, but I also think that 
there is much more to it, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.4.2.1. The Three Strategies to Meet the Challenge 
 
There are many others who have noticed and answered the situationist challenge, and 
according to Adams there are already discernible in the literature three main ways of 
responding to the challenge, without giving up the language of virtue and character 
(Adams 2006, 118-120). First, there are those who are ready to concede the most to the 
situationist challenge and who would free the terminology of virtue and vice from 
commitment to (traits of) character by applying it primarily to actions and attitudes or 
other mental states occurring at a particular time. One hallmark of this strategy S1 is 
Thomas Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value (Hurka 2000)
61
. At the opposite extreme, 
secondly, is the strategy S3 of arguing that a classical conception of virtue is untouched 
by situationist experimental evidence and that the situationist philosophy drawing on it is 
                                               
61 Alfano (2011, 121-136) interestingly argues that.. “(R)egardless of whether people have traits, folk 
intuitions would lead us to attribute traits to them”. Whether people actually have character-traits, should – 
according to Alfano – be explored with the help of scientific methodologies of psychology and behavioral 
economics.  
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badly misguided. Ethicists following S3 are among others Julia Annas, Rachana 
Kamtekar, and Nafsika Athanassoulis (Annas 2003, 20-34; Kamtekar 2004, 458-491; 
Athanassoulis 2000, 215-221). I address their arguments in more detail shortly. 
 
However, the strategy S2, which Adams himself favors is the one I see as being most 
plausible, since S2 readily and realistically allows virtues to be frail and fragmentary, yet 
in the way that they can be considered real moral virtues that are not extremely rare. The 
specific challenge which S2 has to face is whether traits of character or personal qualities 
in general, can be sufficiently excellent to be virtuous if they are allowed to be frail and 
fragmentary. This is an important question, since personal qualities might be considered 
real and beneficial without their being (at least highly) excellent, too (Adams 2006, 119-
120). 
Now, in order to help us still deeper into situationist research and thinking, let us consider 
one more empirical test and its results before moving on. Over 8000 schoolchildren were 
placed in moderately tempting situations where they had opportunities (1) to cheat in 
tests, (2) to cheat on homework or by faking a record in athletic contests, (3) to steal 
money from a box used in a test, and (4) to lie about their conduct in general or about 
cheating on tests in (1) above. The correlation between behaviors listed within any one of 
the groups (1) - (4) was quite high, but the correlation across behavior types (1), (2), (3), 
and (4) was dramatically lower. Situationists maintain that we call a person who cheats in 
exams dishonest, expecting that she will also pocket any money she finds and lie, too. 
The honesty studies, according to the situationist reading, however, falsify this 
expectation. Instead, they find that people do behave consistently only across situations 
that are very alike: the correlation between cheating in an exam and cheating in another 
exam is quite high. Yet, this kind of consistency at most licenses us to attribute to people 
narrow dispositions or traits such as ”cheat on exams” (Kamtekar 2004, 465-66, orig. in 
Hartshorne and May 1928). 
 
Next, consider Kamtekar’s summary of situationist experiments. She has four concerns. 
First, some of the reported experiments – for example the dime in the phone booth test 
discussed above – have been carried out on an extremely small number of subjects. A 
question arises as to whether significant information could be distinguished from mere 
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noise? Second, the experiments do not usually track the behavior of participants across 
situations. Most of them observe any given person only on one occasion. But what can 
reasonably be concluded about the consistency of people's behavior on the basis of a 
single observation? 
 
Third, those experiments that do carry out several tests on the same subjects (such as the 
honesty study above) nevertheless do not track their behaviors as individuals but instead 
infer the behavior of the individuals from the behavior of the groups. However, not all the 
individuals in a group behave in accordance with the group average; therefore, as 
Sreenivasan also points out, the consistency data, being averages, are consistent with 
there being a few highly consistent (in this case ”honest”) individuals in the group. But 
surely the observation that cross-situational consistency and stable character are not the 
norm cannot be considered as a challenge to VE. And, finally, Kamtekar's fourth concern 
is about what we should infer about adults from observations of children's cross-
situational inconsistency or narrowness of disposition: might it not be highly plausible 
that children are more impressionable, less committed to particular ideals of conduct, or 
less integrated than adults (Kamtekar 2004, 466; Sreenivasan 2002, 56-57)? 
 
The proponents of S3, however, hold that a classical conception of virtue is untouched 
even by that part of the situationist experimental evidence which seems methodologically 
immaculate. According to Annas, 
 
..(W)hen Doris tells us that we should focus on situations and the complexities 
they raise, he is, unawares, telling us just what virtue ethicists tell us. When he 
says that our duties are surprisingly complex, and that we have a responsibility to 
think about the background and ”determinative features” of situations, rather than 
waiting till the situation confronts us, his advice is not all that far from the advice 
to develop character by intelligent choice (Annas 2003, 28; Doris 1998, 517). 
 
 Annas proceeds to argue that since virtue, contrary to what situationism seems to hold, is 
not a rigid (reactive) habit, close attention to situations and their contexts is required, not 
excluded, by it.  
She considers one major reason for the evident misunderstanding among the situationists 
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to be that they underestimate and misconceive the intellectual component of virtue. In 
case virtue is granted an intellectual component in situationist considerations, the intellect 
in question is interpreted as a perceptual capacity to see things in a certain way. However, 
Annas maintains that this also makes the virtuous person into a passive spectator of 
situations. The role of intellect in virtue should, instead, be seen as a far more active and 
critical one. The virtuous agent not only judges what is the right thing to do, he does this 
from understanding,”..(S)omething which enables him to criticize the judgments he 
originally started from, and to explain and give reasons for the judgments he makes”. 
Annas also maintains that the virtuous judges in the light of an understanding of his life as 
a whole and the workings of both the virtue in question and other virtues to which the 
situation is relevant. If virtuous, a journalist not only works out whether a certain situation 
bears characteristics which might legitimize invading someone’s privacy, but she also 
deliberates on whether she really is now, or was in the past, for any important good while 
invading peoples’ private lives, and whether such measures possibly threaten(ed) her 
personal integrity or her good life as a whole (Annas 2003, 28). 
 
Annas’s intellect-argument, on the other hand, may be and has been dismissed as an 
approach laying too great an emphasis on the intellectual component of virtue. Julia 
Driver for instance agrees that sensitivity to the morally relevant features of a situation is 
important. However, she wants to avoid making this sensitivity highly intellectual, as was 
discussed above, and maintains that virtue must be accessible also to those who are not 
wise but kind;”..(T)o those who had the misfortune to grow up in repressive environments 
that warped their understanding, yet who are capable of showing the appropriate 
compassionate responds to human suffering” (Driver 2001, 54). 
 
Moreover, and perhaps more to the point, there is also a wealth of theorists working 
within the confines of the (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethical tradition, who wish to press the 
important role of emotions in VE, emotions having arguably a distinctive place in 
Aristotle proper. Rosalind Hursthouse in particular argues, in deeply Aristotelian vein, 
that virtues are dispositions not only to act, but to feel emotions, and that these function 
both as reactions as well as impulses to action. Hursthouse also argues further that 
appropriate emotions have intrinsic value. In other words, having contextually right 
emotions counts as one mode of being for the good (Hursthouse 2001, 108). 
In sum, Aristotelian VE invests emotions and feelings with much moral significance, even 
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to the extent that virtues might be interpreted as more or less equivalent to states of 
emotion, feeling or appetite, ordered however in accordance with some deliberative ideal 
of practical wisdom (Carr, 2009, 31-2). But does the role of emotions in VE carry any 
relevance to the situationist challenge? In my view, it certainly does. The multi-
dimensionality of virtues as such speaks against the rigid, behavioral virtue conception 
which situationism favors. However, emotions also have a distinctive role in motivation, 
and it is only a well-motivated disposition to be excellently for good that constitutes a 
virtue (Stocker 1996, 173-190: Adams 2006, 130). 
 
It seems to me that S3 conveys in a correct manner the tension existing between the 
situationist conception of character traits and that of the broadly (neo)-Aristotelian 
tradition. I nevertheless consider that (neo)-Aristotelians do not heed all the value there is 
in situationist observations and in the respective conclusions on the inconsistency and 
frailty of virtue. Hence, I endorse S2 in facing the situationist challenge. And as was 
discussed above, S2 readily allows virtues to be frail and fragmentary, yet in the way that 
they can be considered real moral virtues that are not extremely rare. In that way I can 
both retain a commitment to more or less enduring traits or qualities of character as a 
central object of moral evaluation, and revise the neo-Aristotelian virtue conception better 





2.4.2.2. Modularity and Frailty of Virtue 
 
To consider first the apparent inconsistency of virtue that exists in our everyday doings, I 
draw on Adams by introducing the concepts of probabilistic virtue and modularity of 
virtue (Adams 2006, 122-130). To consider virtue probabilistic, adds to the familiar 
consideration that to have, for example, a generous inner quality or character trait a 
person does not have to be generous on every single occasion and all the time. As I see it, 
a probabilistic view can be considered a heuristic to virtue. 
To see the point, suppose we had an extremely large number of past observations of a 
                                               
62 Vranas (2009, 213-233) argues that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, 
or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. He maintains that most people are fragmented 
(they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations) and because one cannot 
reliably distinguish those who are fragmented from those who are not, one is not entitled to evaluate people 
in terms of their moral character as a whole. His thesis, however, does not concern the evaluation of, or 
suggest the non-existence of, character-traits. 
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population of a hundred individuals in a great variety of situations. Suppose further, that 
on that basis the individuals have been accurately ranked with regard to a set of 
behavioral characteristics including generosity and that the positive correlation measuring 
cross-situational consistency in the population with regard to generosity is 0.16 
(significant but low). But as was discussed in the context of the honesty test example 
above, this does not necessarily reveal very much about the honesty of any particular 
individual. On the other hand, if we learn with the help of our extremely large data-base, 
that the probability of a certain individual, say my neighbor again, being one of the two 
most generous on at least one of the next ten occasions, is about 60 percent, the situation 
looks quite different for pragmatic purposes. I think that I might now have good reasons 
to ask for her help when necessary and praise her character at least in this respect, if she is 
disposed to act with notable generosity as much as 10 percent of the time (Adams 2006, 
122-125). 
 
The idea of the modularity of virtue can in turn be seen to include two causal and two 
evaluative claims (Adams 2006, 125). The first causal claim is that an agent will 
frequently acquire and exercise a disposition to act in a certain way in one domain 
without being disposed to act similarly in (somewhat) different domains. In another 
words, direct behavioral dispositions commonly are mutually independent in a way that is 
domain-specific. The domains may be either types of situation quite narrowly defined, as 
in the honesty test above, or they may be as widely defined as social roles, such as those 
of a parent, a top-athlete, or a journalist. How the phenomenon of domain-specificity 
might, then, be seen to relate to the Macintyrian concept of practice will be discussed in 
Interlude One and Part three below (MacIntyre 1981, 175).  
 
However, Adams argues further, that to classify a disposition as domain-specific is not to 
say it is not affected in any way by a larger causal nexus. In addition, ordinary moral 
experience makes clear that we also have holistic and relatively domain-neutral (non-
modular) capacities of moral and other practical thinking that we more or less often apply 
in and to a wide variety of situations. Accordingly, such general and relatively domain-
neutral intellectual capacities can sometimes inhibit or otherwise override the behavioral 
potentiality of more domain-specific dispositions (Adams 2006, 126). 
 
The second causal claim is that virtue modules can be added together to form a more 
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inclusive composite disposition. In this case honesty is again an apt example. It can 
plausibly be thought to manifest itself as specific dispositions to different domains, yet it 
can also eventually combine to be a more consistent and general disposition to behave in 
the relevant way (honestly) in a wide variety of situations. The evaluative claims, finally, 
are, first, that at least in some cases the independent modules also have (independent) 
positive moral value; and, secondly, that the result of adding such dispositions together to 
form a cross-situationally consistent composite disposition can rightly be regarded, in 
some cases, as constituting a more complete case of the particular virtue (Adams 2006, 
126-27). 
 
Though the point is not explicitly discussed by Adams or by Kamtekar – who also sees 
the modularity of virtues without embracing the very notion – it seems that there are at 
least two different aspects or dimensions to the modularity of virtue. First, there is the 
domain- or role-specificity. A person can be honest to his near and dear, yet cheat grossly 
on the taxman or his employer. However, there is also the functional modularity of the 
composite (traditional) virtue(s). Honesty means at least both the dispositions not to lie 
and not to cheat, and the disposition not to steal. Furthermore, in a more detailed analysis, 
there is also arguably the still more subtle distinction between the disposition not to lie 
and the disposition not to cheat. Accordingly, one might as a job applicant lie (how 
ardently he wants to work in this particular media house) but not cheat (forge his 
application documents) and, on the other hand, as a journalist cheat (not to tell an 
informant he is a journalist) but not lie (distort the information the informant discloses). 
As Kamtekar argues, and the above analysis suggest, there may be reason – as a result 
and in line to situationist thinking – to abandon some folk-psychological character traits, 
because they assume cross-situational consistency where there is no reason to expect any 
(Adams 2006, 127-28; Kamtekar 2004, 468-69). 
 
Now, before moving on to address the frailty problem, two more remarks. First, one 
might claim that virtue modules are not sufficiently important or effective to qualify as 
virtues, or, in case their importance can be accepted or secured, that they are not 
sufficiently excellent. Here, I think, Adams is correct when he suggests that it is not”.. 
(I)n general right to deny that excellence can come in small packages” (Adams 2006, 
130). Is it not, indeed, ”small packages” with which we unavoidably have to begin, in any 
event? To become virtuous is to become cared for as well as educated and also to grow 
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more experienced. And even when already more experienced, one cannot reasonably be 
denied the domain-specific, modular excellence, because being for the good excellently 
does not primarily concern how comprehensively, but rather in what way one is for good. 
This idea, at the same time, allows virtue to be more or less fundamental or central, as 
was discussed above.  
 
Secondly, I once more wish to lay emphasis on the idea that virtue should not only be 
considered as direct behavioral dispositions, whether domain-specific or more general. 
This was also ardently argued by those in favor of S3. One implication of the wide virtue 
conception, which was adopted in section 2.3., is that one has reason to seek excellence 
and virtue also or even primarily in a variety of distinctive psychological characteristics 
and dispositions that lie behind our overt behavioral dispositions. Such characteristics 
may include motives, beliefs, different cognitive schemes, desires, as well as attitudes, 
and they typically shape behavior jointly in highly complex, multi-level interactions. As a 
matter of fact, I already have worked with this insight above, particularly when 
addressing the work of Michael Slote (Adams 2006, 130-38; Kamtekar 2004, 474-77; 
Slote 2001, 7). 
 
If the inconsistency problem reveals that virtue frequently is domain-dependant and 
probabilistic, then the frailty problem adds a further point: these small domain-specific 
virtue packages may often fail to be sufficiently robust to qualify as virtues. There seem 
to be all too many social temptations, too deep a dependence within us upon what others 
think and do, for virtue to survive. However, on the other hand, how robust or invincible 
does virtue have to be in human life as we generally experience it? Adams answers in part 
by pointing to the fact that we do not in general doubt that excellence can be fragile or 
dependent on a situation.  
 
Consider for example the performance of a top-decathlonist. His performance being 
excellent depends heavily on situational factors: his mood and shape, the weather 
conditions, the quality of track, and sheer luck. Nevertheless, the very existence of all 
these factors does not render his accomplishments less admirable. Why therefore would 
frailty or dependence on social context be a reason for not admiring traits of character, or 
for not regarding them as excellent? Similarly, we should not be surprised to find that 
someone who performs brilliantly in his usual life-context may go to pieces in a novel 
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(social) situation that is sufficiently complex, or ambiguous.  A journalist who manages 
quite successfully with her routine work in the familiar local paper, might have 
considerable problems with her integrity when told by the editor that it is now time to 
adopt a more aggressive and eye-catching journalistic genre. It would take an intelligence 
more prodigious than the human to see at once and in detail how to apply general (moral) 
principles and past experience on encountering a new and very unfamiliar type of 
situation (Adams 2006, 157-58). 
 
However, there is more to the challenge raised by the apparent situational and social 
dependence of traits of character than the question of how excellent a virtue must be: the 
question of whose must the excellence be. Now, the writers within the tradition of VE 
have, in fact, been very aware of the fragility, and the dependence on chance and luck, of 
the human condition since the time of ancient Greek ethical thought. According to Martha 
Nussbaum, as it was comprehended at that time, the phenomenon can be divided into 
three sub-problems: the vulnerable components of the good life, contingent conflicts of 
values, and the ungoverned elements of the personality (Nussbaum 1986, esp. 1-21; 318-
342).  
 
The issue is, to be sure, complex and controversial. There is indispensable dependence on 
moral luck both in the development and in the persistence of virtue. Our education in 
virtue is shaped by and dependent on social contexts and persons whom we did not and 
could not choose. Moreover, virtue once achieved is not intrinsically permanent. In 
addition to situational factors, there are both physiological and psychological 
transformations that affect us and our ways of responding. However, as Adams argues, 
this does not mean that virtue is not real. Our learning how to live is always and of 
necessity a learning how to live in a certain range of contexts and a certain field of 
expectations. One cannot be prepared for the unforeseen. Human moral excellence cannot 
be an ability to respond well to every possible circumstance. In sum, virtue is real, but it 
is dependent and conditional virtue. We are dependent creatures, or ”dependent rational 
animals”, as Alasdair MacIntyre sees reason to put it, and dependent also in matters of 
virtue and vice (Adams 2006, 158-165; MacIntyre 1999, esp. 63-128). 
 
Human mutual dependency has a significant place also in the following section, where I 
address altruism and its controversial status in VE. However, before moving on, I wish to 
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bring up two further issues which both have relevance in the present context, and which 
also have topicality in my argumentation below. The first is the view, that the domain-
specific excellence of being good at a social role, or a (social) practice, is not neatly 
separable from the moral value of the role itself and the institutions and social 
arrangements and processes that provide its indispensable context. I believe that this point 
is highly relevant in the ethics of professions.  
 
However, one major implication of the inseparability of the moral worth of a role and the 
excellence of being good at it is that if collective arrangements that shape some certain 
role are sufficiently poor (bad), it seems that being good at that role will be no virtue (or 
at the extreme will turn into being a vice). It may still be possible to manifest virtue in 
occupying the role, but that is likely to involve subverting the role rather than being good 
at it in the usual or conventional sense. The capacity to adapt this critical distance grows 
along with the learning and embracing of the more general and domain-neutral virtues 
and other practical dispositions. It may even be thoroughly plausible to hold that any 
social role can be inhabited more virtuously with this kind of critical stance than without 
it (Adams 2006, 142-43; Oakley and Cocking 2001, 74-94; MacIntyre 1981, 187-189). 
 
In the second place I wish tentatively to refer to the accumulating literature on 
evolutionary and experimental psychology which suggests that human moral judgment 
may characteristically be a complex interplay between (at least) two distinct types of 
processes, namely domain-specific, social emotional responses, and domain-neutral 
reasoning processes applied in moral contexts. Evidence to that effect has recently been 
gathered for example by Lanteri, Chelini and Rizzello (2008) who manipulated the 
familiar trolley problem
63
 in their experimental research and found that people indeed 
have differing strategies or ways of responding in situations which can all be considered 
morally relevant but which can be otherwise decisively distinguished from each other 
(Lanteri, Chelini and Rizzello 2008, 789-804).  
It has also been argued that our”..(M)oral thinking is driven largely by social-emotional 
                                               
63Philippa Foot (1978) introduced the so-called trolley problem, in which an agent is faced with two simple 
alternatives, both of which result in tragedy. The scenario is roughly as follows. A trolley is running 
down its track, but nobody is in control. Along the track stand five people who are unavoidably going to 
die unless the trajectory of the trolley is altered. By flipping a switch it is possible to lead the trolley to a 
different track, where unfortunately a single person is standing and is then condemned to die. Though a 
case can be made both for hitting the lever and for not hitting it, there seems to be no obviously superior 
option to choose. 
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dispositions built on those we inherited from our primate ancestors’’ (Greene and Haidt, 
2002, 519). In other words, in an evolutionary perspective it seems to make sense to 
regard an emotional aversion to damaging other humans as a fitness-improving trait that 
confers upon its possessors some advantage in grouping successfully. Such adaptation 
could be considered arisen at a time when the scope of aggression was limited literally to 
a stone’s throw, there being no need to avoid harming other humans at long distances, 
since this was not even, technologically speaking, a possibility. 
 
Nonetheless, the way in which this relates to our discussion is that we frequently develop 
emotional responses particularly when we have to act immediately and intimately. On the 
other hand, when we have more time and do not face the people whose life we may or 
have to affect, we characteristically lapse into an elaborate abstract moral reasoning. 
What partly turns the situation into a ”complex interplay”  between at least two types of 
processes is the way in which we also often elaborate afterwards the domain-specific, 
emotional responses (Lanteri, Chelini and Rizzello 2008, 793). These results can for their 
part shed some light on the findings of situationist psychology both on the indeterminacy 
of our responses over a range of different kinds of situations, and on the considerably 
higher coherence of our responses over a range of situations of the same kind. At the 
same time they can be seen to give plausibility to arguments to the effect that S3 indeed 
may lean too heavily on the intellectual dimension of virtue. Practical wisdom not 
infrequently accumulates as the years pass, but it cannot nullify our evolutionary history. 
However, in my view, all this is very much in accordance with our everyday experience 
and also adds to the plausibility of the virtue (theoretical) conception, in which virtue is 
regarded as domain- and situation-specific, as well as frail but real. 
 
2.4.3. Altruism as an Excellence in Being for the Good 
 
In his introduction to virtue ethical readings Stephen Darwall considers consequentialism, 
contractarianism/contractualism, and deontology moral theories (Darwall 2003, 1-4). 
According to Darwall, these theories concern distinctive moral notions of obligation, 
concern, and respect and, ultimately, questions of right conduct. Virtue ethics, on the 
other hand, can be advanced, not as a moral theory at all, but as an account of other 
aspects of human life which are in and of themselves ethically deep. One kind of such 
                                                                             72 
theories is perfectionism, of which Darwall considers Aristotle to be one example. A 
moral virtue ethics, however, is a theory of what is worthy of distinctively moral esteem, 
that is, worthy of esteem or admiration in a moral agent. 
 
 As an exemplary case of such an approach Darwall considers the eighteenth-century 
Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson argued that the basic moral 
phenomenon is a distinctively moral esteem for benevolence, the desire to benefit others 
(Hutcheson 2003, 51-62). Further, as was discussed above, the reason for Michael Slote’s 
rejection of NA and his embracing of a Hutchesonian, or a generally sentimentalist line of 
thought, was that he finds the warm or sentimentalist approaches the only plausible ways 
in which a general humanitarianism can function as a ground-level element of moral 
thought and theory-building. Slote takes in particular benevolence and caring for others to 
be the most fundamental and plausible moral virtues. Hence, the approaches of the 
sentimentalists or of Slote might – at least at first reading – be considered good 
candidates for strategies to defend VE as a distinctively (others-regarding) moral theory. 
 
Unfortunately we cannot wholeheartedly draw on Slote's strategy since it seems 
incompatible with the broad Adamsian virtue conception for which I have argued. But 
how does NA, in turn, when considered as a separate approach from Aristotle proper, 
succeed in the sentimentalist test, and can we plausibly consider it compatible with 
Adams? Recall how Silverman endeavored to show that the Aristotelian framework is, 
after all, compatible with the claim that properly functioning, virtuous, and flourishing 
human beings necessarily develop and act on warm virtues, too (Silverman 2008, 510-
514). In other (Darwall’s) words, Silverman argued that NA (if not Aristotle proper) is a 
moral virtue ethics. In my view, Silverman is able to make his case plausible yet not quite 
decisive. Silverman himself admits that the accuracy of his claims might be challenged, 
but that ”..(I)t is indisputable that within ethics, psychology and the English language 
there are conceptions of well-being requiring an agent to possess the warm virtues to 
flourish that are widely seen as conceptually plausible” (Silverman 2008, 511). 
 
As an alternative or an amendment to Silverman, we might also consider LeBar's 
insightful strategy to equip Aristotle proper with deontic constraints. According to LeBar 
eudaimonist virtue-ethical theories at least provide a framework for maintaining that we 
have the same reason for occupying the second-person standpoint that we do for being 
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virtuous generally: doing so is of crucial importance for living excellently and well 
(LeBar 2009, 650; Darwall 2006; 2007, 52-69). LeBar works in a eudaimonist virtue 
tradition, but I do not quite see why deontic constraints could not hold in uneudaimonist 
NA, too. According to NA we have reason to do what is virtuous therefore we also have 
reason to occupy a second-person standpoint. 
 
For the sake of the argument I assume that (at least some forms of) NA does manifest the 
characteristics of moral virtue ethics. In addition we can accept, with much more ease, 
Silverman's second argument that Slote's warm agent-basing is not capable of providing 
detailed and nuanced moral evaluations, because Slote's theory loses valuable resources 
when constructing its basis merely to support merely a few warm virtues (Silverman 
2008, 510-518). This clearly is also compatible with Adams. However, in order to assist 
us further in this vein, we first have to consider whether Adams favors NA, and he 
definitely cannot be said to do this. Adams claims that he is offering a contribution to the 
”ethics of virtue” but not a form of ”virtue ethics” (Adams 2006, 6). 
 
His ”virtue ethics” has approximately the same scope of reference as ours in this study: 
by it he is referring to a normative, or substantive, virtue ethical theory. Adams' ”ethics of 
virtue”, however, has a different meaning from that of Gary Watson's above in 2.2. 
Whereas Watson works on an abstract and general (meta)-theoretical level, Adams sees 
himself as providing an account of the nature of virtue without attempting to analyze or to 
define the concepts of right and wrong in terms of it. There is a fundamental difference 
between judgments of virtue and judgments of obligation, and there are no plausible 
grounds to give priority to either, Adams argues. Adams therefore cannot be seen as an 
advocate of any form of NA, at least as long as we define NA, for instance, as holding 
that goodness is prior to rightness (as we did above). 
 
Now, although Adams does not offer his virtue conception, or his ethics of virtue, as a 
part of any form of NA, we might try by all means to make a case for their compatibility. 
That Adams defines virtue as being persistently and morally excellently for good (things) 
causes no friction between his virtue conception and NA. Neither does the fact that 
Adams interprets goods that we can be excellently for very broadly. As a matter of fact 
this characteristic features very prominently already in classical forms of virtue ethics and 
seems to be in no way precluded from modern ones either. Excellence can also be seen 
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here as a common vantage point, if not common terrain, between moral and non-moral. 
Virtue and moral goodness in the meaning of being for the good of others can be 
considered (merely) one, yet by far the most pivotal form of excellence. A neo-
Aristotelian theory that embraces this kind of virtue conception at the same time succeeds 
in laying a claim to be a moral virtue ethical theory. As regards, finally, Adams's view on 
the frailty and fragmentariness of virtue, it actually seems conducive to the plausibility 
and applicability of NA by showing how recent psychological findings as well as 
commonsense experience can be readily integrated into the theory.  
 
2.4.3.1. Does Excellence Really Matter? 
 
Let us, however, turn to consider how Adams fares independently with the altruism 
challenge. This is necessary in any case, because Adams defines virtue as excellence in 
being for the good. That altruism, defined as other-regarding benevolence, is a way of 
being for good seems obvious. It even seems to be a major way of being for good, solely 
on grounds of the numbers of others and their mutually dependent goods. Hence what is 
more in need of discussion is whether altruism is excellent and whether it matters. And, 
indeed, does it matter? Is it not at least superfluous, if not thoroughly misguided, to look 
towards the admirableness of a person rather than towards the benefits received by 
others? 
 
However, when considering the answer, we must first recall that excellence is a particular 
type of goodness, namely, intrinsic goodness. This in turn means, that excellence is not 
(only) usefulness or instrumental goodness, but something that is in itself worth having 
and worthy to be admired or honored. A generous person is, then, not (only) to be 
admired because of the benefits which her generosity is likely to yield to the well-being 
of others. It is the trait itself – the tendency in oneself to be generous when appropriate – 
that renders her worthy of the admiration. Adams also analyses the issue by discussing the 
desire to be of service to others. He points to the fact that it is different from the desire 
that other people be served, no matter by whom. The desire to be of service seems to 
mean that one wants to contribute to something good by way of having some 
responsibility for it and, in that way, participating in it. ”..(I) believe the way in which we 
commonly desire such participation makes clear that we regard it as enriching our lives 
with a value that is not merely instrumental, but is something over and above the benefits 
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that is received by the other person” (Adams 2006, 68). 
 
To summarize, Adams seems to believe that if we think of an interest in the non-
instrumental value of altruism as harmfully shadowing or undermining the interest in its 
(instrumental) benefits, we are likely to be thinking of the benefits on the model of 
commodities. This, in turn, could mean that we have a (very) truncated conception of the 
goods of human life, notwithstanding that much human good does depend on 
commodities. To put it in another way, there is the question of whether a person is 
regarded as a means or as an end when she is seen as virtuous. If altruism is seen in 
merely instrumental (consequential) terms, it follows that people are regarded (mainly) as 
means to the ends of others when they are praised for altruistic qualities or actions. And to 
be regarded mainly as a means and not as an end in oneself can be considered degrading. 
However,”.. (W)hatever else a virtue should be, the praise of it should not be degrading” 
(Adams 2006, 67). 
 
Adams, in fact, explicitly argues here against the trait-consequentialism of Julia Driver as 
discussed above. He finds Driver's theory paradigmatically representing an outlook in 
which the moral point of view is situated (implicitly) in a system in which the interests of 
people are seen as in competition rather than community with those of other people. And 
to praise one from that point of view is to actually praise the benefits that others derive 
from one's qualities, inner states, and actions, without regard to whether one's life is or 
becomes happier or better in any intrinsic way (for those qualities). According to Adams, 
this leaves us without a satisfying answer to the question of why one should desire moral 
virtue for oneself or for anyone that one cares for. In communal environment, however, it 
is natural to identify virtues with qualities of will and personal relationship. Such a point 
of view supports a conception of virtue as fundamentally a form of excellence rather than 
of usefulness (Adams 2006, 66-73). 
 
However, although it may matter whether altruism is excellent, the question remains 
whether it is excellent? Adams believes, first on, that there is a conceptual connection 
between value and valuing. He does not mean that either can be defined as a function of 
the other, but that, nevertheless, if something is good, there is a way in which it is good 
(excellent) to value it (Adams 2006, 74). But this suggests, however, that one could be 
excellently for good things that one wants for himself alone. This we would generally 
                                                                             76 
consider a selfish thing to do, but what is it that would be more excellent about wanting 
good things for others (too)? 
 
First, there is the issue of wider scope. An altruistic interest in the good of others typically 
has wider scope than one's interest in one's own good can have. Moreover, it seems to be 
more excellent to be for more rather than less of what is good. Secondly and closely 
related to the first, a great proportion of our own possible (intrinsic) goods depend on how 
we relate to others and how we take care of their goods. Thus my caring about my own 
good alone could not have sufficient richness to compensate for its narrowness. Third, 
intuitively, not to take care of the goods of other people not only is less excellent but is 
morally bad, too. In other words, it can be considered a vice, at least in cases it develops 
into a settled motivational pattern or disposition. And, moreover, not to take care of the 
goods of others seems to be bad or even vicious in another way, too. Namely, not to take 
care of the goods of other people is a way of relating badly to them. Whether or not it is 
reciprocated, caring for others' goods constitutes an interpersonal relationship which, 
according to Adams, is richer and more excellent than the more reflexive relationship to 
oneself involved in caring for one's own good(s) (Adams 2006, 73-7). 
 
What this suggests, it seems to me, is that in Adams’ virtue conception it is excellent to 
take care of the good of others and, accordingly, altruism is a virtue in Adams. It even 
may be seen as a major virtue, since most of us are related or at least connected to a large 
number of others in multiple ways, and as argued above, it seems to be more excellent to 
be for more rather than less of what is good. However, all this does not remove the fact 
that in the Adamsian (kind of) virtue conception(s) potential virtue has broad scope and 
the territory of the moral is considered broadly, too. Moreover, in Adams virtue is 
considered a socially dependent, probabilistic inner state or quality of persons. 
 
Being so vulnerable and indeterminate in its manifestation, can virtue, after all, serve as a 
plausible key concept in a coherent endeavor to try to understand and theorize about 
morality? I think it can, and partly so precisely on grounds of virtue's frailty and 
fragmentariness. These characteristics for their part render an ethics of virtue and virtue 
ethics indisputably relevant to and compatible with the way we actually live and are. How 
we manage with others or how we take care of their good is a major constituent, maybe 
the very essence, of what morality means. However, the notion of morality cannot 
                                                                             77 
plausibly be truncated to apply merely to altruism. To add to this idea and, at the same 
time, to face one more challenge to VE and NA and their respective plausibility as moral, 
other-regarding theories, let us discuss briefly the problem of partiality. 
 
2.4.3.2. Is Partiality to Be Tolerated or Even Welcomed? 
 
The issue has received a wide indeed treatment in the philosophical literature, but I now 
choose to draw particularly on John Cottingham, for reasons soon to become apparent 
(Cottingham 1996, 57-76). Cottingham, namely, takes it to be the rootedness in the real 
world that gives VE a decisive edge over its competitors, i.e. the different varieties of 
deontology and consequentialism. Further, what facilitates this kind of rootedness, even 
without the well-developed virtue conceptions like Adams’, is among other things the 
network of preferences and partialities that VE allows and that generally is part and parcel 
of the human condition. Cottingham calls this kind of virtue ethical perspective 
“autocentric” and maintains that it can largely be rescued from the accusations of 
complacency and bland social conservatism with which it is sometimes charged. 
However, Cottingham works through some parts of Aristotle proper and finds rich 
evidence to the effect that a virtuous person”..(I)s in no sense either a global utility-
maximizer or an impartial seeker after Kantian moral worth” (Cottingham 1996, 62). 
  
Accordingly, Cottingham argues that the Aristotelian idea for excellence assigns value in 
a way which is heavily dependent on decent upbringing, solid endowments of income, 
good health, and other determinants and qualities of life which clearly are not only 
requirements for a worthy life (in Kantian sense), but for outward success and flourishing. 
Thus, Cottingham goes on to argue, the virtuous can plausibly find place and time for 
charity and benevolence, but that will only do after the central (external) ingredients of 
human flourishing are in place; and the securing of those ingredients requires the 
existence of strong and stable networks of partiality and preference. Within the Adamsian 
virtue approach we might respectively say that although excellence (in being for the 
good) brings to our life a prominent part of what is morally worthwhile in it, there are 
also many basic goods that depend on commodities and services of various kinds; which 
are necessary for us; and which we secure by relating to certain others, some of whom we 
regard as our nearest and dearest (Adams 2006, 19-23, 70; Cottingham 1996, 57-64). 
Cottingham anticipates the wealth of protest which his perspective arouses. In his 
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defense, to put it briefly, he reminds us that those tempted to take the high moral ground 
against Aristotle must be prepared to undergo a good deal of honest self-examination on 
how their very own lives take course. Even a minimal level of honesty is enough to reveal 
to most of us that in the structure of the great part of our day-to-day lives we are 
Aristotelians. It becomes visible in who we regard as friends, in which kinds of goods we 
want for ourselves and our families and so on.  
 
Cottingham also suggests that perhaps it is best for virtue theorists to simply bite the 
bullet when confronting the critique. The achievement of (neo)-Aristotelian ethical 
excellence, like other forms of human excellence, is and will be contingent on more than 
mere inner worth. There is the (moral) luck, and there are the other contingences and 
dependences. Cottingham actually asserts that it is a central feature ”..(O)f the conception 
of ethics put forward by virtue theory” that ethical appraisal is seen as continuous with, 
and of the fundamentally same type as other kinds of human appraisal (Cottingham 1996, 
67). This, indeed, comes rather close to how excellence, virtue and the sphere of morality 
are seen very broadly in Adams, too (Adams 2006, 19-23). Moreover, as I see it, both 
perspectives are able to gain in plausibility exactly on the grounds of these mutual 
features: their conceptions of virtue are susceptible both to empirical findings and to 
overall intuitions on the human condition. 
 
This concludes the core parts of my defense against the main challenges of VE as I see 
them. I believe that the discussion so far at least shows that VE (i) has ample potentiality 
as a distinctive departure in considering the features of the phenomena of morality and 
that (ii) VE also can be developed as a moral theory, in the sense that there is not only a 
central but also a conceptually or logically necessary place in it for the virtue of altruism. 
Shortly, in the beginning of Interlude One, I will actually summarize the features which 
have proved to constitute the core of the virtue ethical conception, which I have been 
analyzing. Before doing so, however, I want to return to comparing a theory of excellence 
for a nonhuman animal. I want to do this because of what I claimed about the conceptual 
necessity of altruism in VE and because of the critique VE has been facing on grounds of 
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2.4.3.3. A Postscript about the Telos 
 
Now, as we saw above in section 2.2., Watson found evaluational essentialism to sit badly 
with modern notions:”..(J)ust as God is dead, it will be said, so the concept of human 
nature has ceased to be normative” (Watson 2003, 244). Cottingham, however, sees us 
within the confines of his virtue theoretical conception as creatures whose commitments 
and possible goals are largely determined by specific biological and social ties. In other 
words, Cottingham thinks that it is important to draw a connection between the goodness 
of an individual and considerations about the way of life of the species of which the 
individual is a member (Cottingham 1996, 61-2). 
 
Cottingham seems, on his part, to draw rather heavily on Philippa Foot, who has recently 
been working on the concept of natural normativity (Foot 2001, 25-51). Foot argues that 
there is a logical kinship between evaluative judgments made of plants and animals 
(generally non-human organisms) and moral judgments applied to human beings. An 
organism of a given type, on Foot's account, will count as defective if it lacks something 
that is vital for carrying through with its characteristic mode of survival and reproduction. 
Similar norms apply to human beings as organisms. Yet since humans are practically 
reasoning organisms, there are norms of conduct that they must comprehend and act on in 
order to count as good humans. Foot then goes on to argue, that by the natural norms 
applying to human beings, one counts as defective if she lacks virtues. The claim is that to 
lack virtues (and vices?) is to lack features that we need to get on with a life that is 
characteristically human. Moral judgments assess human conduct from the standpoint of 
natural human goodness:” ..(T)here is no change in the meaning of 'good' between the 
word as it appears in 'good roots' and as it appears in 'good dispositions of the human 
will'” (Foot 2001, 39). 
 
This kind of neo-naturalism has brought Foot face to face with a rather cool reception. 
The critique seems to focus on the fact that Foot clearly does not adhere to the 
contemporary scientific account of the biological world. The orthodox, neo-Darwinian 
view maintains that organismic traits function essentially to promote gene replication, 
while Foot identifies survival and reproduction as basic goals of an organism's traits. The 
critique, however, has also been seen misplaced. John Hacker-Wright maintains that the 
critics both miss the distinctive logical approach to the biological world employed by 
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Foot to define natural normativity and also misconstrue how natural normativity applies 
to practically reasoning human beings. In other words, Foot does not try to challenge the 
superiority of evolutionary explanations. Her aim is completely different, namely to show 
that to establish what is normal for a given species is an irreducibly interpretative task and 
that we are always employing some interpretation when we approach organisms. In sum, 
Foot's theory is not a biological one.  Rather, it is a theory of the structure and the logic of 
how we make (evaluative) statements about living things (Hacker-Wright 2009, 315-17). 
 
Is Watson eventually wrong in his non-naturalism and Foot right in her (neo)-naturalism? 
I have not found reason to close the case in favor of either, yet I embrace Foot's notion of 
interpretation. I think the core point of the idea becomes clear in Hacker-Wright's 
formulation of it. Foot does not, he maintains, either recommend, or see as virtuous, 
behavior on the basis of its being the way people normally behave. Instead, 
recommendations spring up as a result of internal observation or interpretation that we (at 
least partly intuitively) employ in our situation as dependent creatures with practical 
reason. To express it via an example from Foot: ”..(By) the criteria of natural normativity 
charity is a prime candidate as a virtue, because love and other forms of kindness are 
needed by every one of us when misfortune strikes” (Foot 2001, 108). And Hacker-
Wright continues:”..(I) would argue that there are certain, central, almost inevitable 
human experiences that provide the framework for our ethical self-interpretation” 
(Hacker-Wright 2009, 320). 
 
Now, what Hacker-Wright says can also be accepted without any commitment to 
naturalism, or to Foot's natural normativity. I also remarked above Watson’s conceding 
that what actually count as virtues, can at least in part be identified by their contribution 
to a characteristically human life, without any commitment to naturalism (Watson 2003, 
240). Our human condition and experiences as dependent rational animals simply provide 
the framework for our (ethical) interpretation of our social and existential environment. 
One such plausible interpretation might be the one offered by Michael Slote when he 
considered benevolence to be the one (and only) cardinal virtue in a densely populated 
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INTERLUDE ONE  
 
A. Virtuous Craftsmanship and Professionalism 
 
In the present section, Interlude One, I endeavor to delineate a more concise and coherent 
picture of the virtue conception (and virtue ethics) for which I have argued in this study. I 
do it both by drawing a comparison between the position I embrace and that developed by 
Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking; and by laying out a more explicit schema on the virtue 
conception which I embrace (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 39-137). Overall, Interlude One 
is construed as a bridge along which the focus of the conversation shifts from purely 
theoretical considerations onto virtue ethical applications in the ethics of professions in 
general and in the ethics of journalism in particular. 
To make the following of my argumentation easier while discussing Oakley and Cocking, 
I start with the schema. I will both draw on my discussion above and provide some new 
clarificatory remarks and arguments. My aim is not to develop a distinctive and coherent 
virtue ethical theory, but to try to show how a broadly neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical 
framework – which allows for a rich and real-life-rooted virtue conception – has 
individual and indispensable potentiality in normative ethics and action-guidance. 
 
1. A decisive feature of an ethics of virtue or any kind of virtue ethics is its theory of 
virtue. I draw in this study on the virtue conception of Robert M. Adams which 
considers virtue   excellence in being persistently for the (moral) good. In Adams 
virtue is frequently domain-specific, probabilistic and frail, but real and the source 
of intrinsic good-(ness).   
2. In virtue ethical approaches, including my own broadly neo-Aristotelian one, 
character-appraisal dominates over or is prior to act-evaluation. Instead of 
character it is often (more) meaningful to refer to diverse persistent motivational 
factors in the psyche of a person. However, act-evaluation is also an integral part 
of a plausible virtue approach. In this I also draw on Adams and certain other 
theorists and note that virtue ethical theories frequently and unfortunately lack 
within them a place for obligation. This, then, strongly contravenes the general 
intuition that we owe to other people not to hurt them. 
                                                                                                                                            
defined by reference to real-world exemplars. She thus gives an important place in her theory to empirical 
investigation (Zagzebski 2010, 41-57). 
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3. Which character-traits or motivational states can be regarded as virtues does 
depend, in some versions of VE, on what is seen as conducive to or constitutive of 
characteristically human life, which in turn can be defined or grounded in various 
ways. I, however, find it plausible to ground the virtues particularly in common 
interpretative intuitions on objective goods and intrinsic goodness (in accordance 
and partly inspired by Adams); or secondarily on what is considered admirable in 
human beings, or good and necessary for human beings to live a rewarding or 
flourishing life in (a) communit(ies). This part of virtue ethics can be referred to 
as their respective theories of good. 
4. Virtue ethics presupposes a strong continuum between moral and other types of 
human appraisal, excellence, and practical thought. 
5. And, finally, both virtue ethics in general and the virtue ethics developed and 
favored in this study allow for partiality and are auto-centric in their orientation. 
 
Now, the reason why I see it as productive to discuss Oakley’s and Cocking’s arguments 
(2001, 1) in this study is that they aim to show in their work how a theoretically advanced 
virtue ethics offers a plausible and distinctive alternative to consequentialist and 
deontological approaches to the understanding and evaluation of professional roles, and I 
consider that they are very much on the right track in their endeavor. Indeed, I am 
inclined to agree with most of what they claim about VE's superiority to consequentialism 
and deontology, yet I disagree on various issues relating to the way in which they consider 
the characteristics of VE and virtue, and, accordingly, on how the virtue-ethical approach 
can be seen to serve as a basis in an ethics of professions. In sum, I discuss Oakley’s and 
Cocking’s approach in order to assist the reader out of Part two with its emphasis on 
virtue theory down to Part three where I concentrate on the ethics of journalism and on 
the concrete work of journalists. 
 
Nevertheless, Oakley’s and Cocking's analysis of VE fails to meet some of its most severe 
challenges and is therefore partly theoretically and empirically adrift, although there is 
indeed much to acclaim in their endeavor to develop a genuinely virtue-ethical theory of 
professions. On the grounds of the indeterminacy of their virtue conception and on the 
implausibility of some aspects of their brand of VE (or NA) I believe, nevertheless, that 
Oakley and Cocking are running the risk of receiving wrong or inaccurate answers to 
correct questions when applying their theory. In order to be able to show this, I proceed 
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by first addressing the manner in which they set out the basic features of virtue ethics as 
they see it. And as will be noticed, theirs is also a neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue, and 
one which I consider to belong to the traditional or mainstream kind of theories within the 
confines of NA (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 9-38: Oakley 1996, 128-152). 
 
Being a traditional neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue, there are bound to be characteristics 
in Oakley’s and Cocking’s approach which I am unable to accept as parts of my virtue(-
ethics) conception. However, Oakley and Cocking begin with a discussion on the core 
features of VE, in which they draw heavily on Oakley's earlier work that we touched on 
above (Oakley 1996, 128-152). They first define in a familiar way an action as right if 
and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would perform in the 
circumstances. They then observe that there are forms of consequentialism and 
deontology which also give the character of an agent an essential role in the justification 
of right action. This we already discussed when addressing Julia Driver's consequentialist 
virtue theory. However, in this way it is clearly unacceptable to speak of virtue ethics as 
distinctive merely by the primacy it gives to character, and this implication Oakley and 
Cocking naturally take into consideration. 
 
They also address the issue of the very plausibility of a purely character-based criterion of 
rightness of action, but fail to develop it in the direction we took above. One shortcoming, 
as we saw it, resides in the very definition of right action which Oakley and Cocking also 
lean on.  It specifies how to choose the right action but fails to indicate why the right 
action is right. In that way traditional NA and accordingly also Oakley’s and Cocking’s 
approach, can be objected as relying on an unexplained or indefinite concept of right 
action (van Zyl 2009b, 68). Moreover, Oakley and Cocking discuss the major challenge 
faced by VE in the claims of situationist psychology concerning the very existence of 
character(-traits) merely within one footnote, which I find somewhat alarming in a work 
which takes character as one of its fundamental theoretical cornerstones (Oakley and 
Cocking 2001, 9-38) . 
 
One major implication of Oakley's and Cocking’s negligence as regards the situationist 
challenge is the way in which their definition of virtue is left wanting in descriptive and 
analytical depth. They define virtue as plural and intrinsically valuable or admirable traits 
or activities, but this seems to be all: there is no substantive discussion, for example, of 
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the frailty or, particularly, of the domain-specificity of virtue, which, after all, has major 
leverage in their theory, as we shall see below. What they also do not explicitly discuss is 
the relation between moral and other kinds of excellence, or to put it another way, how 
narrowly or broadly and as how established they see the very territory of morality. In 
addition, however, Oakley and Cocking hold that goodness is prior to rightness. There is 
much meta-ethical controversy on this question, and with Adams, I reject it in case there 
is included in it the idea that there is no room for duty or obligation in moral theory at 
all.
65
 In contrast, I do share the view that the rightness of an action is dependent on the 
motives of the agent in question. In other words, acting rightly means in VE or NA acting 
out of virtue or admirably, it is being excellently for some good in action. Right action, in 
fact, then, means in VE good or praiseworthy action. 
 
This approach, on the other hand, leaves ample room for ”deontological rightness” in 
making decisions. I not only act decently when holding back from burning my neighbor's 
house: I first of all owe it to her not to burn it. As a matter of fact, I consider that the point 
and meaning of this kind of continence cannot even be adequately described in standard 
aretaic terms. Yet one solution to that effect might be to consider occupying the second-
person standpoint as a major virtue, in accordance with LeBar's suggestion (LeBar 2009, 
642-671). However, Oakley and Cocking rightly add that the priority claim effectively 
distinguishes VE from traditional forms of Kantianism and deontology in which rightness 
is not derived from notions of goodness or accounts of human good, well-being, or virtue. 
In contemporary Kantianism (deontology), a good agent is one who is disposed to act in 
accordance with certain moral rules or requirements, which themselves are derived for 
instance from the nature of practical rationality (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 19-21). 
 
Nonetheless, according to Oakley and Cocking, there are three more core features in VE: 
the virtues are objectively good, some intrinsic goods are agent-relative, and acting 
rightly does not require that we maximize the good. These are features that I not only 
accept but also see as necessary: indeed we briefly discussed them at the end of section 
2.2. Objective goodness, first, means that virtues are good independently of any 
connection which they may have with desire, and this is clearly compatible with how we 
                                               
65See e.g. Wedgwood (2009) and particularly Thomas Hurka (2010) on the issue. On Hurka’s account 
rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more 
basic moral concept, e.g. happiness or pleasure. I regard Hurka’s solution as elegant and in many ways 
plausible, but on grounds that it is not virtue ethical I leave it aside in this context. 
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described the virtue conception of Adams above. Second, that some intrinsic goods are 
agent-relative is in turn implied by auto-centricity for which I argued above. To describe a 
certain good as agent-relative is to say that its being a good of mine gives it additional 
moral importance (to me). Friendship, for example, which is a standard example of an 
agent-relative virtue, could, nevertheless, be regarded as an agent-neutral virtue, too. In 
that case, it would be the friendship per se which is intrinsically valuable and a pluralist 
(though hardly a monist) consequentialist who believed that friendship is an agent-neutral 
value would tell us to maximize or at least promote friendships themselves. 
 
Finally, Oakley and Cocking argue that acting rightly does not require that we maximize 
the good. In VE we are told to have excellent friendships, not the best ones possible for 
us. And theirs being excellent means that we are guided in our friendship relations by the 
particular and appropriate normative conception of what friendship involves, i.e. we have 
to act out of our knowledge on friendshipness. The non-maximizing principle is 
particularly ill-suited to the core thesis of most versions of consequentialism, which 
instructs us to maximize the good, whether goodness is understood in monistic or 
pluralistic, subjective or objective terms. In this way, the distinctive features which 
Oakley and Cocking (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 9-25) delineate are arguably mutually 
able to effectively distinguish VE from (at least most of) its deontological and 
consequentalist rivals. 
 
Friendship also figures strongly in how Oakley and Cocking proceed in developing their 
virtue ethical theory of professions. The virtue of friendship, namely, shows how VE 
productively allows departures from what impartialist ethical theories would ordinarily 
require of us. And although there are, according to Oakley and Cocking, some important 
distinctions between friendship and professional life – with respect to the challenge each 
might have been thought to pose to impartialist theories – there are also some plausible 
analogies (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 38-73). In terms of our Adamsian terminology, 
Oakley’s and Cocking's analysis of friendship strives to show us how professional virtues 
in VE may, or even should, legitimately be more or less domain-dependent. What then 
actually counts as acting well in the context of a professional role is, in their view 
(Oakley and Cocking 2001, 74) importantly determined by how well that role functions in 
serving the goals of the profession, and by how those goals in turn are connected with key 
human good(s). That is, good professional roles must be part of a good profession, and a 
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good profession is one which involves commitment to (a) good(s) which play(s) a crucial 
role in enabling us to live a humanly flourishing life. 
 
Thus, in Oakley’s and Cocking’s terms the question of whether the whole enterprise of 
journalism can be considered morally sound, depends first upon its goals being in service 
of some key human good(s) (or at least not being against any such good(s));  and second, 
upon journalism's being a profession. Moreover, if all this can be granted, the moral status 
of the pieces of journalistic work, for example of a sports reporter, in turn depends on 
how well the role of sports journalism functions in serving the goals of journalism in 
general.
66
 So, for example, if it is appropriate to take serving democracy, or some of its 
constituent parts, such as   freedom of speech and administrative transparency, as either a 
goal or even the central goal of journalism, then given the importance of democracy to 
human flourishing, journalism would count as a good profession (or at least occupation) 
on this approach. Further, for example, given the (general) news reporter's broad concern 
with what is taking place in the local and national political and social environment, the 
news reporter's role within journalism seems clearly to count as a good journalistic 
(professional/occupational) role. 
 
In this way, in Oakley’s and Cocking's virtue ethical approach (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 
75), in the generation of a defensible professional (occupational) ethic, the norms of the 
profession in question cannot simply be taken as given (as they often seem to be in 
professional codes); rather, they must be shown to reflect a commitment to (an) important 
substantive human good(s) that contributes to our living a good or flourishing human life. 
In addition, the excellences of, for example a good journalist, must be determined by 
reference to some model of what being a journalist purports to be. That is, those 
excellences will be informed by an account of the proper goals of journalism as a 
practice, a philosophy of journalism, and an account of what sorts of relationships 
between journalists and readership (citizenry) are appropriate in such a practice. 
Oakley and Cocking develop the concept of ”regulative ideal” to refer to how internalized 
ethical considerations guide one in her actions and particularly keep her from distancing 
herself too far from excellent or virtuous conduct within a practice. Nevertheless, I 
                                               
66 As Professor Juha Räikkä kindly pointed out to me, there probably are very few who use this kind of 
criteria to assess the journalistic (or moral?) quality or legitimacy of sports-pages. However, it seems that 
the logic of Oakley’s and Cocking’s approach leads to the above inference. 
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consider ”regulative ideal” to be rather superfluous and as overlapping with ”excellences” 
and ”virtues” (or ”principles”). As I see it, what we need, in order to plausibly explicate 
the moral considerations within the dynamics of a practice, is the Macintyrian frame 
modified with the deeper and more analytic virtue conception discussed above. On the 
other hand, there is nothing misleading in Oakley’s and Cocking’s idea of regulative 
ideal. With it, I think, they simply wish to emphasize the importance of grounding the 
ideals and virtues of any one profession (or occupation) on the goals of the respective 
profession, rather than looking towards more general universalistic virtues or moral 
principles. 
 
Accordingly they also contend that this grounding of VE in practice and its inherent goals 
makes the charge of impracticality, which is so often directed at VE by the proponents of 
universalist ethical theories – and which we addressed above – seem rather ironic. 
 
..(F)or on our account, the regulative ideal of a good doctor is informed by the 
appropriate conception of the doctor's role, and this must be derived in important 
ways from the practice of medicine itself. And indeed, other ethical theories, 
whose regulative ideals are distinctive by the prominence they give to universalist 
concerns, look decidedly impractical in their distance from the actual roles and 
concrete sensitivities of actual doctors (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 74-75, 115; 
Adams 2006, 14-35, 65-94, 115-165; MacIntyre 1981, 175-183; Borden 2007, 15-
30; 49-123; cf. Garver 2006, 15-46). 
 
But to what extent should the ordinary prohibitions and requirements of broader ethical 
considerations or theories limit what one may be required to do by one's role within any 
particular profession or occupation? Or is the general conception of the virtuous person 
always inappropriate for evaluating conduct within a professional role? Oakley and 
Cocking argue that it is not. They maintain that in giving an account of the distinctive 
sensitivities and requirements of various professional roles, and of how those 
requirements may diverge from what broad-based morality would allow, one is in no way 
committed to the idea that those role requirements are absolute. One should not overvalue 
the good that might be claimed for excellent performance in certain professional roles. In 
particular, there generally are strong reasons not to violate the founding value(s) of a 
certain profession (or occupation) (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 130-31). 
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Thus, if journalism be a harbinger of administrative and political transparency and 
accountability, untruthfulness and deception cannot be considered journalistic excellences 
or virtues, even though they might occasionally be conducive to disclosure of crucial 
information. It is common knowledge, after all, that a person acting within a role may 
lose sight of how his acting within it promotes or constitutes or fails to constitute his 
leading a good life; and that to the extent that he does so, the broad-based moral values 
making up the picture of good life ought to correct his narrowed vision.  Moreover, as 
was discussed at the end of section 2.4.2., the learning and embracing of the more general 
and domain-neutral virtues and other practical dispositions in addition also tends to 
enhance one's ability to make out the moral worth of the respective role or practice and its 
goals. I actually suggested above, in strong concordance with Robert M. Adams, that it 
may even be thoroughly plausible to hold that any social role (including occupational 
roles) can be inhabited more virtuously with this kind of critical stance than without it 
(Oakley and Cocking 2001, 130-136; Adams 2006, 142-43). 
 
Simone van der Burg and Anke van Gorp serve us with an illuminating example on how 
losing sight of general and domain-neutral virtues may contribute to the ways of seeing 
the moral responsibilities in one's occupation (van der Burg and van Gorp 2005, 235-
256). They discuss an example of engineers who design truck trailers and who do not 
consider traffic safety to be part of their responsibility, although the common supposition 
is that designers in fact should do all that is in their power to ensure safety in traffic. Van 
der Burg and van Gorp argue that engineers understand their responsibility only in the 
light of their role in the practice of trailer design and that this understanding steers their 
decisions, as well as their interpretation of the moral codes. As a matter of fact safety does 
play an important role in design and development, but the engineers' view of a ”safe 
trailer” seems to be based solely on structural measures. And because the engineers have 
always perceived a safe trailer to be a structurally integral trailer, they have never thought 
about traffic safety measures. In other words, their general picture of good life has not 
affected their practice-dependent work and its goals. 
Neil Levy, for his part, discusses how the practice-dependent myopia can possibly lead to 
violations of the founding value(s) in journalism (Levy 2004, 106-118). Levy first takes 
journalism's goal to be “the production of truth”
67
 and accordingly its founding value to 
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be truthfulness. Levy then goes on to contend that journalists frequently find themselves 
in situations where deception might result in disclosure of information which they are 
ardently reaching for. What is alarming here is that occasionally deception can be 
considered warranted. However, there is the danger that within the practice deception is 
allowed far too self-evident a status, in spite of its being against the practice's founding 
value(s). 
 
B. Journalism, a Practice and a Prospecting Profession  
 
Now, what is still missing in our discussion is a consideration of whether doing 
journalism actually constitutes a profession, and whether it in turn has substantial 
relevance to how our approach to the ethics of journalism should be developed further. 
Oakley and Cocking for their part argue that it is widely agreed that for an occupation 
justifiably to claim to be a profession, its practitioners must not deal simply with goods 
that many of us desire to have; rather, its practitioners must be able to help us attain 
certain goods that play a crucial strategic role in our living a humanly flourishing life 
(Oakley and Cocking 2001, 78-9). They also maintain that it is in account of this strategic 
nature of the goods which professionals characteristically help us to secure that cases 
where a professional fails to uphold his role – in comparison with a non-professional who 
fails to fulfill her occupational role – gain such moral significance. 
 
I think that a case could be made on these lines that journalism also qualifies as a 
profession, or that it at least is a solid claimant to become one, even though at the same 
time ample empirical evidence is accumulating to the effect that the phenomenon of de-
professionalization of journalism may also have gathered impetus particularly during the 
last two decades (Aldridge and Evett 2003, 547-564; Nygren 2008, 15-26; Singer 2007, 
79-95; Friend and Singer 2007, 14-53; Russo 1998, 72-111; Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi 
and Damon 2001, 16-36).  
Nevertheless, I do not believe that anything decisive hinges on this issue. Journalism can 
be plausibly considered a practice, and to work as a journalist means adopting an 
occupational, i.e. a social, role within the practice of journalism. What also importantly 
characterizes journalism, as I see it, and as I already argued in Introduction, is how it can 
                                                                                                                                            
that journalists are supposed to write truthful reports. However, to formulate it in the way that he chooses to 
do, the notion appears to point to the direction of social constructivism. 
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also be considered a craft. There is, then, the practice with its own goals and craft-specific 
excellences, of which, according to my approach, some may be regarded as (at least) 
minor virtues, depending on how reliably they can be seen to further some key good(s) of 
readers or citizens. Now, to conclude Interlude one, let us take a yet more detailed look at 
what a Macintyrean practice boils down to and how it relates to other key concepts in this 
study. 
 
First, I take journalism to be a practice in a broadly Macintyrian formulation, on the 
grounds that it clearly is an established and co-operative social activity with its own 
internal goals and excellences in accomplishing those goals.
68
 Typically, for one to be 
able adequately and productively to act (or react) within a practice calls for intimate 
knowledge of its rules, standards, values, and goals, which, also typically, are either 
conceptually or at least practically connected. Examples of practices, in addition to 
journalism, are basketball, archeology, housing construction, and correctional treatment, 
yet occasionally tossing a ball or painting one's house are not practices. A practice is also 
importantly to be seen as separate from its organizational or institutional settings. The 
practice of journalism evolves within media, as does the practice of ecological research 
within universities and other scientific institutions. 
 
Note, however, that practices and their organizational settings frequently, even typically, 
have differing internal ends or goals. While journalism strives to break news and to 
provide readership with relevant information on what is taking place at present in the 
community, media seeks to boost the turnover and keep the shareholders satisfied. Of 
course, there is solid common terrain within the interests of the practices and their 
respective organizational settings, and as a matter of fact – at least in market-driven 
environments – it cannot be otherwise: excellent pieces of journalism, that is excellent 
within the criteria and goods of journalism, often also sell well, as do well-constructed 
houses.
69
 And there is also decisive evidence to the effect that thriving media houses can 
                                               
68”..(B)y a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and particularly definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre 1981, 175). 
69Yet one could argue that they frequently do not sell well enough or that media executives do not 
ultimately trust their commercial potentiality. When e.g. in Finland the top television channels transmit 
their main news programs at different times throughout the evening: at 6 p.m., 7 p.m., 8.30 p.m. and 10 
p.m., the leading American television networks transmit their main news programs in the early and late 
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and do provide more abundant resources and more leeway to the newsrooms than do the 
ones fighting their way through tougher times. 
Nevertheless, making money, the key internal goal of media,
70
 is an external goal to 
journalism. It is not compatible with the conceptual structure of the journalistic practice.
71
 
If we allowed high profit margins as journalism's internal goal, we should also allow, 
respectively, a radical re-negotiation of its excellences. However, the relation between the 
internal and external goals of a practice is a subtle and complicated one and we shall 
discuss it further in Parts three and four (MacIntyre 1981, 175-189; Borden 2007, 15-30; 
66-69). 
 
Second, the excellences, goals, roles and the whole internal culture of a given practice 
generally gradually develop or transform by virtue of the dynamical and deeply 
interconnected nature of social systems and their sub-systems. People normally 
simultaneously occupy positions and roles in various practices and organizations. Change 
and transformation inevitably issue from this social complex with its power relations, 
both intentionally and by chance, however strong may be the normative and 
psychological resistance both of a given practice and within it. Change however 
frequently also issues on grounds of practice's internal revisionary logic. ”Practice”, then, 
is not in general susceptible of conservatism and of fostering of status quo as a theoretical 
construct, as is frequently argued (Borden 2007, 21-23, Lambeth 1992, 73-74; Mason 
1996, 191-210). 
 
Third, whether or not journalism can be considered a profession, I hold as one of its 
decisive characteristics – something which both distinguishes it from other media-related 
occupations and gives credence for the consideration of at least some of its excellences as 
                                                                                                                                            
evening, reserving the hours between 7 p.m. and 11 p.m. for entertainment to maximize ratings and 
revenue. The situation e.g. in Denmark is very much like the one in Finland. However, the difference 
between Finland and U.S. seems rather plausibly to be traced to the difference between the public 
service model of broadcasting (to which also the commercial channels have to adapt to some degree) 
and the  purely market-driven one (Curran, Iyengar, Brink Lund and Salovaara-Moring 2009, 5-26). 
70The so-called public service channels of course have other main goals which are defined in law and 
regulation. 
71MacIntyre writes: 
      ..(I)ndeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions, and consequently of the goods 
external to the goods internal to the practices in question, that institutions and practices 
characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice 
are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for 
common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution 
(MacIntyre 1981, 181). 
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virtues – its being for democracy and in that way also for human flourishing. 
”Democracy” is indeed a notoriously complicated and controversial concept, but I take it 
as acceptable to see it  as an umbrella notion, under which are included for example the 
freedom of speech, administrative transparency and an equal opportunity to pursue 
political power. In this way journalism as a practice can be seen to be at least for some 
goods which are conducive to democratic arrangements and habits and which can also be 
considered independent strategic human goods. Yet, this does not mean that journalism 
could or would not also have other goals, as was considered in Introduction. For example 
entertainment and consumer-counseling are often considered legitimate journalistic goals. 
In other words, readers can be and are seen within journalism not only as citizens but also 
as consumers (Baker 2002; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White 2009, 
223, 225-6; Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008). 
 
Fourth, the virtue (-theoretical) conception discussed above gives a plausible view of how 
virtue either may manifest it domain-specifically or may contingently issue from the 
domain-specific, i.e. from role- or practice-specific excellence. On the other hand, in my 
Adamsian approach excellence and virtue are not autistic in their domain-specificity in 
virtue of their being frequently overridden not only by more holistic and domain-neutral 
moral and other practical considerations but also on grounds of their connectedness to 
those key human goods which the respective practice is for (in case it is for any such 
good(s)). In this way the virtue conception embraced secures an opportunity for a detailed 
ethical analysis of both what it is to be and act out of virtue in a given role within a given 
practice. 
 
However, in what follows I go on to analyze in greater detail how virtue is understood in 
earlier work in the ethics of journalism, and what are the very reasons to adapt into the 
approach I have been developing and go on to develop below. The main goal of Part 
three is, then, to re-evaluate that work already done on the subject, which has a basis or a 
flavor of virtue ethics.
72
 
                                               
72Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001) write interestingly on ”good work” from the point of view 
of psychology; they seem to regard this as a work that is both professionally excellent and morally 
sound. In addition they maintain that professions, and more generally all ”realms of work”, have a 
distinctive, central mission as well as standards of performance. The ultimate ethical edge of each realm, 
however, resides in practitioners' identities which they bring along and develop further when entering a 
realm. Nonetheless, these authors seem to think that to qualify as good or competent, professional 
performance has to be morally sound (virtuous?), too. 
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3. VIRTUE’S STANDING WITHIN THE CRAFT 
 
In the following sections I aim to lay out how virtue and virtue theory has been mobilized 
to provide the foundation – or some foundational elements – for the ethics of journalism. 
Because the body of work in journalism ethics which have at least virtue ethical flavors is 
considerable, I proceed via examples. First of all, for reasons of clarity and coherence of 
presentation, we have to choose a plausible and defensible way to compartmentalize the 
material, i.e. the existing literature. And what I consider to be a  solid basis for mutually 
differing categories, is how firmly and plausibly the concept of virtue used, and the virtue 
ethical view developed, are argued for and in what way, if any, they are defended 
theoretically (or empirically). 
 
Following this line of thought, there seems to be justification for developing four 
categories with respect to the material in hand. The first is the zero-category for 
developments where there is neither reference to nor interest in virtue or virtue ethics. 
Second, there is the work on journalism ethics which either only briefly mentions the 
existence of virtue (ethics), or considers its position subordinate particularly to 
deontological or consequentialist considerations. In the third category, in turn, I place the 
varieties of journalism ethics which on the one hand rather heavily draw on virtue-ethical 
considerations or virtues but on the other do not strive to explore their plausibility or 
ontological and epistemological status in any considerable depth. The fourth category, 
finally, is our main target of analysis on grounds that there we can find both decisive 
reliance on virtue and willingness to argue for its predominance in a theoretically 
coherent manner. 
 
The main interest in the following will be in categories three and four, but in order to give 
a fuller portrayal of today's journalism ethics and the way journalism is considered today, 
I also discuss selected examples of categories one and two. Accordingly, the examples 
addressed in sections 3.1. and 3.2. will be given a more superficial treatment than those 
which for this study are the decisive ones in sections 3.3. and 3.4. 
 
3.1. Implicit Contract and Fair Agreement: Ward and Kieran 
 
Stephen J.A. Ward (2004) finds the foundation for his version of journalism ethics in 
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contractualism. He suggests that journalism duties, like all ethical duties, arise out of 
agreements and that the ethical duties of journalism are the duties that arise from the 
distinct social role of journalism. This role, in turn, is to be considered a role as defined 
by a contract between journalists and their society. According to Ward this contract calls 
on journalists to be impartial, independent communicators. Journalists come under the 
general duties of truthful communication that apply to all public communicators, yet they 
also inherit duties specific to their profession. Professional journalism is the organized, 
socially recognized activity of communicating to the public and for the public from the 
impartial perspective of the public good. Ward then suggests that journalism also 
importantly is not the politically neutral activity of disseminating bits of data but”..(T)he 
dissemination and analysis of the most important information for a self-governing polity 
or for a polity that aspires to be self-governing” (Ward 2004, 26). 
 
However, when discussing further the duties and values which he finds specific to 
journalism, Ward concentrates on objectivity, which he sees as the principal norm of 
journalistic work. He explains objectivity as a rhetorical invention that emerged from a 
new journalism-audience relationship in the nineteenth century. New technology, the 
commercialization of news, professionalism in journalism, fears about the manipulation 
of public opinion, and the advent of  the ”objective” society were among the motivations 
for the construction of objectivity as at least a rhetorical core norm of journalism. Ward, 
nonetheless, considers the traditional view of objectivity in journalism to be untenable. 
Journalism cannot plausibly be understood as the passive recording of events, objectivity 
being a matter of merely expressing the recorded facts. The traditional view exaggerates 
the norms of neutrality and detachment, Ward argues, and suggests that it be replaced by 
his ”pragmatic objectivity” (Ward 2004, 9-36; 314-331). 
 
To be sure, Ward's treatment of objectivity is many-sided and firmly anchored both in the 
history of journalism and in the history of ideas. Yet what is of importance in the context 
of this study is that his is not an approach of virtue ethical considerations. He himself puts 
his position as follows: ..(T)he ethical perspective that stands behind my contractualism is 
a Kantian view of value. We confer value on the objects of our rational choices.” And 
then he also adds existentialist flavors to his conceptual arsenal: ”..(O)ur notion of 
persons as ”ends-in-themselves” is a conferring of value on ourselves as autonomous, 
rational beings. We are, in a Sartrean way, condemned to choose, as rational beings in a 
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causal, natural world” (Ward 2004, 27). 
 
It is difficult to see precisely what this Kantian and Sartrean contractualism embraced by 
Ward is, because he does not explicate it in any detail. As a matter of fact his approach is 
eventually neither straightforwardly built on nor decisively affected by traditional ethical 
theories nor is it a standard piece of applied journalism ethics. He concentrates on 
objectivity, both on its origins as journalistic value and on adequate interpretation of the 
notion in the context of today's journalism. As far as I can see, there is no definite reason 
why Ward could not have construed his kind of objectivity alternatively as a core 
journalistic virtue. There is the practice of journalism in his discussion and his ”pragmatic  
objectivity” also seems to readily lend itself to the situation-specific and domain-
dependent reality in which the virtue conception which I have been defending obtains. 
 
However, Ward's is but one example in the substantial body of work in journalism ethics 
which professes more or less contractualist contours without any deeper commitment to 
any specified theories. As a further example Matthew Kieran writes on the notions of the 
fourth estate and the implicit contract that obtains between citizens and the news media 
(Kieran 1997, 25-30). He argues that it is important to realize that this kind of implicit 
contract entails a normative conception of good journalism. What good journalism then 
amounts to, is what we already traditionally consider it to be, namely, the covering of 
what we ought to know, construed in terms of events and policies that affect how we are 
governed and how our society is governed. Hence politics and the processes of 
government are legitimately considered a mainstay of good journalism. 
 
Kieran, nonetheless, also suggests that journalism cannot plausibly be seen merely in 
terms of the fourth estate account. Any account that totally rules out what we are 
interested in, seems intuitively false, for without any doubt, we are ardently interested in 
many other things in addition to (or instead of) politics and the maneuverings of central or 
local administration. Why, on the other hand, it is or would be illegitimate and outright 
wrong for journalism merely to become part of the vast entertainment culture is that 
media's freedom to intrude into privacy and to speak freely against politicians and those 
with economic power is granted by society on the grounds that the media has its 
watchdog function to fulfill. ”..(T)ake away the function, or where the news media as a 
whole fails to fulfill that function, and it is not clear that the news media have any right to 
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behave in such a manner nor indeed that the price is one worth paying” (Kieran 1997, 33). 
 
Kieran interestingly finds an opportunity for excellence in journalism, too, yet he couches 
his view in the language of obligations. There are the minimal obligations to ensure that 
the events reported did in fact take place, and that the reports consist of information about 
which a readership with reasonable education and compassion would want to know. Yet 
good or ideal journalism would do more. It not only reacts to and reports on episodic 
events but also seeks out and explains fundamental shifts underlying episodic events 
(Kieran 1997, 39). From our virtue ethical viewpoint, however, Kieran seems to lose 
some analytical resources and power. When taking journalism to be a practice with its 
practice-dependent skills, excellences and virtues, we have at our disposal a more fine-
grained and real-life-rooted set of analytical tools to describe how journalists ethically 
speaking get along. 
 
In terms of Kieran's approach it seems that in order to fulfill her contract, journalists 
either do what they are minimally obliged to do or exceed the minimal expectations, but 
the question lingers: what would the exceeding amount to? Why is it in any way more 
ethical than fulfilling the minimum? Does the fulfilling of contract come in degrees, and 
in case it does, how is it to be understood? Nonetheless, from within our virtue 
conception, the answer is clear: while exceeding the minimal, one is in a better, in some 
cases even in a more excellent or virtuous way for good; it is both for the internal goods 
of journalism or the key goods of humans which journalism as a whole (arguably) is for, 
or even for the good of some certain human other(s). In other words she is living and 
working more excellently and in that way bringing more intrinsic – and with a high 
probability also instrumental – good into the lives of readers. The virtue approach 
effectively enables one to see moral life as it is, in different shades of grey, instead of a 
misleading black-and-white image of more absolutist theories. 
 
However, Kieran in the end comes closer to our approach not only by attaching to his 
conceptual arsenal two regulative ideals which he more or less derives from his 
contractualist view but also by discussing extensively the characteristics of an ideal 
reporter (Kieran 1997, 43-63). The first regulative ideal states that journalists must shape 
and phrase their reports according to the level of understanding of the intended audience. 
This statement aptly emphasizes the fact that doing the minimal generally is not 
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sufficient. In order effectively to further the good(s) of citizens, the reporting has to be 
accessible and to give a firm factual basis for readers' own judgments. This is where 
journalistic excellence according to our virtue approach can habitually be seen to 
transform into (minor) moral excellence if the craftsman is, by virtue of his dedication, 
able to deliver crucial information which furthers the good(s) of readers. 
 
The second regulative ideal in Kieran's scheme is that of the impartial reporter
73
, and the 
discussion on impartiality brings Kieran, in turn, to the issue of objectivity, in relation to 
which he clearly shares some insights with Ward's pragmatic objectivity. How Kieran 
then finally characterizes a good journalist is by and large what we can read in any well-
reflected standard journalism ethics textbook or in various ethical codes for journalism 
professionals. One of the most influential of these books might be Kovach’s and 
Rosenstiel's The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public 
Should Expect (2001). In it the authors define journalism's primary purpose to be ”..(T)o 
provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing” (Kovach 
and Rosenstiel 2001, 17). They then go on to suggest that to fulfill this task journalists at 
least must maintain an independence from those they cover, serve as an independent 
monitor of power, strive to make the significant interesting and relevant, and keep the 
news comprehensive and proportional. In portraying the essence of journalism and the 
core responsibilities of journalists Kovach and Rosenstiel typically do not draw on any 
explicit theoretical considerations but suggest that theirs are principles that ”..(H)ave 
always in some manner been evident” (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001, 17). 
 
Many of the characteristics which Kieran or Kovach and Rosenstiel suggest that 
journalists should have, nonetheless, can perfectly well be considered excellences or 
virtues of the practice of journalism. One can reach deeper and deeper into excellence; it 
is to grow more courageous, accurate, insightful, or to be able to track the significant in 
complex, multidimensional issues. Moreover, the internal goods of the practice can at the 
same time be seen to constitute a reason for and a direction of the striving for excellence. 
The emerging journalistic pieces are of relevance and interest to people both as citizens, 
consumers and inquiring social beings. Nonetheless, the point in the discussion of this 
                                               
73 The notion “impartial reporter” has its origin in the history of (American) journalism (ethics). I think that 
today it can be interpreted simply to mean that reporters should only work with the good of readers in their 
minds.  
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section is that a major part of journalism ethics either draws on other theoretical resources 
than virtue ethical, or rejects theoretical considerations altogether. And much of relevance 
indeed can be said even without any commitment to some certain coherent theory. 
 
Next I will turn to examples which demonstrate a willingness to see theoretical resources 
in general and virtue ethical approach in particular, as either useful or even necessary. I 
will first address the work of Jane B. Singer who has recently explored the way in which 
the rapid developments within online technology and virtual culture impinge on ethical 
issues in journalism, and how all this may also affect the way we see journalism and 
alternative answers to the question of who actually is a journalist. I will subsequently 
discuss how Elliot D. Cohen draws on virtue ethics in his article on the end of the 
democratic press and find that his is an approach which might be labeled a version of 
virtue consequentialism (Singer 1996, 95-106; 2003, 139-163; 2006, 2-18; 2007, 79-95; 
Friend and Singer 2007; Cohen 2004, 266-275). 
 
3.2. Ethics and Journalism Quality: Friend, Singer, and Cohen 
 
Cecilia Friend and Jane Singer open their discussion on online journalism ethics by 
giving some examples of where one might find philosophical backing for one's endeavor 
to handle the ethically challenging situations today's media landscape presents (Friend 
and Singer 2007, xxi-xxv). What they, and especially Singer, find particularly relevant in 
the online world, with its emphasis on the individual and her decisions, is existentialism. 
Yet in her earlier work Singer also strives to base her visions about virtual journalism on 
virtue ethical considerations (Singer 1996, 95-106). However, the emphasis on the 
individual and her opportunity or inescapable predicament for choice certainly also fits 
into virtue ethical thinking, and subsequently Friend and Singer also briefly discuss 
Aristotle. In particular, they find the value of moderation or the principle of the mean 
interesting and useful. 
 
In their respective example an editor working on a story about a local murder rejects both 
an extremely gruesome photograph and likewise the option to omit a photograph 
altogether, instead choosing a photograph that complements the story without 
sensationalizing it. ”..(A)ristotle would approve of such a choice”, Friend and Singer 
venture to conclude their discussion (Friend and Singer 2007, xxiii). Further, and what is 
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to the point of our discussion, Singer is not the only scholar to drift to and fro between 
existentialism and virtue ethics. At least John C. Merrill, who can be considered to be the 
leading advocate of an existentialist approach to journalism ethics, has in his more recent 
works moderated his radically existentialist views and stressed the need for a more 
Aristotelian approach (Merrill 1997). 
 
What then might it be that makes Singer, as well as Merrill, oscillate between different 
philosophical approaches? At least part of the answer may be that she considers autonomy 
and accountability to be the two core journalistic norms, yet it seems to be hard to 
demonstrate a frictionless fit for them, as has been also contained by Kaarle Nordenstreng 
(Nordenstreng 1998, 124-134). Singer, nonetheless, develops a notion of ”the socially 
responsible existentialist” in which she seeks to draw both on existentialism and on social 
responsibility theory in order to construct a productive merger between the two 
contravening ideas (Singer 2006, 2-18). The medium that particularly cries for socially 
responsible existentialists is, according to Singer, the Internet. It affords all individual 
users complete autonomy over personal communication, along with the power to 
disseminate that communication globally with a single click. 
 
At the same time, however, no inherent social responsibility is connected to that action. 
An online user need have no obligations to any other user; but, however it may be with 
others, journalists should have. Singer suggests that it is their explicit acknowledgment, 
as well as the ways in which such responsibilities are enacted that set them apart from 
those who decline to do so. In this way, in addition to delineating ethical foundations for 
the profession, Singer also strives to give a new, up-to-date definition of who actually is a 
journalist.  
 
Traditionally the journalist was someone who engaged in the particular process of 
gathering, organizing and disseminating timely information in a way that drew its 
credibility from various ethical precepts or virtues, such as truthfulness, balance and 
fairness. Yet in today's networked world millions of people gather, organize and 
disseminate information every day. Clearly, in this environment, while all journalists still 
publish information, not all publishers of information are journalists.
74
 There is no longer 
                                               
74Mark Deuze and certain other scholars consider the change to be even deeper. Deuze sees the whole of 
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a gate for the gatekeeper to guard. Hence, the shift in the definition of a journalist moves 
from process towards normativity. In this way a virtuous freelance blogger might become 
regarded as a better journalist than her colleague working in a traditional newsroom 
environment, although waving decency (Singer 1997, 72-89; 2003, 139-163; 2006, 2-6; 
2007, 79-95; Robinson 2006, 65-83). 
 
Whether or not Singer's project succeeds, it is not difficult to see why her writing also 
reveals an affinity to virtue ethics. In order to meet the demands of the profession, 
journalists have to be independent and autonomous, Singer writes. They have to remain 
free from external and internal pressures that dilute the truth-telling enterprise, at least in 
its more excellent, innovative and investigative form. Yet simultaneously they have to 
recognize that as professional journalists they are accountable to the public (Singer 2006, 
6-7). There are, then, the profession- or occupation-dependent internal goods towards 
which journalists have to reach; and because one of the prerequisites for being able to 
approach those goods is to work autonomously one must to high degree draw on one's 
personal traits of character and on (one's) journalistic excellences. 
 
Elliot D. Cohen presses in a yet stronger way the need for autonomy and individual virtue 
(Cohen 2004, 266-275). He finds American journalism to be fraught with incestuous 
relations between government and big corporations, and that this relationship is 
conducive to an environment which turns the press, the watchdog, into a docile 
representative of government authority and business enterprises. In addition there is the 
unavoidable logic of market-driven media houses to concentrate on maximizing their 
bottom line profit. According to Cohen, under these circumstances to be a good journalist 
emphatically involves speaking out loudly against those powers working to undermine 
the central goals of journalism and the public trust. 
He also argues that it is not only cowardly to accommodate oneself to external or internal 
pressures and remain silent; it is journalistically incompetent as well. The central virtues 
                                                                                                                                            
society transforming into a media life in which we live in our own ”personal information spaces”. 
However, in a more concrete vein Deuze also argues that convergence culture, as he calls it, takes place 
on both sides of the media spectrum: production and consumption. Within this spectrum, then, the 
distinctions between the traditional role-players are dissolving. ”..(T)he key to understanding the 
currently emerging relationships between media consumers and producers, or between media owners 
and media workers (whether paid or voluntarist), is their complexity. These relationships are constantly 
reconfigured in a convergence culture, and at times are both reciprocal and antagonistic. Such liquid 
relationships are seldom stable, generally temporary and, at the very least, unpredictable” (Deuze 2009, 
477; 467-480). 
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in journalism – habits of being responsible, loyal, fair, impartial, honest, and courageous 
– are also part of what it means to be a competent journalist. So, argues Cohen, one 
cannot be a competent journalist without being a virtuous journalist. Nonetheless, Cohen's 
is an ethics of virtue and principle and it is ultimately also an ethics of outcome. He 
writes:”..(T)hese habits (virtues) involve dedication to principles of conduct that follow 
from the journalistic end of serving democracy. Insofar, as this end is a moral end, these 
virtues and their corresponding principles are also moral” (Cohen 2004, 268; also O'Neill 
1992, 15-32). 
 
Cohen sees the difference between virtues, i.e. moral excellence, and ”merely” 
professional or occupational excellence in much the same way as we do, but he considers 
excellence and virtue as being a way to adhere to principles the following of which in turn 
is conducive to the ends and goods of journalism. However, rather incoherently, or at least 
ambiguously he at the same time suggests that the virtues also conduce in a direct way to 
promoting the ends of journalism (Cohen 2004, 268). Moreover, he does not specify 
which exactly would be the principles journalists ought to follow. Nonetheless, what is 
now importantly issuing out of the conversation and to which I return repeatedly, is how 
the relation between the ethics (of journalism) and the goal(s) of journalism is considered. 
Singer considers moral goodness to be a criterion to distinguish journalists from non-
journalists. To avoid any ambiguities it would be important to know whether Singer is 
referring to journalistic excellence or to excellence in being for good, i.e. to moral 
virtue(s). It seems legitimate to discern from her writing that the second alternative 
obtains. However, because in our virtue conception journalistic and moral excellence may 
combine, we ought also to know whether, and under which conditions, Singer considers 
doing journalism to qualify as being for the good (of others). 
 
These questions remain open also in Cohen's work but he at least is cognizant of the 
situation:”..(I)nsofar as this end (of serving democracy) is a moral end” (Cohen 2004, 
268). And indeed, in case increasing circulation and boosting profit would be, or is 
considered to be, the goal(s) of journalism, journalistic excellence cannot in general 
become regarded as virtue. As discussed above, to be virtuous means being excellently 
for some (moral) good, which, in turn, frequently – if not without exception – means 
being for the good of other human being(s). In addition, profit-seeking also seems 
unavoidably to be a good external to journalistic practice, and thus it might call for a 
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wholesale redefinition of the very practice of journalism to consider blooming circulation 
or high profits its internal goals or goods. What, however, remains to be discussed in Part 
Four is the (current) situation in which poor quality seems to diminish citizens' interest 
and trust in journalism and also, subsequently, to throw media houses into the perils of 
dramatically declining circulations and profits which, in turn, leads to dismissals and 
other human hardships. Under these conditions, then, can one show virtue in striving to 
improve the quality as a means also to boost the withering business (e.g. Belsey and 
Chadwick 1995, 461-473)? 
 
Now, returning to our main concern in this part of the study, we see how virtue gradually 
becomes more prominent as one or even the core concept of genres of journalism ethics. 
In Ward and Kieran explicit discussion of virtue is absent, Singer recognizes virtues' 
potentiality, even having some interest in drawing on them, and Cohen finally considers 
them an integral part of journalistic competence. Cohen however sees virtue as merely an 
instrument to other, major ends or goods, and on grounds of this we addressed his work as 
an example of category two in our scheme which purports to throw light on the 
multiplicity of the depth in which virtue has become analyzed and mobilized in 
journalism ethics. 
 
However, let us subsequently discuss some category three examples, which, in 
comparison with category two, manifest a heavier reliance on virtue but no systematic 
analysis either of the ontology and epistemology of virtue or of its place in the whole of 
the tradition of virtue ethics or theory. The main category three examples in the following 
will be the classical work of Klaidman and Beauchamp and the journalism ethics of 
Karen Sanders.  In addition we discuss some aspects of the journalism and journalism 
ethics conception of G. Stuart Adam, which do not particularly draw on VE but do, 
however, manifest some characteristics upon which I want to touch briefly in this context 
(Klaidman and Beachamp 1984; Sanders 2003; Adam 2004, 247-257; Adam and Clark 
2006). 
 
3.3. The Virtuous and Competent Journalist: Klaidman and Beauchamp 
 
The Virtuous Journalist (1987) by Klaidman and Beauchamp could perfectly well also 
figure as one of our category two examples. There are, nonetheless, some plausible 
                                                                             103 
reasons to discuss their approach as an example of category three. Firstly, although there 
is ample room in their considerations for rules, duties and obligations, Klaidman and 
Beauchamp at least implicitly give the impression that character and virtues are the 
notions which capture in the most adequate manner the essential in moral phenomena. 
They argue that even journalists who are repelled by virtue language would probably 
agree that the public is better served when journalists perform well because of good 
character than because of sanctions, threats, rules, laws, regulations and the like. In this 
they draw on Henry Beecher, a Harvard anesthesiologist, who was convinced that rules 
and regulations, if used to restrict experimentation in medicine, were more likely to do 
harm than good. Accordingly, Beecher, in fact as early as the 1950's, recommended 
educating physicians through a virtue-based rather than a rule- or duty-based ethic 
(Klaidman and Beauchamp 1987, 18).  
 
Secondly, Klaidman and Beauchamp find some of the particularities of the practice of 
journalism to inescapably make demands especially on the practitioner's character. They 
suggest among other things that virtuous traits of all kinds are significant in environments 
such as journalism on grounds of their being too pressurized to permit prolonged and 
careful reflection:”..(B)y cultivating moral virtues, doing what is right in these situations 
can become a matter of course rather than a conflicted debate over how to interpret rules 
whose meaning and application may be less than clear” (Klaidman and Beauchamp 1987, 
19). 
Klaidman and Beauchamp, finally, also do what many others with virtue ethical 
inclinations neglect, namely give an account of what they mean by virtue and character. 
What they mean by virtue is a beneficial disposition, habit, sentiment, or trait, and as they 
use the term, a moral virtue is”..(A) fixed disposition to do what is morally commendable, 
which entails a desire to act according to moral principle” (Klaidman and Beauchamp 
1987, 18). Klaidman and Beauchamp also, insightfully and in accordance with the 
approach endorsed in this study, assert that almost all professions have virtues that are 
keys to success in the profession but are not moral virtues. Although I allowed the 
possibility of professional virtue or excellence under certain conditions to grow into or 
become legitimately interpreted as a moral virtue, the original insight and the point of 
departure is the same: one not only loses in descriptive power but also fails to have an 
accurate close-up view on the phenomenon of morality if one fails to notice the 
distinction. 
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Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987, 18-19) also produce a vivid example to drive their point 
home. A militiaman opened fire on a taxi during the Israeli occupation in Lebanon in the 
beginning of the 80's. The driver perished immediately, the customer on the backseat was 
injured. Meanwhile the shooting increased, preventing rescue workers from approaching 
the car. Goskun Aral, a Turkish photographer, however, joined Ali Moussa, a Lebanese 
soundman, in a rescue effort. The men dragged the injured customer from the car under a 
hail of machinegun fire. Other photographers, who had taken positions by the nearby 
hotel, displayed a different kind of courage. They also braved the shooting, and clicked 
away at their colleagues (orig. Nora Boustany in The Washington Post, March 30, 1986, 
D3). 
 
3.3.1. Virtue as a Necessary Element of Competence 
 
That courage, like certain other traits of character, may reveal and constitute either 
professional or moral virtue, is the conclusion drawn by Klaidman and Beauchamp from 
their example. In our terminology, then, courage may serve both as a professional 
excellence and as a (moral) virtue. However, to manifest virtue in being courageous, one 
has to be excellently for some good. Rescuing the injured ones Aral and Moussa clearly 
so acted. At the cost of risking their own health or lives they helped a fellow human being 
from bleeding to death. The other photographers, contrariwise, helped themselves into an 
opportunity to cover and deliver something humanly touching, and in this they, on their 
part, showed professional excellence. But is it totally out of place to think that they were 
for some moral good as well? 
 
Imagine that it was not yet at all well known that Lebanon and its inhabitants were 
severely harassed once again, and that to turn the heads of the global audience absolutely 
called for some striking pictures with an intimate story to go with them. Would the 
covering and disseminating of this kind of material, then, be virtuous too, in addition to 
its manifesting professional excellence? To be sure, it all seems to depend on a multitude 
of situational and contextual details. What eventually motivated the photographers? Were 
there good reasons not to join in the rescue operation? And did the news-desks of the 
world actually suffer from a severe shortage of vivid material from Lebanon? Questions 
abound and the respective answers may very well give plausible reasons to believe that 
the photographers indeed manifested professional excellence yet did not excel in being 
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for any moral good. Nonetheless, the point of asking these questions in the first place is in 
giving credence to the view that professional excellence and moral virtue occasionally 
may merge. A journalist may simultaneously, in one single sequence of motivation, 
deliberation and action, show up both professional and moral courage or some other 
virtue(s). 
 
Klaidman and Beauchamp do not explicitly venture to analyze the territory of the moral, 
yet they share Cohen's view that moral qualities are intrinsic to journalistic competence. 
They assert that incompetence in journalism not infrequently results from moral failure, 
rather than merely from a lack of professional rigor or experience. In other words, they 
see virtue embedded in competent journalism. In this way they eventually come very 
close to how I consider the relationship between professional and moral virtue, for in case 
virtue or ”moral criteria” are embedded in professional competence, how exactly are we 
to see professional excellence apart from virtue? Here is Klaidman’s and Beauchamp’s 
insight verbatim: 
 
..(T)ape can be edited accurately, fairly, and objectively, or it can fail to meet these 
criteria. The editing cannot justifiably be called competent unless they are 
satisfied, which suggests that moral criteria are embedded in our very conception 
of competent journalistic practice. That is, standards such as fairness and accuracy 
are moral dimensions of competence (Klaidman and Beauchamp 1987, 23). 
 
Note that Klaidman and Beauchamp regard competence partly as constitutive of moral 
criteria or standards.
75
 There seems to be implicit in their thinking that to be competent, 
or, more emphatically, to be excellently competent, one has either to meet the moral 
standards excellently or at least to meet them, and this in addition to non-moral standards. 
In my terms, in case one meets them excellently one can be said to be for some moral 
good excellently or, in other words, to manifest virtue. On the other hand, if one in 
addition to the non-moral criteria meets the moral dimensions of competence but without 
any at all or traceable excellence, his work can manifest competence yet be lacking in 
                                               
75According to Alasdair MacIntyre”..(W)e have to accept as necessary components of any practice with 
internal goods and standards of excellence the virtues of justice, courage and honesty. For not to accept 
these, to be willing to cheat...so far bars us from achieving the standards of excellence or the goods 
internal to the practice that it renders the practice pointless except as a device for achieving external 
goods” (1981, 178). 
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virtue (and vice). In case this last reading holds, one can be competent without being 
virtuous. Whether or not the reading will survive closer examination, it at least allows for 
more nuanced and detailed deliberation and distinction in moral and ethical judgment and 
is consistent with the virtue conception developed above. To allow for at least domain- or 
situation-specific competence without virtue also seems intuitively right. If I write a nice, 
entertaining portrait of a local sports celebrity, it seems reasonable to call my work 





On the other hand, whether or not one considers virtue to be a constitutive and 
accordingly a necessary component in journalistic competence, one has also to consider 
whether and to what degree or in what manner a journalist have to be technically 
competent or able, i.e. skillful, to be considered virtuous as a journalist. On first reading 
the answer may seem self-evident: moral goodness does not, indeed cannot depend on 
technical aptitude or social skills. My commitment to excellence as a kind of convergence 
or mutual platform to goodness, however, makes demands to be explicit here. 
 
Thus, to manifest moral excellence in being for some good does not mean to be in a 
technically or logically impeccable way for that good. It simply means what it says: to be 
morally excellently for some good. And as was discussed above, moral excellence confers 
intrinsic goodness on one's own and others' lives, and something intrinsically good is 
worth having as such, regardless of its possible instrumentally favorable consequences. 
Nonetheless, there is the issue which we briefly discussed when addressing Michael 
Slote's work in section 2.1. Imagine some journalist to be so clumsy, with his gear or with 
his reason that he tends repeatedly to make bad mistakes, in spite of his good motives to 
inform and help other people. Can such a journalist be called virtuous (as a journalist)? 
Michael Slote might answer that the situation cannot hold as such. In case the journalist 
has good motives, it follows that, out of respect to his readers, he does all there is to do to 
meet the necessary standards.  If need be, no doubt, he resigns. A neo-Aristotelian 
observer, let us say Eric Silverman, might instead consider the journalist to be clearly 
lacking in certain virtues, such as practical wisdom, patience, honesty (about himself) and 
perhaps continence. The journalist may indeed show benevolence and other warm virtues, 
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All this discussion, of course, becomes futile if one defines virtue to be a necessary element of journalistic 
competence. 
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but clearly he does not perceive the situation aright. Silverman might grudgingly, 
however, call him virtuous. 
 
But then, how do I fare, with Robert M. Adams? Quite well, as I can see it. One can begin 
by maintaining that the journalist in question obviously is not a fully virtuous person, but 
as discussed above, such are very rare. Virtue comes sporadically and is even then frail. 
Secondly, one is entitled to argue that in case the journalist works hard to forward some 
good of his readers or some particular group of people in his community, he at least may 
show virtue. This obtains on grounds of the possibility of his being for that good, say the 
just distribution of labor opportunity among local ethnic groups, excellently. The details 
of his managing the situation then contribute to a thoroughly-argued answer on whether 
he manifested virtue. In sum, according to the virtue conception I embrace, virtue 
certainly is possible in the absence of non-moral journalistic competence. However, the 
issue of whether the conclusion can be considered self-evident we re-address in Part four. 
 
3.3.2. Journalism as a Moral Craft: Adam and Sanders 
 
Returning to our main line of present discussion, one scholar who might ungrudgingly 
follow the main thrust of Klaidman’s and Beauchamp's as well as our reasoning is G. 
Stuart Adam. He defines journalism as a literary and moral craft and argues that there is 
also authorshipness embedded in journalism. Hence, the consideration of the ethical 
obligations of journalists should be construed in relation to the activity of authorship and 
the creation of individual journalistic texts. A second consideration of moral significance, 
according to Adam, is that the authorshipness we are speaking of has evolved within a 
democratic system of government and a democratic civil society. In that way, asserts 
Adam, journalism is”..(A) democratic art and the place and role of journalism are crucial 
to the operation of democracy” (Adam 2004, 249). 
 
Adam naturally considers journalism to be a literary craft in complete understanding of 
the rapid technological change that is stirring up today's media landscape. Despite the 
upswing of new media and the convergence of old and new, text is still for him the core 
gestalt, the foundation, of journalistic work both in print and broadcast as well as in 
online. Where Adam then comes near the virtue approaches is when he argues that 
democracy's processes, including journalism, are not natural or inevitable outcomes of 
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some hypothetical contract between journalists and citizens. On the contrary, they are the 
products of moral learning which are, or should be, embedded in the operations and 
methodology of the craft. Adam also alternatively argues that”..(O)perations of freedom 
are to be found in the disciplined application of clear standards that must be learned and 
worked at” (Adam 2004, 251). 
 
Adam seems to suggest that effectively to be for the core human goods of freedom and 
self-governance, journalists have to develop their professional skills and excellences to a 
level of considerable refinement, and that some of those excellences are moral. There 
occurs in his discussion, nonetheless, a theoretically rather unsystematic set of concepts, 
although, to be sure, this is also true of Klaidman and Beauchamp. Virtue figures highly 
both explicitly and implicitly in Klaidman and Beauchamp as well as in Adam, yet they 
first of all see virtue as instrumentally beneficial in living and working in accordance with 
the right principles which they, in the end, fail to explicate. 
 
There is, however, much insightful contemplation and conversation both in Klaidman and 
Beauchamp and also Adam which I take along to Part four. In the features that deserve 
further attention are included particularly Adam’s definition of journalism as a democratic 
craft and the way in which all three writers find excellence and virtue intrinsic to 
journalism. But there are further steps to take before we are ready to proceed to Part four. 
As the next link in our exemplary chain towards theoretically coherent versions of virtue 
based journalism ethics I will consider Karin Sanders's book Ethics & Journalism (2003). 
In it she explicitly opts for a virtue ethical approach, and when she gives a more detailed 
treatment of what kind of virtue ethics she favors, hers proves to be a version of NA. In 
addition to Aristotle proper Sanders draws for example on Rosalind Hursthouse as well as 
on Oakley and Cocking, both of which we found to be central figures when discussing 
NA in Part two (Sanders 2003, 27-39; 160-170). 
 
Rather than addressing further Sanders's familiar neo-Aristotelian views, let us see how 
she finds an important issue which we so far have not wholeheartedly faced.
77
 While 
discussing reporters' integrity, Sanders namely lays emphasis on how economic and 
structural realities such as understaffing, job insecurity, and casualized labor heavily 
                                               
77However, see footnote 15. 
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affect the way in which journalists conduct their work. In general, she considers intense 
competition and the market logic to be formidable factors in shaping the environment in 
which journalists make their choices. But choices they have to make and ethics is about 
making one's own choices, Sanders asserts. In other words, she rejects any negative 
implications of her view that there is no place for ethics in the modern global market 
economy or that an individual agent is not sufficiently able and resourceful to affect the 
practices or the institutions (and finally the whole of the economic system?) from within 
(Sanders 2003, 136-37; cf. Bauman 2008; Harcup 2002, 101-114). 
 
Sanders, finally, refers to the general data which suggests that if organizations pursue 
profits to the exclusion of all else, they will end up losing both customers and their best 
workers. In this she also takes advantage of Belsey’s dichotomy of industrial versus 
ethical journalism (Belsey 1998, 1-14). Within industrial journalism is included the view 
that there are particular difficulties in embedding ethical practice in media organizations. 
Media houses are fast-moving, with little time either to examine the issuing subjects or to 
acknowledge mistakes. An instinctive aversion to reflection may even harden into an 
arrogant rejection of criticism and the development of journalistic cultures which are 
inimical to honest practice. In addition, it often seems that the industry has seen ethics 
merely as a public relations problem upon which action need only be taken when 
problems arise. 
 
How, then, can ethical industrial journalism be encouraged, Sanders asks, and answers, 
that it originates in ”ethical efficiency”. She seems to think that there are core moral 
values and virtues which work for the good of all parties involved and that there are also 
ways to make it apparent for all (Sanders 2003, 137; cf. Craft 2004, 258-266). However, 
the main features of Sanders's work seem to look very familiar to us. She draws on virtue 
in general and on NA in particular and has an affinity to how Oakley and Cocking 
consider professions and their respective role demands on practitioners. ”Ethical 
efficiency” finally also revives the issue of how to think of (journalism) ethics as a 
vehicle to (economic) efficiency. In order to be virtuous one has to be morally excellently 
for some (moral) good. But granted that virtue might be promoted as a means to improve 
quality and to increase the level of turnover do we not have before us a case of an ethics 
of outcome? 
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In Part four we also address the efficiency problem but we first concentrate on our final 
examples of virtue ethics as a more or less foundational element of journalism ethics. The 
main examples explored below are Aaron Quinn's ”Moral Virtues for Journalists” (2007) 
and Sandra L. Borden's Journalism as Practice (2007). The reasons to dwell on these 
particular writers and to present their work as category four examples are that they draw 
heavily on the work of scholars which we have discussed above, and that the work of 
these scholars in turn is at the center of the recent developments in virtue ethics and virtue 
theory. Quinn's and Borden's reliance on virtue theory is also ”purer” than that of most 
writers in today's journalism ethics. They are at pains actually to ground their work on 
explicit and coherent virtue ethical foundations. And in the same thorough manner they 
also explicate the definitions of the virtue conceptions which they mobilize in their 
respective works. The theoretically more plausible way in which Quinn and Borden 
proceed at the same time provides to an opportunity for us to show where their 
approaches might fall short of ours, despite the many respective similarities (Quinn 2007, 
168-186; Borden 2007). 
 
3.4. Moral and Professional Virtues for Journalists: Quinn  
 
Aaron Quinn writes that his essay outlines an account of virtue ethics applied to the 
profession of journalism. He also asserts that his is an original account of journalistic 
virtue ethics. It seems that Quinn takes as given that journalism can be considered a 
profession, because he does not discuss the issue and in addition draws rather heavily on 
Oakley and Cocking, particularly on their notion of a regulative ideal in professions. But, 
once again, should journalism be considered a profession and does it matter? I have 
already argued above that a case could be made to regard journalism as a profession, yet a 
more plausible and productive way to proceed is to consider journalism a practice, a craft-
like occupation with its internal excellences and goals. This is also broadly the strategy 
adapted by Sandra Borden, as will be discussed below. Quinn, nonetheless, proceeds by 
introducing his views on virtue ethics generally and his key virtue ethical concepts. This 
section does not seem to reveal anything particularly original in his approach: his is 
broadly a standard version of NA, modified to allow for an emphasis on the virtues of 
justice and integrity. 
 Then, however, there comes an opening for an important feature which clearly also 
resides at the centre of the virtue ethical conception which we are embracing. Quinn 
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stresses, namely, that his is an internal view of professional ethics. By internal he simply 
means that moral reasons and motivations originate in the journalist's thinking and are not 
handed down in the form of external rules or principles. Quinn, nevertheless, argues that 
his internal approach does not require the rejection of the useful forms of external 
regulation.  
 
..(I)n fact it is a foundational complement to some forms of external regulation. 
However, a strong moral framework requires that its possessors both understand 
and accept the inherently normative nature of journalism and gradually inculcate 
key journalistic moral virtues, moral values, and moral principles to positively 
develop their professional character (Quinn, 2007, 168). 
 
Quinn joins Cohen, Klaidman and Beauchamp, and also Adam in emphasizing the way in 
which virtue is embedded in competent journalism and in addition seems to distinguish 
between professional and moral virtue. As a matter of fact there is implicit in his 
discussion that there also exist certain journalistic moral virtues. However, I take it that he 
merely means that journalism characteristically and frequently calls for certain moral 
virtues, such as justice and integrity which he considers key journalistic virtues in his 
modification of NA. Why Quinn then considers justice and integrity the key journalistic 
(moral) virtues is that he finds them, respectively, the main agent-neutral and agent-
relative virtues. According to him justice is an overarching virtue which does much of the 
work in clarifying many difficult decisions that are less clear in alternative moral theories 
or traditional journalistic ethics codes. He argues that justice even permits in certain 
situations the omission of truths or deception or lying when it brings about some 
appropriate good. 
 
Quinn regards integrity as a sense of what being a good journalist means, and as a 
willingness to adapt one's behavior accordingly. In other words, acting with integrity is 
acting according to what we have reason to do (on grounds of our understanding of what 
it is to be a journalist).
78
 Note  that when interpreted in this way integrity may also steer 
one away from certain general journalistic conventions (or, at the extreme, from the very 
                                               
78Normative (moral) reasons have recently been receiving a great deal of attention. I do not, however, 
address the issue in this study, yet I find it interesting and of deep importance. For some key insights and 
approaches to the issue, see Ethics, volume 119, number 1. 
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occupation) in case those conventions are at odds with what one accepts as professional  
excellences or goods in journalism or with what one considers major virtues and values in 
the whole of her life plan. When discussing Oakley’s and Cocking’s approach to the 
ethics of professions in Interlude One, I accordingly maintained not only that it is 
common knowledge that people acting within a role may lose sight of how their acting 
within it promotes or constitutes or fails to constitute their leading a good life; but also 
that to the extent that they do so, the broad-based moral values making up the picture of 
good life ought to correct their narrowed vision (Quinn 2007, 170-184; Oakley and 
Cocking 2001, 130-136; Adams, 142-43). 
 
3.4.1. Avoiding Moral Schizophrenia 
 
Quinn admittedly builds rather coherently on a virtue ethical foundation. However, 
probably partly because of the limited space at his disposal, even the key concepts are 
defined in a very general manner. There is for instance no substantive discussion of a 
theory of virtue, yet Quinn declares that there are three fundamental concepts derived 
from classical Greek notions of virtue ethics that are central to understanding virtue 
theory, namely virtue, phronesis, and eudaimonia (Quinn 2007, 170). In the brief 
accounts of each of these he then draws heavily on Hursthouse as well as on Oakley and 
Cocking. Hence, his no doubt is a (mainstream)-neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theory. 
Accordingly he argues that for one to be a virtuous journalist, one must usually have a 
good broad-based education including an emphasis on”..(P)arochial and theoretical 
matters in journalism” (Quinn 2007, 173). 
 
In addition one must be trained in an environment that both provides examples of and 
supports moral behavior among journalists. This, Quinn asserts, is analogous to a virtuous 
person (broadly construed or understood) having been raised in a good family, which 
provides the proper assurance of moral understanding through one's childhood days. 
Finally, both in journalism and more generally in one's life, one must be internally 
motivated to do good in part as a result of the respective upbringing and in part from one's 
understanding that the good life can only be achieved in this way. The main challenges or 
objections to VE, according to Quinn, are the justification problem and the virtue-conflict 
problem, which we above in 2.2. and 2.4. regarded as the standard or even the routine 
challenges to VE. Quinn does not even mention the situationist challenge and the 
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challenge to show that VE actually is a moral theory, which I considered the main 
challenges to VE. On grounds of his heavy neo-Aristotelian reliance on character and its 
virtues, this strikes me, to say the least, as odd. (Quinn 2007, 170-179). 
 
Quinn, finally, sees his study as indicating several reasons why virtue ethics is preferable 
to competing moral theories. Virtue ethics, inter alia, relies on good character and 
practical wisdom for practical reasoning rather than committing to the strict decision 
procedures common to both consequentialist and deontological theories which fail to 
offer the correct moral judgment for all moral problems. Quinn seems to refer here to the 
widely discussed problem of moral schizophrenia that is instructively addressed by John 
Dobson in his article on how to apply virtue ethics to business. Dobson argues that in 
Kantian and utilitarian (business-) ethics one is supposed to step out of her occupational 
role and ”..(D)on the hat of a Kantian or of a utilitarian” (Dobson 2004, 2). In such 
approaches, Dobson maintains, the agent adopts a type of moral schizophrenia in which 
being a good professional for example in the sense of being an innovatively writing 





In this way, given the action-based, i.e. consequentalist or deontological approach, a 
journalist could be a good journalist in the sense of being very efficient and widely read, 
yet at the same time not be a good journalist in the sense of being ethical. And as Quinn at 
least implicitly argues, and several of the writers discussed above explicitly assert, this 
would be a (conceptual) misunderstanding. In order to be a good or competent journalist, 
one has to be ethical as well, because moral excellence is unavoidably embedded in 
journalistic excellence and competence. At the same time, however, as was also discussed 
above when addressing the work of Klaidman and Beauchamp, the virtue conception of 
Adams importantly seems to allow for the intuitively obvious possibility of showing 
(domain-specific) technical excellence without virtue, as well as showing virtue without 
being technically competent. Still, one can of course refuse to call a technically superior 
but not virtuous person competent (Quinn 2007, 184; Dobson 2004, 2; Stocker 1976, 453-
66). 
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A classic treatment of moral schizophrenia is Michael Stocker's ”The Moral Schizophrenia on Modern 
Ethical Theories” (1976, 453-466; reprinted e.g. in Crisp R. and Michael Slote (eds.) 1997). 
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Quinn, nonetheless, also regards as the virtue of his approach that with practical wisdom 
guided by the virtues of justice and integrity, virtuous journalists have both an impartial 
and agent-relative view of morality. Moreover, virtue ethics is particularly suited to 
journalism because journalism requires quick thinking and is fraught with moral 
confusion. VE offers a habituated person who by disposition is prone to make morally 
good decisions (Quinn 2007, 184). This concludes Quinn's “several reasons” to consider 
VE preferable to its rivals. Yet, whether his reasons are multiple or not, they are overall 
fairly well in accordance with our considerations. Quinn allows virtue ethics 
comprehensively to structure his work and is willing to show why a virtue ethical 
foundation is particularly appropriate in the ethics of journalism. Why he prefers NA to 
other varieties of VE remains, however, unclear, and if the originality of his approach 
merely means that he finds the virtues of justice and integrity the most decisive ones in 
journalistic practice, his approach cannot be considered very groundbreaking or even 
novel. 
 
It is problematic to draw conclusive comparisons between Quinn's work and our approach 
because Quinn mainly seeks to argue for the superiority of virtue ethics as compared to 
deontology and consequentalism; we on the other hand have worked mainly to find out 
and show in more detail where exactly reside the potentiality and the resources of virtue-
based approaches and how they can be mobilized to allow for rich ethical evaluation and 
judgment in journalism. Indeed, one might think that Quinn is somewhat late with his 
project; from the writers under discussion Sanders in particular worked very much in the 
same vein as Quinn quite a few years earlier (Sanders 2003). Nonetheless, as a 
comparison to both Quinn's and our approach we explore in what follows how Sandra L. 
Borden develops a highly detailed and thorough virtue ethical approach to journalism 
ethics with the help of basically the same theoretical foundation as that of Quinn (Borden 
2007). 
 
3.5. The Moral Community within the Practice: Borden 
 
Borden's point of departure is the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981; 1979), 
particularly the concept of practice which is central to MacIntyre's virtue conception and 
virtue theoretical approach. Borden's goal, in turn, is to show how by using practice as a 
central theoretical concept we can find substantive resources from within theoretical 
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ethics to fight against the on-going commodification of journalism. She enters the core 
parts of her work by asserting that providing a definition of journalism is notoriously 
difficult. However, a virtue framework directs us toward a teleological definition 
grounded in a theory of journalism that provides a substantive link between the practice's 
product and purpose. According to Borden, such a theory should include at least five 
elements, namely a link to human flourishing, commitment to the common good, 
reporting as the defining activity of journalism, a desire to make a difference, and a way 
to make a living (Borden 2007, 49). 
 
These constitute the marks which distinguish journalism-as-practice as a normative 
activity, and which at the same time clarify its relationship to readership. In addition, as 
was discussed above – and in common with all practices – journalism also relies for 
excellence on a set of skills, a vocational aspect and certain institutional resources. 
Overall Borden maintains that her kind of journalism theory proposes that journalism's 
immediate goal is to create a special type of knowledge
80
 necessary for community 
members to flourish and that this knowledge becomes produced and disseminated by 
journalists in the form of ”news”. The ultimate goal of journalism, subsequently, is”..(T)o 
help citizens know well in the public sphere” (Borden 2007, 50). 
 
What then are the internal goods, according to Borden, that promote the ultimate goal? 
Recall here, that every practice manifests its own internal goods which at the same time 
are partly constitutive of the ultimate goal and the whole of the practice. Accordingly 
Borden, following MacIntyre, argues that internal goods are the reasons why practitioners 
in the first place participate in a particular kind of practice. If a good can be achieved or 
gotten (also) in some other way, it is not internal to this particular practice. So, what 
counts as a good that can only be achieved by practicing journalism (or something like 
it)? Borden's answer takes the form of a comparison between science and journalism. 
Although there are major differences between these practices, there are similarities as 
well, even mutually recognizable internal goods. Science's system is well-developed and 
more rigorous, but both are intellectual practices with respective internal goods of an 
intellectual practice. These include, among other things, knowledge, inquiry, originality 
                                               
80 Borden does not introduce us to any system of different kinds of knowledge here. I think that with 
“special type of knowledge” she simply refers to the type of knowledge generally presented by news-
stories, i.e. to bits of daily information on the workings of diverse spheres of our social machinery. 
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(in the sense of doing one's own investigation and thinking), and newness (in the sense of 
being the first to find out, think, or experience something). 
  
Nonetheless, this is clearly not enough. What kind of internal goods journalism has that 
other practices do not share? Borden is not able or willing to give any explicit list of the 
relevant goods, and probably for good reasons. She discusses some characteristically or 
exclusively journalistic goods, such as practical knowledge aimed at citizens to be used as 
a tool in self-governance, when scientific knowledge, in comparison, is created for its 
own sake and is accessible to but a small audience. There are also similarities between, 
say, journalism and teaching, as well as between journalism and history as an intellectual 
practice. 
  
All this gives Borden reason to consider journalism a specific configuration of resources 
and influences from or shared by various other intellectual traditions or disciplines with 
their internal goods. This particular configuration then also determines what counts as 
living an excellent life as a journalist, rather than a scientist, teacher, novelist, or public 
official. However, there are some very exclusive journalistic goods too:”..(T)he thrill of a 
scoop, the pleasure of a well-written lede, the satisfaction of pinning down a pattern of 
wrong-doing, the honor of witnessing history. For a journalist, it does not get any better, 
as only a journalist can truly understand” (Borden 2007, 64; 59-64). 
 
3.5.1. Journalism in the Grip of Market Economy 
 
Borden's reliance on MacIntyre is conspicuously comprehensive since she draws heavily 
not only on his key virtue ethical concepts, such as virtue, practice and internal and 
external goods, but also embraces his foundational view of the hostility of market 
economy and modernity in general to the virtues. Although she is not explicit on the 
point, what seem to be the most profoundly inspiring lines for Borden in MacIntyre's 
work are to be found in his After Virtue (1981). I quote MacIntyre here at some length, 
since we address what follows in detail also in Part four: 
 
..(A)s, and to the extent that, work moves outside the household and is put to the 
service of impersonal capital, the realm of work tends to become separated from 
everything but the service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labor 
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force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalized acquisitiveness, on the other. 
Pleonexia, a vice in the Aristotelian scheme, is now the driving force of modern 
productive work. The means-end -relationships embodied for the most part in such 
work, on a production line, for example, are necessarily external to the goods which 
those who work seek; such work too has consequently been expelled from the realm 
of practices with goods internal to themselves. And correspondingly practices have 
in turn been removed to the margins of social and cultural life. Arts, sciences and 
games are taken to be work only for a minority of specialists: the rest of us may 
receive incidental benefits in our leisure time only as spectators or consumers 
(MacIntyre 1981, 211). 
 
To put it briefly, modernity, and in particular the market economy, is hostile both to 
practices and to those virtues which are supposed to sustain the respective practices. As 
regards journalism, Borden asserts that media-houses' organizational reward systems do 
not necessarily honor journalistic achievement and often undermine journalistic authority 
by blurring the boundaries of the practice. Managerial objectives, in turn, often run 
directly counter to journalistic standards and excellence, for example by insisting on 
efficiency over completeness. Business logic in itself, finally, is reluctant to meddle with 
the psychology and rigor of money-making or to upset political or commercial allies 
(Borden 2007, 66). 
 
The practice of journalism, then, is in danger either of becoming removed to the margins 
of social and cultural life, or of becoming hijacked or diluted by external goods and goals 
with their respective excellences. Borden opts for the threat that comes in the form of 
dilution, possibly simply on grounds not only of her own experience but also of ample 
general evidence to the effect that journalism – at least so far – has remained a major 
factor in today's market-driven societies. Nonetheless, Borden accordingly analyzes 
virtues in their practice-sustaining roles or functions. She regards her approach to be a 
departure from other virtue-based views which underline the virtues required of 
individuals, or which focus on practices as the context for the individual exercise of the 
virtues. From the approaches discussed above she regards as individual-centered the ones 
of Oakley and Cocking, Klaidman and Beauchamp, Cohen, and Adam (Borden 2007, 65-
66). 
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Borden, however, considers that there are five different practice-sustaining functions for 
virtues to fulfill. First and foremost, they should protect the practice from corruption by 
external goods. Newness for example, a legitimate intellectual internal good of journalism 
can degenerate into mere novelty aimed at turning peoples' heads when reporters are 
required to constantly update stories even when they are unable to confirm any 
developments. With the capacity for real-time online reporting it indeed would be a 
deficiency to adhere to old production cycles that only offered news updates once or 
twice a day. Yet, striking the appropriate mean calls both for the virtues of initiative and 
curiosity and for an appreciation of what constitutes true knowledge as opposed to mere 
trivia and gossip (Borden 2007, 65-69). 
 
The additional practice-sustaining functions delineated by Borden for virtues are (a) 
keeping the institutions that house the practice healthy, (b) maintaining the kind of 
relationships that are necessary for achieving the practice's internal goods, (c) preserving 
continuity with the practice's tradition and (d) supporting the practice's regenerative 
capacities. With regard to (a) Borden draws verbatim on MacIntyre who maintains, that 
the ability of a practice to retain its integrity depends on how well the virtues also work to 
sustain the institutions that harbor the practice (MacIntyre 2009, 195). In these institutions 
are included also the commercial news organizations and media houses. Their 
commercial vitality is needed to guarantee the autonomy and integrity of newsdesks.  
 
Under (b) in turn Borden discusses how, in order to achieve its internal goods, journalism 
as practice requires collegial relationships that are trust-based rather than autonomy-
based, contractual relationships. This is so, because journalists need each other to secure 
journalism's credibility and its effectiveness as an authoritative intellectual practice with 
civic aims. They are constantly working to prove that the news they create is generally 
accurate and dependable and that their judgments are oriented toward public service 
rather than self-interest. Moreover, this endeavor, to be successful, must be a mutual one 
each individual journalist trusting her colleagues to take care of something which she 
values and depends upon herself. 
 
The good of a whole human life, and beyond that, of a tradition are also needed in order 
to provide an overall pattern that can order and prioritize the goods that inform practices, 
maintains Borden in (c). She argues that to sustain the integrity of a practice, practitioners 
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need to consider how both their own choices and key events in the life of the practice fit 
into the larger narrative of the practice's tradition. Such ongoing self-reflection also partly 
explains the dynamic nature of a practice's goals and goods. However, Borden finally 
argues under (d) that this dynamic aspect of practices requires virtues to perform at least 
one more practice-sustaining function, namely, to support the practice's regenerative 
capacities. By them Borden refers to how well the journalistic practice is able to display 
adherence to interactive feedback processes, transparency, and correction procedures. She 
also recommends tentativeness, in the form of acknowledging the epistemic limitations of 
even the most systematic forms of (journalistic) inquiry. Hence, the central virtues of 
practice-sustaining in this context are accountability and modesty, while for instance in 
the context of (c) they are integrity and a sense of legacy (Borden 2007, 70-86). 
 
3.5.2. MacIntyre as a Harbinger of Post-Modernity 
 
The unquestionable originality and ingenuity of Borden's work is due to her commitment 
to MacIntyre’s giving prominence to collectives and to tradition. By leaning on MacIntyre 
she is able to put the practitioners as a distinct group with their moral predicament into a 
historical and social context. In this way she is indeed a follower of MacIntyre both in 
detail and in his more sweeping reflections on modern western culture. What is totally 
lacking, nonetheless, is any discussion on how MacIntyre also has come under severe 
attack. Mason, among others, sees one of MacIntyre's key tenets, namely the one that 
modernity is hostile to the virtues, problematic in several ways. MacIntyre asserts that 
virtues cannot flourish where there is radical disagreement because they rely on the 
existence of a shared conception of the good. But why does it follow that the virtues must 
suffer where there is no agreement on a substantive conception of the good? (Mason 
1996, 195-199). 
 
Mason and in particular Dobson also show how MacIntyre's critique of market capitalism 
is vulnerable and at least partly misguided (Mason 1996, 202-206; Dobson 2009, 43-50). 
Dobson provides evidence to the effect that excellence can flourish even in environments 
marked by the hardest market-driven competition. He shows how MacIntyre's description 
of a utopian fishing crew has striking resemblance with how John Roberts characterizes 
the factors that contributed to the success of Nokia in the 1990's (MacIntyre 1994, 285; 
Roberts 2004, 174; 276). Dobson in the end concludes that MacIntyre's logic rests on the 
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premise that economic goals corrupt other, non-economic goals, the type of goals people 
had in pre-modernity. But the evidence does not support this premise, he argues. 
”..(T)here is now available a wealth of evidence to indicate that it is precisely advanced 
capitalism in general and the modern firm in particular that has engendered human 
flourishing” (Dobson 2009, 48). Of course, Dobson too acknowledges that this is not to 
say that the modern firm, embraced by capitalism, is perfect in the sense of nurturing 
internal goods and virtues within practices. However, it has provided unparalleled 
material wealth as a foundation for practices (Dobson 2009, 46-49). 
 
The practice, however, is the main locus of Borden's considerations because that is where 
the practitioners become endowed with the tradition. The practice typically not only 
assists or inculcates appropriate technical mastery, but in addition plays its role as a moral 
community and hence as a source of moral identity. Borden also in this context discusses 
the practice's potentiality for successfully supporting individual members who resist 
ethically questionable business requirements. She considers practice at least potentially to 
be an effective moral community fostering a true willingness among practitioners to 
sanction each other and also to go to each other's aid (Borden 2007, 87-100). 
 
Borden's approach has considerable functional or structural flavors and she leads and 
couches her discussion repeatedly in sociological terms. Journalism's function is to 
participate in keeping democracy alive and to help citizens to be well-informed in the 
public sphere. The practice's function is to secure journalists' adherence to the goal(s) of 
journalism and to the tradition which endows them with appropriate skills, values, and 
virtues. The function of virtues is to sustain the practice (and the institution). Finally, 
because modernity (and liberalism) in general and market economy in particular are 
hostile both to the virtues and to the practices, there is the danger of the corruption (and 
even the collapse or the extinction?) of the journalistic practice by the influx of external 
goods and excellences. 
 
In addition to the problems which Borden's work shares with MacIntyre's theory-building, 
there are several other questions to be asked. First, what is Borden's virtue conception in 
detail, and is it an instrumental and consequential virtue conception? Borden suggests, 
following MacIntyre, that a virtue must not only enable one to achieve a practice's 
internal goals and goods, but must also be integrated into an overall picture that defines a 
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good human life (Borden 2007, 29; MacIntyre 1981, 187-189). This, however, does not 
exclude the option that a good human life could be defined in consequentialist terms. The 
lack of any discussion on the intrinsic value of virtue(s) adds to the impression that 
Borden's is a markedly instrumental type of virtue conception, and that hers is an ethics of 
outcome. With a modification of Julia Driver's words, traits of character are virtues as far 
as they are systematically conducive to the sustenance of some practice, in Borden's case 
the journalistic practice. 
 
Secondly, there is not a single word on the plausibility of the folk psychological kind of 
virtue conception used in her work, either in terms of its commensurability with the 
modern developments in virtue theory or with empirical, social psychological research. 
This counts as a particular shortcoming because Borden's work is not merely a piece of 
ground-floor applied ethics but a treatise on journalism's social function illustrated with 
the help of the classical theoretical apparatus of MacIntyre. Thirdly, Borden considers her 
work as a departure from other virtue-based views that underline the virtues required of 
individuals, and she accordingly concentrates on the practice-sustaining potentiality of 
virtues. 
 
This can be considered an insightful shift in emphasis, yet it leaves us without any 
guidance as regards the morally demanding situations in which journalists frequently find 
themselves, and accordingly there is also no advice on the evaluation of how well 
journalists manage in moral terms. One can of course argue that they at least collectively 
manage well when the practice prospers, and granted that Borden's is a work on the 
journalistic practice and how it can be sustained, one might not be entitled to expect any 




Nonetheless, what Borden's analysis leaves open is whether all or any of the practice-
sustaining virtues are moral ones, ways of being excellently for the good(s) of others. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see clearly in what way a practice is in need of some 
particular virtues of sustenance. The excellences of a practice contribute to the attainment 
of the internal goods of the respective practice. The goods and the respective excellences 
may and do change, but they nonetheless work together to constitute and sustain the 
                                               
81And Borden, indeed, has attended to this issue elsewhere (Borden 1999, 93-104). 
                                                                             122 
practice. Overall, it seems that Borden rather wants us to take certain measures to ensure 
the sustenance of the journalistic practice. This indeed might be advisable, yet hardly 
renders such measures virtues. Their being expedient does not allow for them to be called 
(moral) virtues. However, as I see it, there should at least be a discussion on whether, and 
under what circumstances, being morally excellently for some good also promotes the 
sustainment of the practice. 
 
Now, in order to facilitate our moving into the still more concrete Part four, I put forward 
for consideration what I think we have secured so far and what, on the other hand, 
demands further argumentation and support of examples below. To begin with, let us 
recall that the main goal of this study is to argue for a particular virtue conception and 
integrate it to an otherwise broadly neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical background. This 
synthesis, then, is argued for to make for a more detailed and many-sided consideration 
and judgment of the ethical complexities and dilemmas of journalism than is provided by 
its rivals in the virtue ethical tradition. This approach was also defended above against 
deontological and consequentialist attacks, yet this has been considered to have already 
been mainly and more fully accomplished elsewhere and is secondary to the main goals 
of this work.  
 
Nonetheless, I take it that we by now have a case for a ”third alternative”, that is for the 
view that virtue ethics is a plausible, autonomous
82
 alternative for the consideration of 
moral phenomena. In my broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to it I regard as its core 
elements its theory of (moral) good and its theory of virtue. The good resides 
constitutively in virtues, which can be secured with the help of the innate intuition and the 
respective interpretation that our position as dependent human beings amongst our likes 
confers upon us. Hence, what is generally found to be morally admirable in us or what is 
inscribed in ethical tradition also importantly provide information about virtue. 
Accordingly there also is no reason for grounding the virtues in some supposititously 
more foundational good(s) or goals such as the characteristically human life. Virtues as 
such can be considered traits of character or other persistent characteristics of the human 
psyche, and this in turn renders them prone to situation-dependency and frailty. This view 
on virtue(s), adopted from Adams, gives them plausibility both when considered as a part 
                                               
82
By 'autonomous' I refer in this context to the fact that with the help of virtue ethical concepts only, we are 
able to lead meaningful and detailed discussion on what is of moral value in human life. 
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of everyday experience or against the results of modern social and evolutional 
psychology. 
 
The approach is a moral virtue ethical theory on grounds of its virtue conception which 
renders warm virtues a major status in being excellently for good(s). This is highly 
important in the ethics of journalism where solid expediency, encouraged by hard 
competition and deadline, repeatedly allows more readily for professional virtues such as 
courage, determinateness, and detachment than for warm virtues such as benevolence and 
empathy. However, the virtue conception of Adams is one with breadth and depth. This 
permits the giving credit for excellence and virtue also in circumstances where it is not so 
obvious or habitual. Moreover, to regard excellence as a common ground for various 
kinds of virtuosity gives one a further analytical asset for disclosing the morally 
challenging situations and characteristics of journalism, as well as for accordingly making 
balanced judgments on them. 
 
What nonetheless remains to be done below is to discuss further the introductory 
definition of journalism. This now falls due, on the one hand because the discussion in 
Part three has opened up many new horizons on the subject, and on the other because I 
have to consider once more what actually are the most essential characteristics of the 
practice of journalism in order to secure beyond doubt that the approach argued for in this 
study signifies a powerful enough way to consider their ethical repercussions. I do this via 
addressing recent research on journalists' work procedures and culture. The work under 
discussion has been carried out by Laura Ruusunoksa and Risto Kunelius (2008; 2009) 
and it conveniently also allows for a quasi-phenomenological discussion on grounds of its 
heavy reliance on journalists' own voices. 
 
In addition I shall return to some issues which have been recognized as being important 
but which I have left without (full) treatment. They comprise for instance the problem of 
the arguably inherently moral character of journalism and the issue of what it actually 
means to try to be more ethical in order to improve the quality of journalism. I also left 
the discussion on external goods unfinished above. In the course of completing all this I 
also try to explicate in more detail my position against some of the most plausible 
counterarguments that it might provoke. Whether or not virtue ethics as such is a 
plausible foundation for doing normative ethics I however do not return to discuss. In 
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sum, in Part four I strive to fill in the picture of how an Adamsian virtue conception can 
be applied in discovering the morally relevant features and facts in today’s journalistic 
work. Accordingly, I will continue to make theoretical remarks but will at the same time 
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4. THE PRACTICE AND THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST 
 
As a preface to my brief exploration of some key characteristics of journalistic work I 
immediately take up one issue which readily presents itself as a challenge to my 
approach. It is due to the simple and solid observation that journalists generally work 
together: theirs is an occupation that calls for team work. There are of course free-lancers 
and other loners, but predominantly journalism is practiced in hierarchically and 
functionally ordered newsrooms and other working facilities. There also prevails a 
common professional tradition and mythology which hails independence and originality, 
even to the limits of deviance, whereas modern news production at the same time draws 
on predictability, standardization and concentration. Under these circumstances, then, 
how can a journalist be personally accountable for what she is doing? Do not the market 
logic and employer pressure on the one hand, and both the written and unwritten collegial 
and occupational expectations and rules on the other hand dictate what one should and 
can do? And, ultimately, does a virtue ethical approach actually render it applicable in 
collectives? (Machin and Niblock 2006; Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2009, 33-49; Deuze 
2007; Borden 2007, 1-14.) 
 
This issue certainly deserves attention. However, as regards the discussion on the 
potentiality of the Adamsian approach to detect in detail the moral dimensions in the hard 
cases which journalists repeatedly find themselves solving, there seem to be no 
insurmountable problems. Whether a journalist works free-lance or as a member of a 
newsroom her work nonetheless manifests or fails to manifest virtue (or vice). To work 
from within a group hardly nullifies one’s individual status as a moral agent in spite of the 
collegial pressures and expectations. Further, the virtue ethical approach delineated in this 
study is hardly called into question by the fact that journalists live and work in different 
kinds of groups and teams, as almost all of us do in these days. On the contrary, compared 
to its virtue ethical rivals it features particularly well when the situation is characterized 
by a multitude of details within a widening net of human relations, including the collegial 
and co-operative relations. This is due among other things to the prominence given by the 
approach to warm virtues generally, as well as to partiality when legitimate. The general 
comprehensiveness also naturally adds to its applicability. 
 
However, granted that both outsiders and the practicing journalist are able to tell what the 
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relevant moral characteristics of a situation are, and perhaps even what the journalist 
should do, can she do it? Recall that there are at least both her employer's expectations 
and the collegial community with its commitments, ideals and habits that more or less 
affect her interpretation of the situation. Therefore it seems obvious that in case the 
journalist, let us say, should for moral reasons negotiate or act counter to what editors 
urge, solid support from colleagues would help her not to submit. The occupational or 
professional community, which conveys and renegotiates the excellences of the respective 
practice, might be considered a moral community, too (Borden 2007, 87-104). It at least 
may have, and often does have, potentiality to support its member(s) who pursue both the 
goals of the practice and moral soundness, possibly in defiance of her employing 
organization. On the other hand, it may also sanction those of its member(s) who run foul 





It is of course possible to say that a journalist has to do what she is morally bound to do, 
whatever her collegial community or employer may expect, and in certain cases she 
indeed should ignore all such expectations, come what may. Such cases might at least be 
the ones in which a journalist is expected to act against the very founding values of the 
practice or to discharge her general moral integrity, as discussed above. Moral heroism
84
, 
however, demands exceptional circumstances. Larry May suggests that two conditions 
must be met for heroism to be expected on behalf of the community's shared values: 
either the good at issue is very great or the person who is expected to sacrifice receives 
steady support from her (collegial) community (May 1996, 27). 
 
How the virtue ethical approach I have been arguing for, then, could support the 
maintenance of a healthy and firm moral community, is by providing an applicable and 
down-to-earth arsenal of concepts with which to explore the moral ramifications both of 
the day-to-day journalistic decision-making and of the output.  To be successful at a 
community level, virtue-based thinking, however, should feature high in newsrooms; it 
should loom large in daily editorial meetings and general feedback sessions. In other 
words, it should become a shared, cherished and internalized part in the whole process of 
                                               
83 According to my experience, however, this possibility is seldom put into effect. 
84
A classic text on supererogation and moral saints is Susan Wolf (1982, 419-439; reprinted e.g. in Crisp R. 
and M. Slote 1997, 79-98). 
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looking at and talking of journalism both in the community and within the practice.
85
How 
the introduction of this kind of newsroom policy into the concrete then takes place, is no 
different from how new policies in general become ushered in: key figures are needed, 
argumentation and co-operation are required, together with a steady demand for that 
which it is desired will become embraced and internalized. In sum, the whole procedure is 
largely a matter of education and of newsroom leadership until a virtue ethical viewpoint 




It is, however, important to dwell a little longer on the basic observation that journalists 
mainly work from within groups. I already suggested that the collegial group and its 
tradition may give support to a practitioner yet may at the same time put (negative) 
pressure on him; i.e., and as Borden also argues, solidarity does not substitute for 
individual conscience and reflection. Solidarity even may degenerate into some kind of 
unreflective or mindless followership that characterizes the groupthink phenomenon in 
cohesive groups (Borden 2007, 92).
87
 In such a case there is ample need for what both 
Adams and Oakley and Cocking insisted on above: one has to broaden her horizon 
beyond mere practice- or role-dependant excellences and virtues and other practical 
thinking in order not to lose sight of how acting within the practice either constitutes or 
fails to constitute leading a good life (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 130-136; Adams 2006, 
142-43). 
 
Borden discusses individual conscience mainly as one resource in resisting business 
demands on the journalistic practice, and this indeed can be considered a vital 
observation. She nonetheless leaves unattended one complicated issue, namely, how one 
should (re)act in situations such that external excellences and goods, mainly ushered in by 
business demands, are on the verge of becoming, or have already become, more or less 
                                               
85The language of the journalistic community however does not have to be conspicuously virtue ethical to 
the letter. As Klaidman and Beauchamp assert,”..(T)he language of both character and virtue sometimes 
sound ridiculously prim, as journalists occasionally delight in pointing out” (1987, 17). The discussion 
can e.g. draw on the names of the virtues without explicitly calling them virtues. To reflect on how 
truthful or just an article or a procedure is obviously does not make people feel as uneasy and awkward 
as talk of virtues or vices may do. As a matter of fact this is how journalists themselves repeatedly and 
routinely state their opinions and cases e.g. on political procedures and decisions. 
86Ethics consultation as such, however, is considered a controversial undertaking. See e.g. Jukka Varelius 
(2008, 65-76). 
87There prevails in Finland a long tradition on referring to journalists as lemmings, i.e. as un-autonomous 
members of a herd heading unreflectively in the same direction. Note the deep divergence between the 
public lemming image and that which journalists have traditionally cherished of themselves as 
individualistic lone riders in the service of the Truth and the People. 
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generally accepted as (new) journalistic excellences by the very journalistic community 
itself
88
. Under these circumstances the community as a community obviously cannot help 
the one(s) with a differing view. Whether and how decisively the problem is a moral one, 
depends on the new values and goals inculcated and accepted. However, granted the 
possibility that journalism or a journalist qua journalist frequently may be excellently for 
some good, the question of the practice's goals and excellences also bears moral 
relevance. In the following, section 4.1., I continue to develop the issue whilst at the same 
time amending our original definition of journalism as it was delineated in Introduction. 
 
4.1. The Practice: The Consumer Overcomes the Citizen 
 
As was already briefly discussed in Introduction, the journalistic work, in common with 
so many other professions and crafts, is in a state of flux, reflecting the influence of a 
number of technological, cultural, economic, and political changes. Laura Ruusunoksa 
and Risto Kunelius have consequently explored how professional journalists in Finland 
make sense of and adapt to the changing environment (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008, 1-
26). Their empirical evidence is mostly derived from two sets of qualitative interviews of 
journalists, one of the sets comprising interviews with journalists occupying mid-level 
editorial positions in daily papers. Ruusunoksa and Kunelius also discuss and develop at 
length some sociological concepts and horizons in order to analyze their data, but I find it 
advisable in this context to pass all that and merely to consult their data and their 
concluding remarks on the very answers of the interviewees. 
 
The first dimension of change discussed in the editor-interviews is economy, and the 
respective central notion with which the interviewees seek to portray the core of the 
change and the challenges they have to meet appears to be competition. Competition is 
now considered harder than ever, but according to Ruusunoksa and Kunelius, competition 
also gains positive connotations when editors reflect on its impact and meaning. It seems 
that the editors are willing to understand and communicate the economic realities; it takes 
special commitment and skills to take care of the circulation and catch people's attention 
on a daily basis (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008, 10). 
 
                                               
88 Recall our discussion in 2.4.2.2. on how virtue may call for subverting one’s role in a community. 
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Another constantly reappearing notion in the vocabulary of the editors is business 
thinking. And again, respondents draw a clear line between the past and the present. In the 
old days marketing people of the same media house were regarded as outsiders, today the 
shared vocabulary of the whole corporation is the vocabulary of business. Overall, the 
editors seem to think that understanding the business logic is a proactive capacity and a 
source of power and competence. According to Ruusunoksa and Kunelius, news 
managers' general strategy of dealing with new economic pressures is to turn them into 
virtues of hard work, competition and cooperation. This does not, however, mean that 
they would all take at face value that journalism is a business, like any other. Rather, there 
is a sense of struggle: the economic facts are objective and unavoidable ones with which 
one has to live. (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008, 10-11). 
 
As regards the technological dimension of change, then, the editors also manifest a deep 
need to adapt to its imperatives, and what those imperatives bring about is, for example, a 
more format-driven model of journalism. Planning means, again, effectiveness but on the 
other hand it gives opportunity to make clearer judgments of what is important, that is, to 
steer toward a more active journalism. Another aspect of technology which manifests 
itself in editor response is the uncontrollable flow of information which is felt to make the 
life of journalists harder and the task of providing good journalism more difficult. 
(Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 2008, 11-13). 
 
While analyzing how the editors adapt to the ongoing cultural changes, Ruusunoksa and 
Kunelius make at least two noteworthy findings as regards our view on and definition of 
journalism. First, news managers seek to adapt to the growing consumer-orientation in 
society by emphasizing the notion of service journalism. The notion refers to news stories 
and other material which are produced to readership as consumers (in contrast or in 
addition to as citizens), inter alia writing about consumer issues and also framing issues 
as consumer choices. Second, the experience-driven journalism and even the 
entertainment values are seen to be welcome. Accordingly Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 
find”..(A)profound renegotiation of the professional attitude here” (Ruusunoksa and 
Kunelius 2008, 14). A lengthier citation from the original data may also be in place here: 
 
..(W)e have of course taken in much more of the light stuff, gone to a more tabloid-
like direction, and not everybody (among the staff) likes this. They would just 
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prefer to produce the world-changing journalism and save the rain forests. Well, 
there is no social demand for that, you know. Of course we have readers who like to 
read that stuff, and that kind of stuff is also created automatically, since we have 
these, what you might call more old-fashioned reporters (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 




The analysis and discussion on the political dimension of change, finally, brings forth the 
belief in a trend of depolitization and in a need to detach journalism from bureaucratic 
power. The editors want to follow their audiences who no longer seem to attach 
themselves to political collective identities, yet they find a role for their papers as agents 
for local well-being and as forums for debate. In sum, editors seem to welcome at least 
many of the details and dimensions of the flux that has submerged them. On the other 
hand, there seem to linger doubts that the role of acting as a watchdog weighs less today, 
and mainly so because of the entertainment seizing the ”newsholes” of the pages. The 
surveillance of socially important issues has become perhaps more lazy than it should be 
in a more and more complicated world where political and economic interests are deeply 
intertwined and global: ”(T)he prize of accommodating to changes in political landscape 
has been that journalism has become socially less ambitious” (Ruusunoksa and Kunelius 
2008, 15-16). 
 
The decisiveness of the results of only one (plus one) interview survey may rather easily 
be counter-claimed but I nonetheless think that there is a case to consider (newspaper) 
journalism as verging on an encroachment by external goals and excellences. Ruusunoksa 
and Kunelius at least substantially add to the earlier findings and to the general popular 
impression of journalism's questionable state. Moreover, they try and do look into the 
future.
90
So, granted that the above analysis reliably characterizes the present state and 
future of (Finnish print) journalism, how should we possibly change our definition of the 
very practice, and did we in the end find something that has any moral relevance? 
                                               
89Editors, not unexpectedly, submit to the rapid change and employer pressure more willingly than 
reporters. This becomes verified e.g. via additional interview survey material with which Ruusunoksa 
and Kunelius compared their editor interviews. I find editors, in any case, decisively important sources 
when exploring to the phenomenon of (changing) journalism and how it is considered among journalists 
on grounds of editors' influential positions in newsrooms and because they nearly all also display a 
meritorious background as reporters. 
90
To receive a more general and deeper view on the possible futures of newspaper industry, see e.g. Franklin 
(2009). 
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In the introductory definition I suggested that on the macro level journalism is arguably a 
viable factor in an effectively functioning democracy, and a practice producing and 
transmitting information and opinion for the public when maintained by a market-driven 
institution called media. As far as I can see, as regards the discussion so far, we should at 
least place more emphasis on the fact that journalism only potentially is a viable factor in 
sustaining democracy.
91
 Whether or not the potentiality becomes reality is contingent 
upon how high on journalism’s agenda is the task of participating in the creation of a 
well-informed public; and consequently this has to be empirically verified. However, 
during the last years there clearly seems to have been a shift toward considering readers 
(predominantly) consumers instead of citizens in journalism. This suggests that the 
material implications of the notions of service journalism and even of entertainment could 
or should be included in the definition, too. 
 
On the micro level I defined journalism as a literary and moral craft with a touch of 
authorshipness. In addition I found it comprising many technical skills and procedures 
typical to journalism but also shared by some other crafts and occupations. To be sure, it 
seems that technical skills no doubt are called for in today's journalism, yet 
standardization and strict planning may be diluting the authorshipness. Furthermore, how 
moral a craft, journalism actually is, depends upon whether it can be shown to be 
convincingly for some major human good(s). In case entertainment and customer 
consultation predominate also on the journalistic pages, it becomes harder to legitimize 
the privilege of journalists to intrude upon people's privacy or to take advantage of free 
access to places or to information which are not wholly public. However, once again the 
moral soundness of journalism and the moral excellence of journalists as journalists of 
course ultimately depend on how truthful, just and courageous they are, or to put it in a 
yet more comprehensive way, how excellently they are for some indisputable good(s) in 
their work. 
 
However, equipped with certain new tentative views on the reality of journalistic practice, 
let us finally turn back to the issue of discovering that the practice of journalism has been 
partly invaded by external excellences and goods. First of all we have to reflect on 
                                               
91An alternative way to interpret journalism’s function in society might be to regard it as an indicator of the 
state of democracy. A free press that is able to dig into the doings of the mighty and rich would in that 
case merely indicate that democracy is alive, and would not necessarily be doing so much to sustain its 
functioning. See also note 32 above. 
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whether we actually can distinguish the invasion of external excellences from the natural 
transformation of the practice with its goals and standards of excellence. I think we can. If 
the introduction of new values and excellences takes place in a very short time, possibly 
causing considerable resistance in the journalistic community; or if the motive or the 
justification for inculcating new excellences into the practice seem to have nothing, or 
very little, to do with existing core journalistic values, there is reason to raise the alarm. 
Business thinking and competitiveness, inter alia, do not readily translate into journalistic 
excellences. Both the minor and the more decisive transformations of the practice, 
nonetheless, have to become negotiated and accepted by the journalistic community itself. 
The reason and the initiative for the shifting of the values can of course originate outside 
the practice, but legitimate interpretation and acceptance can only issue from within the 
practice, as was argued in Interlude One. 
 
According to Borden we need courage and ingenuity when fighting corruption by external 
goods (Borden 2007, 66-69; 80), and the same virtues are certainly needed as decisively 
when fighting against an already corrupted practice. In such a situation virtue alone can 
be drawn upon. The respective moral community, not to mention the respective 
organization or institution, may be or probably is hostile to redefinition or redemption, 
and additionally the existing internal codes (of ethics) may be of no use. This 
hypothetical, yet certainly plausible, state of affairs also renders it more obvious why 





First, journalists habitually find themselves in situations which considerably diverge from 
the mean, and which are in addition characterized by an abundance of more or less 
perplexing details; these in turn frequently render the existing rules or codes of ethics or 
of conduct inapplicable. Second, the habits, principles, and rules of a practice frequently 
sustain excellences of the respective practice which occasionally may infringe on moral 
soundness and virtue (and on some moral principles, I presume). Think of the traditional 
value of competitiveness in journalistic communities: it frequently induces infringements 
on privacy or poor verification policies, and these diminish the trustworthiness of the 
                                               
92By a ”plausible state of affairs” I refer both to the popular view that journalism has become decisively 
invaded by commercial goals and to research results that at least point in the same direction, exemplified 
e.g. by the work by Ruusunoksa and Kunelius discussed above. 
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disseminated information.  
 
Third, a plausible theory of virtue characterized by sensitivity to detail and circumstantial 
factors is able to help one to disclose and settle what actually is morally relevant in a 
particular case, and in this way to render also the hard cases more accessible and soluble. 
Fourth, at least some of the virtue ethical approaches allow for a plausible way to 
consider in what way and how well a particular occupation as a whole in various 
circumstances adds either to some (major) human goods or to practitioners’ potentiality to 
be for some (moral) good(s). 
 
The above summary can also be read as a defense against the objection that the moral 
soundness of journalism must be grounded primarily upon rules and codes. According to 
this objection, virtue-based approaches are too general and too vague, and virtues too 
frail, to be helpful and applicable in the communal heat of newsrooms. I nonetheless 
continue to discuss the relationship between rules and virtues in section 4.2., making 
however first some concluding remarks not only on the problem of the arguably 
inherently moral character of journalism but also on the issue of what it actually means to 
try to be more ethical in order to improve the quality of journalism. 
 
4.2. Beyond the Minimum Performance 
 
In this section I will develop further the argument on the reasons why the virtue approach 
argued for in this study has undisputable potentiality in journalism, and what the claim 
would mean that virtue is inherent in journalism. Thereafter I conclude the discussion on 
whether it after all makes any sense to talk of improving the quality of journalism by 
being more ethical or virtuous. The discussion and claim on the inherently moral 
character of journalism can, firstly, be grounded on our commitment to consider 
journalism as a practice. According to MacIntyre's original view we have to accept as 
necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence at 
least the virtues of justice, courage, and honesty (MacIntyre 1981, 178-79). This is 
because every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who 
participate in it. The virtues are the goods by reference to which we define our 
relationships to those other people with whom we share the various purposes and 
standards which inform practices. However, I argue that as regards practices such as 
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journalism, it may also be the case that we are also bound to define in the same manner 
our relationships to certain other (groups of) people outside the practice. 
 
As an example, consider how honesty indeed seems to be a necessary component of 
journalistic practice or the whole of journalism. If newseditor E is unable to trust 
journalist J to verify the facts properly and to decide upon what is relevant in a particular 
case which he is supposed to cover, she will be in difficulties when editing J's 
contributions. Respectively, colleagues C1 and C2 are also entitled to rely on J's honesty 
in many ways. It will be unacceptable that they habitually check over or neglect all 
information they receive from J. It would manifest a grave divergence from the collegial 
relationship on which doing journalism draws, and in the end would endanger the very 
existence of the practice of journalism as a practice. This obtains because a refusal (or 
failure) to accept the practice-dependent excellences in which are also included the 
virtues of honesty, justice, and courage, bars one from achieving the other excellences and 
particularly the goods internal to the practice and renders the practice pointless, except as 
a device to pursue some external goods, such as money and reputation (MacIntyre 1981, 
178). 
 
In journalism, nonetheless, the virtue of honesty seems to be a good in reference to which 
we also define some crucial relationships between insiders and outsiders. The practice of 
journalism habitually becomes partly defined by both scholars and journalists themselves 
as dissemination of truthful and relevant information. Readers, then, seem entitled to 
believe that a promise, if not a contract, obtains between them and journalists and to 
break a promise of course signifies committing the vice of dishonesty. General belief in 
this collective journalistic promise partly explains why journalists are so readily allowed 
certain privileges, as regards for instance access to information, personal contacts and 
various kinds of institutions. 
 
”Promise” rather than ”contract” catches the essential in the journalist-reader relationship 
since violating the collective journalistic promise renders one dishonest, at least in the 
very case under discussion; whereas failure to submit to the clauses of a contract is a 
more formal notion and not infrequently (also) constitutes breaking a law. In other words, 
promise can be considered a purely moral category and institution, which also obtains 
with only one active party. Breaking a promise also frequently goes without (external) 
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sanction and it can be forgiven while a breach to contract normally has to be reconciled. 
And, finally, in case the relationship were to be considered as contractual, one is entitled 
to wonder in what way journalists could put the blame on readers for committing a breach 
of the contract and what it would mean. 
 
Nonetheless, in the same way we could make a case of justice and courage also being 
inherent to journalism. Internally, courage means commitment to the standards of 
journalistic excellence (and virtue) even when there is communal pressure to forsake 
them; and externally in it is included  exploration of the relevant issues in cases where 
one may also have to risk harm or danger to the employer's advertisement revenue and 
(consequently?) to one's own career or salary. 
 
An alternative way to consider the inherence-claim, however, would be to resume a point 
left incomplete above in section 3.3. It was maintained that there seems to be at least 
implicit in Klaidman and Beauchamp – as well as  in Cohen's, Adam's and Quinn's 
thinking – that to be a competent journalist, in addition to non-moral standards, one has 
also to meet the moral standards, and preferably excellently. Earlier, I argued for the view 
that in many cases it would not be necessary for a journalist to be virtuous in order to be 
competent and to produce skillful texts. This is because it seems obvious that I can, for 
example, interview an athlete and write a story on his future plans competently without 
being morally excellently for any good. To be competent, I naturally have to manifest 
honesty and benevolence to some degree, but I might do it merely to get along with my 




The question then arises whether we can merge these two views. One move to that effect 
would be to argue that although virtue is not necessary in all single journalistic endeavors, 
it becomes of necessity in the long run and in case we consider journalism a practice with 
its internal goods, in which is included the good of citizens (and consumers and human 
beings in general). According to this plausible view we could not achieve the internal 
                                               
93 One might say that I have to be at least decent to get along with my work properly. Johan Brännmark 
suggests that there is ample room in virtue ethics for a creature he calls “decent person”. Brännmark argues 
that decent person might simply be defined as a character-type that is non-vicious. Some of the decent ones 
may merely be free of vices but some may even be more or less virtuous. Hence, what one should see is a 
continuum with one end representing the darkest pits of badness and the other the saintly and heroic. Most 
of us, for example the decent ones, are to be located somewhere in between (Brännmark 2006, 589-604). 
See also Nuyen’s account of what it is to act decently toward someone (2002, 499-510). 
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goods without virtue, as maintained by MacIntyre (1981, 178-79). Without moral 
excellence the practice would disintegrate into a detached community of journalists (if 
indeed they could any longer be so called) reaching for various external goods (if these 
could any longer be so called, in absence of the manifest dichotomy of internal and 
external goods).  
 
However, would not simple reliance on rules and codes be adequate?
94
 Would not rules 
and codes of ethics also guarantee the achievement of internal goods? I think not. Rules 
and codes of ethics have a place in sustaining a practice, in the way Quinn argues above 
in section 3.4. Rules and codes provide a starting point and a general view on how to 
manage in a particular practice, but they certainly do not fully guarantee the professional 
or moral excellence and the achievement of the internal goods. They rather indicate the 
minimum performance that can be considered or accepted as an instance of journalism, 
football, archeology et cetera. This is also why rules cannot serve as the critical 
foundation in the ethics of journalism. To give greater force to the argument and to 
continue my argumentation on the potentiality of rules and principles compared to that of 
virtues in journalism ethics, let us briefly explore the codes of ethics of The Union for the 





4.2.1. Journalism's Codes of Ethics 
 
As argued in Introduction one of the main problems with the existing codes of ethics in 
journalism is that they lack comprehensiveness and coherence. In many cases fairly little 
thought seems to have gone into making the code well ordered with a coherent and well-
argued base. There also tends to be little attempt to state either their purpose, or why the 
rules commended are individually necessary or jointly sufficient. As regards our 
examples, the Canadian code (C) fares a little better in this respect. It declares in its 
preamble that 
                                               
94Ethical codes developed within and for journalism, namely, sometimes even act as points of reference for 
other professions. Rosenkoetter and Milstead e.g. write that”..(C)odes of ethics have proliferated over the 
past two decades and have been adopted by nearly every known professional group and discipline, 
including health care executives, the culinary arts, journalism, and newspapers (Rosenkoetter and Milstead 
2010, 137; italics added). 
95
The Finnish code (2005):”The Ethical Rules for Journalists” (Orig. in Finnish:”Journalistin ohjeet”) and 
the Canadian one (2002):”Ethics Guidelines”. The translation from Finnish is by K.H. 
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..(I)t is our privilege and duty to seek and report the truth as we understand it, 
defend free speech and the right to equal treatment under law, capture the diversity 
of human experience, speak for the voiceless and encourage civic debate to build 
our communities and serve the public interest...A free flow of information sustains 
and vitalizes democracy because understanding emerges from vigorous 
discussion, openly reported. Our legal traditions give media privilege and 





In addition C discusses in its preamble separately but briefly among other things the 
issues of privacy and public interest. So, while consulting the individual rules of C one 
can find at least some grounds or reason for them in the preamble. In the Finnish code (F) 
this is harder. In fact about all the preamble of F explicates is that “..(T)he aim of this 
code is to support the responsible use of free speech in media and to further ethical 
deliberation within journalism”
97
. In addition there is the familiar tenet that free speech 
establishes the foundation for democratic societies. No analysis of the important and 
controversial relationship between freedom of speech and freedom of the press, however, 




As regards, the individual clauses of the codes, then, they are more often than not 
conspicuously general, vague or apparently ad hoc in nature. F for example asserts that 
the decisions have to be made on journalistic grounds in newsrooms, but to what does 
“journalistic grounds” refer?
99
 It is to be hoped that it does not signify the circular 
assertion that the decisions should be made by journalists. As Borden argues above, 
“..(C)oming up with a definition of journalism is notoriously hard” (Borden 2007, 48), 
and in case one purports to create a code of ethics for such a slippery item, she at least 
ought to attempt to explicate what her subject matter concerns.  
 
Later on F maintains, inter alia, that it is recommendable for a journalist to inform his 
interviewee of his profession; that a journalist has to verify his data as well as possible; 
                                               
96This is a citation from the very beginning of the preamble of the Canadian code of ethics. 
97Orig. in Finnish: ”Näiden ohjeiden tavoitteena on tukea sananvapauden vastuullista käyttämistä 
joukkoviestimissä ja edistää ammattieettistä keskustelua.” 
98
See e.g. Judith Lichtenberg (1987, 329-355). 
99F §2 
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that a journalist can break the news despite an evident deficiency in his data; that 
essential mistakes have to be revised immediately et cetera.
100
C echoes F, if not in detail, 
at least in spirit: it also maintains that reporters should not conceal their identities, except 
in rare cases; that reporters are responsible (how and to whom?) for the accuracy of their 
work and that editors are responsible for the accuracy of any facts that they add or 
changes that they make; that the journalist or the paper should correct mistakes of fact or 




In sum, C wins over F in accuracy and strictness, but the problem remains common to 
both: what is “possible” and “essential” in particular contexts and what do these epithets 
mean? The codes draw on experience and general knowledge in showing where there may 
be problems awaiting, yet the practitioner only fares morally well in particular situations 
if she be practically wise and virtuous. In other words, the codes hardly add anything at 
all to what practitioners' experience and (professional) education reveal, leaving aside 
how badly they give guidance in novel situations. Finally, this all becomes sadly 
underscored by the empirical fact that a considerable proportion of journalists do not even 
know their professional or occupational codes of ethics. 
 
Far less, however, may they know of virtue; in which case, why continue to stubbornly 
insist on a virtue approach? The reason is because, first, the virtue approach argued for in 
this study has real, domain- and situation-specific analytical power, which can be used to 
analyze whether, and in what way, one is or could be more or less excellently for good in 
some particular situation. Secondly, one is able to make a distinction between 
professional and moral excellence, yet without losing sight of their habitual close 
coexistence or of their potential merging together. With the adopted virtue conception at 
her disposal one can show, in accordance with general intuition, how virtue may manifest 
itself without professional excellence or vice versa. Moreover, one can also allow for 
time- and situation- or domain-specific virtue or excellence and explore whether a 
domain, practice, association or other collective and their goals can be seen as morally 
acceptable or even virtuous. Overall, virtue draws on experience and education, as do the 
codes, but what makes the decisive difference is in the way experience and education is 
                                               
100F §9, §10, §13, and §20. 
101
There is no numbering for the clauses of C but those referred to have been put under the headings 
”Fairness” and ”Accuracy”. 
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put into effect. In rules they become petrified into external, law-like commands, while in 
virtue they build into the internal psychical whole that guides the practical decision-
making of a person and protects him against moral schizophrenia (Quinn 2007, 179-181; 
Dobson 2004, 2; Stocker 176, 453-466). 
 
Consider an example. The previous Foreign Minister (FM) of Finland resigned in 2008 in 
the middle of intensive negative media exposure resulting from some of his personal 
SMS-messages becoming public. In those messages, to put it briefly and following the 
general interpretation of the course of events, he courted a couple of younger women. It 
seems that FM originally did not break any (written) law or rule, fail to fulfill his duties or 
in any detectable way endanger state security. Moreover, the press had recently hailed his 
career as a success. His had been a victorious comeback of a veteran politician. However, 
resignation was forced upon him. How did the Finnish media manage professionally and 
morally? The issue of course had considerable commercial leverage and would interest 
the audiences of all outlets, and therefore at the beginning it was a matter of breaking 
news. And the news could even be regarded as relevant and consonant with the collective 
journalistic promise: FM indeed is a powerful political actor whose choices and character 
makes a difference to all of us. 
 
Yet, on second thoughts, FM's maneuvering had very little or nothing to do with his 
office, and consequently, the relevancy claim at least becomes doubtful. The manner in 
which, where, when, and with whom one associates may reveal something of importance, 
yet it seems clear that in this case publishing did not coincide with being for any good, 
neither can it be hailed as professionally    excellent. In fact, if indeed one of the ladies 
courted by FM acted as the whistleblower, the first publisher was left with nothing to 
excel in within the practice of journalism, except to hasten in turning his ready-made 
information into a (commercial) scoop. Accordingly, the question that seems to deserve 
deeper reflection is whether the first publisher actually committed a vice. He clearly 
intruded into FM's privacy, even into its most intimate territory, and so acted against FM's 
personal good. The facts that FM's courting habits obviously manifested general bad taste 
and that he bewilderingly light-heartedly put his position at risk, do not (necessarily) 
license turning his privacy public. Therefore, according to the adopted approach, the 
publisher manifested at least a minor vice, yet it may be that he also manifested either a 
low level of professional excellence or at least of professional aptitude. 
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The sequel of the incident, however, changed the setting with its moral as well as 
journalistic ramifications. When pushed by the press raiding him for confirmation and 
further information, FM lapsed into a series of sidesteps which arguably could partly be 
regarded as straightforward lying. Now media had its case: a FM whose practical wisdom 
and honesty could be put into question. Nonetheless, as regards the general thrust of the 
argumentation, situational details and their moral relevance are of decisive importance. 
One importantly has to know moral excellence from professional excellence or 
expediency and one has to consider whether an intentional psychical state or act in any 
particular context manifests being for or against good or whether a particular act is both 
for one and against some other good. 
 
Most of the codes of ethics also advise respect for privacy in similar words to those of the 
Canadian code discussed above: “..(I)ndividuals have a right to privacy except when that 
right is superseded by the public good.” This leaves one pondering what is public good 
and under what circumstances it legitimately supersedes one's personal good. C however 
then adds a comment that one finds lacking in many other codes: “..(E)ach situation 
should be judged in the light of common sense, humanity and the public’s rights to 
know.”
102
 In other words, the code tells us to be practically wise and be for others' 
good(s). As a matter of fact C provides us here (accidentally?) with a rule or principle that 
applies in all journalistic work, not merely as regards privacy: each situation should be 
judged in the light of common sense and humanity. This in turn comes very close to 
merely saying that one (also) needs habitually to manifest practical wisdom and warm 
virtues when practicing journalism. The rule, again, appears simply redundant by merely 
reminding us of the importance of virtue. Yet what is missing is the idea of being 
excellently for the good (of others). The virtue implicit in rules is of instrumental kind: it 
either is helpful in following a (higher) principle or is conducive to good consequences. 
 
By now we have been able at least to some degree to substantiate the idea that absent 
virtue, journalistic competence is deficient. First, we can now draw on MacIntyre's 
definition of practice and maintain that as a practice and as a collegial community(-es), 
journalism simply cannot function without some virtues, such as honesty, justice, and 
                                               
102Virtue ethics also has a long, solid tradition of the discussion of tragic cases, situations in which two or 
more virtues point in differing directions or in which one good can be achieved merely by sacrificing 
some other(s). An accessible introduction to the subject matter is e.g. Martha C. Nussbaum's The 
Fragility of Goodness (1986). 
                                                                             141 
courage. Second, I defend the view that journalism also calls for the virtues of honesty 
and truthfulness when defining its relationship to readership. Only by giving and keeping 
the collective journalistic promise can a journalist gain legitimatization for the privileges 
she habitually draws on as a journalist. 
 
Third, although a journalist can be virtuous without living up to high technical and 
professional standards – and professional excellence on the other hand does not guarantee 
virtue – professional excellences like accuracy and capacity to make out the relevant and 
pass it on to readers in an illuminating manner, may in a comprehensible way be seen to 
add to any journalist's potentiality to be also morally excellently for some good(s). 
Consider here as an example a journalist who wants to further the good of the people 
begging in the streets of Helsinki. Let us assume that she already does excellent altruistic 
relief work privately. But in case she in addition writes insightful and influential articles 
on the issue with the motive also to help the wretched, can we not say that she is all the 
more morally excellently for the good of these others? I would argue that we can and that 
this is how Adams' way to regard virtue as but one (albeit major) sub-category of 





Finally, journalism can be considered a practice or a craft (or a profession) that is 
collectively for some (key) human goods, such as people's self-governance, or 
administrative transparency. Whether or not this actually obtains, nonetheless, is a 
contingent, empirical matter and hence has to be studied explicitly in individual cases (for 
example as a function of time). Some virtues may also be explicitly instrumentally useful 
for the sustenance of the very practice of journalism or for adhering to the principles of 
the practice or for complying with the hypothetical contract between journalists and the 
public. These notions, however, of course refer to theories of outcome or principle and 
fall outside the conception of virtue argued for in this study. 
 
There seems to be a case for virtue being inherent to journalism; yet I would describe a 
                                               
103I omit in this context any substantial treatment of the issue of whether being excellently for good (s) 
might in some particular cases run counter to professional excellence. At first sight it might seem 
obvious that it can, particularly in cases where moral excellence bars expediency. Recall, however, that 
we just found virtue to be inherent to journalism. Accordingly, it seems that virtue cannot be considered 
an impediment to professional performance, at least in the long run. 
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journalism which is devoid of moral excellence as barren and wanton rather than as 
deficient. As discussed above, single journalistic pieces might and frequently do show 
competence without being morally excellent. However, in case the production of a 
journalistic community is permanently marked by the absence of moral excellence, 
journalism as a surplus to merely entertaining or informative writing is prone to wither 
away. The writing of the community may very well meet the high technical standards, but 
without the motive to further either the public good, or the ability of others to become 
knowledgeable in public affairs, or simply the good(s) of others, even the most refined 
work is prone to become transformed into something outside the legitimate confines of 
journalism. 
 
4.2.2. The Quality of Journalism and the Goodness of Life 
 
The discussion in the previous section concentrated on whether virtue is inherent to 
journalism, and on what grounds we should prefer virtue to rules and other deontological 
considerations as the foundation of the ethics of journalism. Missing, then, are our 
answers both to the question of whether it makes any sense to talk of improving the 
quality of journalism by making it more ethical, and to the challenge of consequentialist 
views in general. It is to be noted that, there was a reason to sequence the issues in this 
way: in case virtue could not inhere in journalism, it would seem clear that ethical 
soundness does not bear – at least in any direct way – on journalistic competence or on 
the quality of journalism. However, we found the case to be the opposite, on condition 
that journalism should be considered a practice with the goal of helping people to become 
well-informed in public affairs, and that in so doing journalism is furthering some core 
human good(s). But even granted this point, does moral excellence really add to the 
quality of journalism? Let us first consider the case introduced above, namely that raising 
the question of how the journalistic quality of the article written with the motive of 
helping the people begging in the streets differs from the hypothetical alternative identical 
to the first apart from being written with the motive of boosting one's own career? 
 
There is no doubt that the first writer is more excellently for good, but this in turn does 
not seem to make any difference to the journalistic quality of her article (yet it makes a 
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great difference to her living well).
104
 On the other hand, journalism actually comprises 
the whole of the practice and the sum total of its products. And on this level of analysis 
moral excellence indeed also makes a decisive difference to journalism. First of all, and 
as discussed above, devoid of virtue the practice declines into mere groups of people 
active in search of external goods. Thus, virtue works more to keep journalism alive and 
oriented to practice-dependent goals than to secure its piecemeal quality. Devoid of virtue 
there are no internal goals and excellences, and without them the essence and the 
characteristics of the practice dilute into something that case by case may or may not bear 
the resemblance and execute the standards of journalism. 
 
To support the quality of journalism, then, one should work for the sustenance of the 
practice and against its becoming invaded by external excellences and goods. To support 
the moral soundness of journalism one also should work for the sustenance of the practice 
with the initiative to secure moral excellences among the standards which the community 
within the practice cherishes and continues to renegotiate. However, in order to 
consciously head for the sustenance of a practice by adhering to virtuous behavior 
manifests a case of an ethics of outcome which I refused to regard as an example of virtue 
ethical theory in case virtue theory is considered a pure third alternative. 
 
To be sure, without moral excellence journalism as defined by us does not exist. Yet, as 
regards single pieces of journalistic work, incidental moral void does not necessarily 
extinguish professional excellence. To manifest virtue is to live a better life, not to write a 
better story.
105
It may well be that one can be for good by being for the sustenance of 
journalism, at least in case we accept that journalism is, or at least might be, for some key 
human goods. Nonetheless, to be virtuous, one has to be excellently for the good (of 
others). In other words, to be virtuous and work morally soundly, one has to make 
excellent, not expedient choices. In accomplishing this one may also frequently add to the 
quality of journalism, yet on the individual level and within one's moral reasoning the 
                                               
104Recall how Michael Slote opted for the moral worth of the action to depend entirely on the agent's 
motives. 
105There are some well-reported cases in the history of journalism which give solid support to my view. 
Even fully or grossly fabricated stories have been acclaimed exemplary journalism. One of the incidents 
is the Janet Cooke case. Cooke, as a young Washington Post reporter in the beginning of the 80's, was 
awarded the Pulitzer Prize for her story of an 8-year-old cocaine addict. However, it then turned out that 
she had made it all up. How the Janet Cooke story still lives on and affects both the journalists and the 
ethics discussion within the practice, see Sandra L. Borden (2002, 101-103). 
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point of departure is moral, not professional, excellence. Thus, the project of heightening 
the quality of journalism by making it more ethical is at least dubious. Although being 
virtuous is conducive to our having better lives, one reaches for virtue only (or at least 
mainly) because of its inherent worth and not because of its instrumental value. 
 
Virtue becoming constituted in being for (others’) good also bears heavily on how the 
adopted virtue conception excludes other, more established consequentialist 
considerations with virtue ethical flavors, such as the trait-consequentialism of Julia 
Driver discussed above. Consider a journalistic community that has read Julia Driver's 
Uneasy Virtue and has found her argumentation convincing. It now has as its goals the 
well-being of the citizens and particularly their being knowledgeable in public affairs, 
which is included in the general well-being. Now, as trait-consequentialists the 
practitioners regard as virtues all traits or other permanent human psychical 
characteristics which either more often than not, or systematically, to cite Driver, are 
conducive to citizens' well-being – something which in many prominent cases is defined 
as their being knowledgeable in public affairs. What might these virtues be? Might 
excellence in interviewing technique and in writing obtain? Why not, since informative 
and interesting pieces certainly become noticed and may enhance the knowledgeability of 
citizens. And although talent in persuading people to talk and open their heart generally is 




From our point of view, nonetheless, two immediate objections emerge. First, the 
distinction between professional and moral excellence becomes blurred, and in close 
relation to this, with the help of persuasion and writing skills one can also be for good 
without excellence. One can persuade by putting illegitimate pressure on his interviewees, 
by intruding on their privacy, or by sheer deception. Behavior of this kind might also 
effectively help disclose crucial information in the long run, and hence might qualify as 
virtue among our consequentialists. Yet, since we regard as virtuous only being 
excellently for good, we have to disagree with the consequentialist community here. 
 
But how can it be that being successfully for good is not virtuous? And how fatal is this 
                                               
106One could e.g. consider it one instance of a more general virtue of being approachable and others-
minded, which in turn is close to benevolence, an undisputable key virtue. At the same time it may very 
well be that for a psychic state to be a virtue (in consequentialism) it does not have to be a trait of 
character in the conventional sense of the phrase. 
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issue actually to the virtue conception argued for? Let us tackle the question by discussing 
competitiveness, a trait that has always had leverage in newsrooms (the eternal quest for 
scoops) and which editors in the    Ruusunoksa-Kunelius -research also considered at 
least “a virtue of necessity” in modern journalism. It certainly is dubious whether 
(journalists') competitiveness is beneficial to citizens' well-being, or whether it can 
improve their knowledgeability, but let us suppose it can. Must we consider it a virtue, 
after all? No, we must not, says Adams. And the reason is the same as with the 
effectiveness in information seeking: competitiveness is not the sort of trait that 
(necessarily) makes one a morally good person. Competitiveness even involves a sort of 
hostility to the interests of other people, because competitiveness “..(I)s a matter of 
wanting to do better than others, which involves a wish that others do less well, which is 
hardly a mark of virtue, even if it has good consequences by spurring us to productive 
activity” (Adams 2006, 56; italics added). 
 
This does not mean, as Adams also points out, that a virtuous person may never compete: 
virtues are many, and they often pull in differing directions. Virtue, if one is competitive, 
shows in one's ability to limit appropriately its field of operation. However, it seems 
possible, or even probable, that there are traits or other enduring psychic states which we 
cannot consider virtues, yet which carry more or less permanent beneficial consequences. 
In relation to this particular question I consider bullet biting the best strategy by which to 
defend my position. There are beneficial traits other than virtues, and they frequently 
manifest themselves within practices and other social environments whose very existence 
depends on virtue. Devoid of virtue journalism does not exist as a practice, and devoid of 
journalism there are no competitive or intruding journalists (who may or may not add to 
the good of others). In addition there is the old and intuitively strong argument against 
utilitarianism and consequentialism in general: the end does not justify the means. 
Deontology and virtue ethics agree on this. One is not allowed to treat a human being as a 
means only, and one cannot live a good life by being vicious. 
 
Drawing on the virtue conception which was borrowed from Adams renders purely 
consequentialist considerations somewhat redundant. As discussed above in section 2.3. 
being excellently for good leads in most cases to consequences, that also benefit others. 
Moreover, benevolence and other altruistic traits and attitudes being major virtues it is 
hard to see how consequences would not secure the place they deserve in the judicious 
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and practically wise minds of virtuous people (Adams 2006, 53-60). Virtuous journalists 
hardly manifest an exception here. 
However, in the following section I start summing up the whole of the discussion so far. 
In addition I finally also address at a little greater length the issue of external goods and 
how they can be seen to function within the dynamics of a practice. 
 
4.3. The Individual: The Ability to Draw the Line 
 
My concluding remarks to this study comprise two parts. In sections 4.3. and 4.4., I 
review all that has been developed to this point, mostly in the form of examples, and In 
Part five I study whether my argumentation also applies to journalistic online work with 
its particular characteristics. The viewpoint of the review will be that of an individual 
journalist with considerable freedom of choice in his work, yet at the same time 
increasingly squeezed by the transforming social structures around him. Towards the end 
of Part four, in section which has been named Interlude two, the individual viewpoint 
also receives strong subjective contours. In Interlude two I namely construe a sequence of 
short examples on how virtue helps one through a working day as a practicing journalist.  
In this section I also return to the dilemma concerning the responsibility and potentiality 
of an individual practitioner both as a moral agent and as a member of a working 
community. Online work, then, as I see it, deserves special treatment on grounds of its 
potentiality to become the major journalistic outlet. In addition it calls for procedures and 
ways of thinking that are not typical of other, more established outlets. In that way it may 
well serve as a plausible final test case for whether our approach to journalism ethics is 
able to stand up to the future challenges, too. 
 
In any event, my main goal in this study has been to give some evidence to the effect that 
virtue ethics indeed forms a sound foundation for a plausible case for an ethics of 
journalism. Accordingly in order to render the developed approach and its particular 
conception of virtue conducive to distinction and conceptual clarity, as well as to 
theoretical plausibility, I have argued for the following: 
1. Journalism can be considered a practice, a social arrangement with its internal 
goals and excellences. 
2. Journalism's major direct internal goal is to disseminate truthful and relevant 
information in order to support people's knowledgeability in public affairs. 
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3. By supporting people's knowledgeability journalism also is for some major human 
goods, such as self-governance and other values conducive to democracy. 
4. Good is the major moral category and good resides in how we are and relate to 
others and to ourselves. Good particularly and importantly also manifests itself in 
virtue, it is in being excellently for (other's) good(s). 
5. Journalism as a practice cannot survive without virtue. Both the internal 
relationships of the moral community within the practice, and the community's or 
its members' relationships to readers are dependent on virtue. 
6. Virtue, i.e. moral excellence, is only contingently included in occupational 
individual excellence. Hence one can occasionally manifest occupational or 
professional excellence without being excellently for any moral good. 
 
In order now to further clarify and defend some of the above arguments and their 
ramifications, let us consider some problems typical to the branch of journalism covering 
cultural phenomena. I use as the point of departure a series of articles published recently 
in Helsingin Sanomat, the biggest daily paper in Nordic countries.
107
To draw on 
journalistic (meta-)material also facilitates understanding of how journalists themselves 
dwell on some of the moral problems of their practice. Nonetheless, the articles present as 
one of the main problems the fact that film and music producers, managers, importers, 
and the like largely decide who and when and how journalists are allowed to interview. In 
addition, importers frequently pay the costs when reporters fly to London or Paris to 
meet, or at least to see, the star. In these circumstances, the questions arise, therefore, 
first, can one write truthful and reliable journalism, and, second, what might the 
subsequent moral implications be?  
 
One could of course rush into suggesting that writing on cultural phenomena does not on 
the whole notably contribute to people's knowledgeability of public affairs, but that would 
be an obvious mistake. The entertainment and culture industries and their products both 
strongly affect and direct people's lives, and subsequently call for intimate journalistic 
coverage. Furthermore, writing on cultural phenomena exemplifies the way in which 
journalism serves readers more or less successfully, not only as citizens, but also as 
consumers and curious human beings with diverse interests. 
                                               
107
I.e. in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. A summary of the articles was also included in 
the copy published on the 28th of May in 2010. 
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However, what precisely would be morally suspect for example in submitting to 
producers' ready-made viewpoints and answers? To be sure, the case establishes an 
example of the analytical power of the distinction between bad and immoral journalism. 
In case the journalist makes perfectly plain such issues as who sponsored her travelling, 
who set the questions and answers, and why the artist should be going public at this 
moment, the only major moral problem might that concerning the general journalistic 
promise, since the relevancy and even the truthfulness of the article clearly seem to fall 
suspect (by for example blurring the distinction between journalism and public relations). 
However, while the story may prove to be pointless or outright bad journalism, it may be 
truthful and may even be welcomed by the fans who long for whatever crumbs of 
information as regards their idols. The article might even also manifest professional 
excellence both by adding to the readership's becoming knowledgeable on the 
maneuverings of the entertainment industry and its concomitants, and by simply 
displaying a piece of excellent and enjoyable writing. This obtains in particular if the 
journalist also consults sources other than the artist and his staff, and purports to deliver 
the more general context of the session to the readers as well. 
 
But are there any grounds whatsoever to suggest that the journalist also might have 
manifested virtue while succeeding professionally? Can we say that she was morally 
excellently for some good? This might be, on condition that she indeed did seek to be for 
the good of the readership and that she did it courageously and with perseverance and that 
she was for the good (of readers). On the other hand, one could argue, that she might 
accomplish all this also when failing to excel professionally. But is that so, after all? One 
can be courageous and care for others' lot while not being professionally competent. 
However, in case one is lacking in professional competence and is even aware of it (as 
fortunately we frequently are), and yet attempts to be for some (important) good, is she 
not at least lacking in practical wisdom and (self)-honesty?
108
 I think she may be. 
 
Whether or not all this, nonetheless, still amounts to or allows for her being excellently 
for some good despite her lack of competence, is hard to solve without exploring further 
details, but what is crucial in the context of this study is how the theoretical concepts at 
our disposal enhance our ability to analyze the situation and its moral relevancy minutely. 
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Recall how in section 2.1. Silverman endeavors to show that Slote's agent-basing is driven into trouble 
while concentrating merely on warm virtues and agents' motivational states. 
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It is of particular importance to see how moral excellence diverges from professional 
excellence, even though they share in being modes of excelling, and even though 
professional excellence may contingently be seen to add to one's moral excellence in 
being for some good. This kind of sensitivity to distinction in concert with analytical 
power is frequently missing in other virtue-based approaches to the ethics of journalism. 
Particularly misleading or confusing in many of the earlier approaches is how 'virtue' is 
used to refer to any professional or practical excellence or skill that is helpful in reaching 




There are however multiple other moral concerns shared by journalists writing on cultural 
(and other) phenomena. Let us address three of them in order to shed further light both on 
the moral problems harassing today's journalists and on the potentiality of the approach I 
have been outlining. First, professional and social circles may be very small, particularly 
in small countries like Finland. Journalists and artists and authors know each other well 
and tend to associate with each other. Under these circumstances, can one produce, say, 
credible critiques? Second, gifts and favors abound. How serious a moral problem does 
this present? Third, some of the specialized magazines are very small and economically 
vulnerable. Are they able (to allow freedom for the journalists working for them) to resist 
advertiser pressure in a credible and morally sound way? 
 
In fact, all these issues concern the question of whether the readership can place trust in 
the truthfulness of what they read, or, from the point of view of an individual journalist, 
whether he is able to adhere both to the general journalistic promise and also to otherwise 
morally sound working procedures under such a manifold pressure. Consider the case of a 
journalist being acquainted with an author whose novel he is supposed to review. The 
papers and magazines of course probably apply some general rules which may advise to 
the avoidance of situations as this, yet the journalist in question has long experience and 
is known to almost all the more distinguished authors in country. That in turn counts as a 
professional advantage, too.  
 
                                               
109Also MacIntyre himself perhaps has inadvertently helped writers into this unfortunate habit by not 
making the distinction sufficiently clear. He certainly emphasizes that there is more to virtue than what 
can be learned in the context of practices but he nevertheless may steer us into seeing some particular 
practice-dependent and non-moral excellences as virtues. This is because he argues for the origins of 
virtue (thinking) to reside in practices. 
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In case the editor urges the journalist to proceed, what should he do and what can he do? 
The practical situation in which the journalist now finds himself is as follows: he has an 
interesting new novel in front of him which he very much would like to review. The 
review would bring him extra payment. He knows the author well and occasionally even 
associates with him in private. The editor wants him to do the review. The unwritten rule 
or standard of the practice and the local professional community advises one to avoid 
reviewing work accomplished by colleagues, relatives, or friends. The author would be 
pleased to have the journalist to review his book. 
 
Now, would it not be wise for the journalist simply to lean on the rules in a hopelessly 
complex situation like this? He indeed at least might attempt this, but as a practically wise 
citizen and journalist he nonetheless first wants to look clearly into what exactly are the 
morally relevant characteristics of the case. To put it schematically again: the journalist 
knows he is thoroughly able to convey the merits of the new novel to readership, maybe 
even more so than most of the other writers. He knows the author well, true, but he would 
not describe them as friends. He considers that he has as an employee a prima facie duty 
to obey editor's orders. There are the conventions and rules, indeed, but the journalist 
finds them either too self-evident or too coarse-grained to be helpful. On grounds of their 
acquaintance and mutual respect for each other as professionals and being aware of the 
author's hope to be reviewed by him, the journalist feels as if he is under some slight 
obligation to complete the work. 
 
There are, of course, many other details that can be considered morally relevant in the 
context.  However, the above list alone helps to demonstrate the complexity of even the 
average real-life decision-making situations and, equipped with the virtue-ethical 
conception developed above, one might reason on the case as follows: by writing the 
review the journalist would help people to become knowledgeable, and he would obey the 
editor's request to proceed with the job. Further, when one is acquainted with, not to 
mention when one is a friend of, someone, there is indeed a legitimate reason to heed his 
wishes. At least at first reading therefore it seems that the journalist could be for good 
(people's knowledgeability) by writing the review, and that he even might excel morally 
in doing so (by wanting to further people's knowing well, by taking heed of the opinion of 
an experienced colleague and by understanding the peculiar and positively partial 
character of friendship and similar relations). As regards, then, the negatively affecting 
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aspect of journalist's acquaintance with the author, the intimacy of the relationship fixes 
its decisiveness. To be sure, by destroying the credibility of one's writing one cannot be 
for any good of the readership or of his organization or of himself. Since, therefore the 
case is not an obvious one the virtues of honesty and practical wisdom are also definitely 
called for. 
 
Concerning the next issue, gifts, favors and the like, we can take advantage of research 
carried out by Susana Herrera Damas and Carlos Macia Barber (2009) amongst 
journalists working in Madrid and its vicinity. Damas's and Barber's aim was to explore 
how journalists see the legitimacy of accepting various gifts when carrying out their 
work. The results of 30 in-depth interviews and 410 surveys of newspaper, radio, 
television, online and press office journalists showed that the interviewees are very 
reluctant to accept gifts with a monetary value of over 200 euro, or to carry out activities 
financed by a news source. Fewer scruples arise regarding acceptance of presents of 
nominal value of a promotional merchandising nature, free tickets to shows and 
exhibitions, or paid meals and trips. As a matter of fact many journalists considered not 
accepting small gifts of nominal value both unfriendly and unwise (Herrera-Damas and 
Barber 2009, 64-92).
110
In sum, in the eyes of the journalists the moral acceptability of 
gifts is very much a function of their monetary value. Accepting the smallest gifts, then, 
may even be regarded as manifesting minor virtue yet with the increasing of the monetary 




Accordingly, it seems that as regards reporters the issue in giving and receiving gifts is 
where to draw the line. Rules, obviously, will not work on grounds of the 
incommensurability of the cases, except by containing a reminder of the very general 
necessity to be heedful. What else then can one do but to draw on one’s own and others' 
practical wisdom? One line of such a reflection might go as follows. Arguably the most 
                                               
110In general, those journalists who according to Damas and Barber are most predisposed to accepting gifts 
are young professionals, those who do not have a degree, and those who work on the Internet, as well as 
producers, editors and assistant editors. Those who are most critical of the giving and accepting of gifts 
are journalists employed by public enterprises and those who work in small companies. Journalists who 
are situated at the ideological extremes show, interestingly enough, identical results for all types of gifts 
(Herrera-Damas and Barber 2009, 64-92). 
111For one reason or another Spanish sayings and proverbs are rich with phrases which colloquially transmit 
the threat that gift giving can pose for one’s integrity. ”Hoy por ti, mañana por mí” (Today for you, 
tomorrow for me), or ”Favor con favor se paga” (A favor is repaid by another favor) make good 
examples. And maybe most in place here is: ”A la sombra del favor crecen vicios”(Vice grows in the 
shadow of favor). I find at least Finnish poorer in this respect. 
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important feature of a piece of news-writing is that readers can, for good reasons, believe 
in what they read. On the one hand journalism means disseminating truthful information 
and on the other hand, more decisively, there obtains the general journalistic promise. To 
accept a costly gift equates with, if not the making of another promise, at least giving the 
image of making another promise which run counter to the original journalistic promise 
on truthful writing. And while this holds, readers have good reasons not to believe in – 
not to be convinced of – the reliability and truthfulness of the journalist's production on 
grounds of the new image. 
 
In more virtue ethical terms, the journalist who allows for the (wrong?) image to become 
existent commits the vices of indifference and disrespect as regards both his readers and 
his original promise, as well as the whole of the practice of journalism. And practically 
unwise and dishonest he no doubt also seems to be. In addition, allowing for the new 
image to emerge can be considered a sign of incompetence. Even though mistrust 
probably would not affect a journalist's ability as regards information gathering and 
writing, or other basic areas of technical competence, the expediency of his (and his 
colleagues') work, nonetheless, might suffer. He possibly could no longer be considered a 




4.4. Goods External to Journalism 
 
At this point I will finally also make further remarks on external goods.
113
 As was 
maintained above, external goods are goods which typically can be secured by being 
active within some practice, yet which are not practice-dependent. Money and other 
material assets are one example, prestige and power others. As regards gifts and favors, 
they can also be considered external goods. One does not have to be a journalist in order 
to receive a free weekend trip to London. However, not all external goods are in all ways 
morally suspect. A good life consists of many external goods, too, as already Aristotle and 
other ancient thinkers argued (Aristotle 1975, 11-13, Annas 1993, 329-438, Cottingham 
                                               
112This of course depends on several factors, e.g. on how reliable the journalist in question or the medium 
he is working for are considered ahead of the accepting of the gift; and whether the readership considers 
one (more) occasion of gift giving and taking as making any difference at all. However, there is the 
possibility that loose conventions in accepting gifts indeed is one of the  factors that have resulted in the 
low credibility which today's media outlets enjoy. 
113
On the character and position of external goods in the virtue theory, see also MacIntyre (1981, 182-83) 
and Borden (2007, 66-69). 
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1996, 65-70).
114
Hence, one can as a journalist legitimately reach both for internal and 
external goods.  
 
It is of crucial importance, nonetheless, to recognize that a journalist carries several roles, 
also qua journalist. Within the practice (of journalism) he can only pursue its internal 
goods and aims, and this is what it means to participate in a practice. Yet as an employee, 
as a member of the organization, within his relation to the media house, he generally 
pursues his (and his family's) material livelihood. And even this obviously does not 
exhaust the range of differing roles of any one and the same journalist. He might in 
addition be considered a human being reaching for respect and admiration, or perhaps 
personal influence. 
 
Hence, the question arises of how a journalist knows which goals are acceptable and 
which ones she should prefer in a particular situation? Unfortunately, there is no better 
advice than to take heed of what one is primarily due to produce at the very moment. 
When practicing journalism, participating in the dissemination of relevant information to 
readership, one can legitimately only reach for the internal goods of the practice; while 
negotiating on one's organizational position and liabilities, it is natural to think and talk 
also of money. Moreover, as a practitioner one should prefer journalistic to organizational 
goals and pressures when they conflict at a basic level
115
, even though it might jeopardize 
some of the organization's goals and hence the journalist's own pay check (Borden 2007, 
92-3). This is because the employee role and other roles external to journalism are only 
contingently attached to it as a practice. 
 
In case and at times when the differing roles are compatible, however, no problems may 
seem to exist. It may seem that one can contingently write relevant and informative 
journalism while also seeking after fame or pursuing better position in the organization. 
Or might it even be the case, that personal desire for esteem is productive of professional 
excellence and high-quality journalism? I think it may contingently be so. Yet it is much 
harder to manifest moral excellence while ardently seeking after personal success. To take 
                                               
114The ancient Greeks did not use these exact words and concepts, yet they made it very clear that without 
e.g. health and at least moderate wealth, one's life is not as good as it might be. However, Stoic 
philosophers as well as Cynics, seemed to disagree with other schools of thought. 
115A basic level case is e.g. one in which the goals of the practice are outright precluded by those of the 
organization. A situation in which advertisement revenue becomes secured by ignoring the advertiser's 
malpractices in workplace safety measurements could be regarded as one basic level case. 
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care of one's own good, is also part of living well, yet to be excellently for good(s) 
necessarily calls for being also frankly and prominently interested in others' good(s). As a 
matter of fact, with this in mind we can make a case for the potential co-existence of 
professional excellence and vice. Namely, there seems to be no conclusive hindrance, 
empirical or conceptual, for a single journalistic project to manifest vice, let us say on 
grounds of its gross disrespect for personal privacy, while simultaneously bringing into 
daylight some major injustice in administrative practices. In this way we take a more 
decisive step in arguing that individual pieces of professionally excellent journalism do 
not necessarily manifest virtue, while even the weaker formulation is contrary to what 
some other approaches with virtue ethical foundation or flavors maintain, as discussed in 
Part three. 
 
In sum, external goods comprise goods that are general in the sense that they are not 
practice-dependent and can be accomplished from within various practices
116
 (MacIntyre 
1981, 178). MacIntyre's original text (1981) however ignores the fact that there 
necessarily exists another class  of external goods, too, in relation to any particular 
practice P, namely, goods that are internal to some other practice(s) yet which P does not 
share as internal. These kinds of goods are not external in the very general sense, as are 
money and name that can be reached for almost from within every practice. Instead, they 
are merely relationally external. What renders the distinction meaningful, or even of 
importance, is the fact that internal goods can be, and often are, shared by various 
practices. Above, in section 3.4., we already discussed how Borden finds that journalism 
and science share the internal goods of originality and novelty, and how the distinct 
constellation of the whole of internal goods and respective excellences eventually fixes 
the independent existence of any practice. Accordingly one can also meaningfully regard 
practices as more or less close or akin to each other. 
 
It seems appropriate to consider our final issue in this section – the economical 
vulnerability of a paper or magazine and its moral repercussions – within the conceptual 
scheme developed above, namely, by briefly exploring how the practices of journalism 
and advertisement diverge in terms of their respective constellations of internal goods. To 
be sure, journalism not infrequently even becomes defined in relation to advertising, and 
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Perhaps they can also be accomplished outside the practices. Yet at least in the modern world close to all 
moral agents participate in practices. 
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perhaps for good reasons, on grounds of their cohabitation in the very same pages of daily 
papers and magazines. It seems that in the journalistic camp the emphasis is on deep 
divergence, while advertizing professionals frequently either seek to point at the 
similarities or even purport to generate journalistic look-alikes. In fact, it is arguably 
included in the  journalistic promise, as well as in most of the journalistic codes of ethics, 
to make clear the distinctions between, on the one hand, the dissemination of information 
and opinion, and on the other hand between journalism and advertisement. But how do 
journalism and advertising differ from each other as practices and why is the difference 
considered less critical amongst the advertisers? 
 
In the internal goods shared by both the practices are clearly included those of originality 
and novelty, as was also the case with journalism and science. In addition there is the 
efficient production and dissemination of potentially useful information for a local or 
national readership, as well as such goods as high visual and literary quality. Where, then, 
one can see the respective lists of internal goods beginning to diverge, is where the 
readers become regarded as citizens; as individuals whose being knowledgeable in public 
affairs is tantamount to democracy. However, caution is necessary here: today's politics 
also become not simply soaked in but also dependent on advertisement. Both politicians 
and (their) ideas become routinely and expectedly merchandized. Yet a more careful 
analysis reveals the decisive difference. Advertising is for (and) particulars: for some 
particular individual human or thing. And it is a personal investment by one or several 
particular individuals, to be cashed later on in future. Objectivity, generality and critique 
are either completely ignored or at least pushed into background, to be taken care of by 
journalism, which is for citizens and consumers in general by the journalists in general. 
 
Accordingly, the internal journalistic goods of providing a critical and diverse picture of 
events and persons and their mutual relations are not shared by the world of 
advertisement. However, the various internal goods shared by the practices and their 
spatial coexistence tend to charge up the relations of the practitioners, and also 
occasionally lure advertisers to take advantage of the mutual resemblance of the practices. 
Paradoxically, in order to be of any use this kind of strategy presupposes that journalism 
both remains competent and morally sound and is regarded as competent and morally 
sound by the readership. The cynicism which journalists frequently have to face as 
regards the issue unfortunately gives the impression of at least partial failure. 
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To be sure, to participate as a journalist in making it difficult for readers to know whether 
they are being helped towards knowledgeability, or exposed to marketing efforts, can be 
regarded as breaking the general journalistic promise. It may also be regarded as being for 
someone's good (the advertiser, the shareholders et cetera) but it certainly is not being 
excellently for good. On the contrary, it is being for good, if not by deceit, at least by 
recklessly endangering the interests of those very readers whose good one has promised 




 How virtue helps a journalist to choose 
 
In what follows I purport to widen the horizon of the applicability of the adopted virtue 
conception and to describe, in a schematic and summary way, how virtue might guide a 
journalist through his working hours. The point of the description is to show how 
naturally virtue might function as one – but crucially important – dimension in the 
practical day-to-day decision-making of the newsrooms. The term virtue (or vice) is 
indeed seldom used in everyday journalistic parlance, yet all that is referred to by ‘virtue’, 
i.e. the necessity to be truthful, patient, fair and benevolent, readily makes sense to all 
journalists. Hence, all that is needed is a heightened awareness of virtue’s demands upon 
us. Accordingly, consider an example of an average journalist (he could be the author of 
this study, but I reticently call him Joel) and his work in a typical (Finnish) middle-sized 
newspaper. On an ordinary day, while on duty, Joel might be bound to make at least the 
following choices, all of which have also moral relevance: 
 
(8 a.m.) First thing in the morning, the news-editor presents him with a choice between 
two potential stories: an interview of a successful entrepreneur and a report on how 
unemployment is hitting the region uncomfortably hard. Joel opts for the latter on 
grounds of the relevance of the subject matter. He considers that writing on interesting 
and exemplary people is also important, but feels confident of his choice: “This is what 
readers want me to do under the circumstances”. (honesty, relevance) 
(9.45 a.m.) In order to charge his story also with the relevant emotional aspect Joel 
interviews a technician, who lost his job a couple of days earlier. The interviewee speaks 
in a very colorful tone, giving full vent to his frustration. However, Joel chooses not to 
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use the most furious comments: “I guess he might feel sorry to see it in the headlines first 
thing in the morning”. (beneficence, moderation, honesty, relevance) 
(10.30 a.m.) The interviewee also gives some information on how his employer picked 
the ones who should go, and it really did not seem to do justice to all of them. However, 
the employer did not want to comment when called by Joel, nor could Joel verify the 
information through any other sources. He chooses to wait and see whether he can use it 
later on: “Right now I can’t rely on it.” (patience, beneficence, justice, courage) 
(12.15 p.m.) In the middle of Joel’s most rushed hours, the online crew signals that they 
want him to contribute to their offerings. What is needed is a concise and intimate piece 
on the increasing unemployment, preferably in the form of a vivid example. Joel feels 
irritated: “As if I weren’t already swamped with work!” He first plans to refuse or 
alternatively to fool around with shocking headlines and over-colored text, but soon he 
succeeds in controlling himself:”Well, this is part of my work and these guys are also just 
doing what they are expected to do. Besides, this may also be of use to readers.” 
(temperance, solidarity, reasonableness, truthfulness) 
(12.25 p.m.) That settled, Joel hears the buzzing of his cellular. This time it is his mother-
in-law who wants his attention. She is not able to get her car out of the garage because of 
the snow and ice. Additionally, she insists that Joel’s paper should immediately run an 
online story on how bad the weather conditions actually are and on how to avoid the 
worst pitfalls in the evening’s snowy traffic. Joel silently counts to ten, then promises to 
call his brother who would be in a better position to help the lady in trouble. He also 
obediently forwards the idea of his dear mother-in-law into the hands of the online desk. 
The result: he gets rushed into completing his story on unemployment. Joel sighs 
complaisantly, calls his brother and finally tries to concentrate on his notes. (benevolence, 
temperance, accountability, practical wisdom) 
(12.35 p.m.) Only a few minutes later Joel realizes that there are some slight 
inconsistencies in his notes on the unemployment statistics. The graphic artist is already 
working on the material he delivered to her. So, what to do? Should he dig into the 
discrepancies or concentrate on completing the story on the technician? What is certain is 
that he cannot get through it all during his regular working hours. Joel decides to pick up 
the cellular again: “I have to get it right. I have no choice. I just can’t throw in people’s 
faces whatever numbers I happen to have scribbled in my notebook.” (truthfulness, 
honesty, accuracy, patience) 
(2.35 p.m.) After a surprisingly smooth period of two hours, the cellular calls Joel’s 
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attention once again. A workplace steward from the company which dismissed the 
technician wants to have a chat. Joel receives a lot of information on the personnel 
management habits of the company and although he tries to put an end to the call the 
steward just goes on venting her deeply-detailed and more or less hostile message. 
However, finally the trustee slows down and hangs up: “And remember, don’t use my 
name in your story!” Joel feels a little bewildered and irritated. Interesting details, indeed, 
but do they have that much or anything at all to do with the main thrust of his article, the 
rapidly growing unemployment? “Not really”, Joel murmurs while summing up the 
incident. “And I guess primarily it was meant to be background conversation, and not to 
be used as such in the story. So, because I don’t want to call her back now, I’ll put all this 
aside.” (trustworthiness, patience, practical wisdom) 
(5 p.m.) Finally, the story is completed and the main desk, as well as the online desk, has 
its share of the fruits of thorough spadework. Joel leaves the news room. While in the 
elevator between the third and the fourth floors, Joel feels the cellular vibrate in the 
pocket: “Hey, man, you forgot the commenting piece on your story!” It was the news-
editor. “I..ah..actually I don’t know how to comment it all. Why not just let the facts 
speak for themselves, uh?” The news-editor expresses unconvinced and half-hearted 
approval. Joel shoves the phone back into his pocket. He doesn’t feel very proud of 
himself. However, his wife is already waiting in a nearby café: “You can’t have it all”, 
Joel snorts and rushes out of the elevator. (sense of proportion, friendship, integrity in 
one’s life) 
 
To conclude, finally, the whole of my argument, I now proceed to Part five and take a 
brief look into the future. As discussed above there may be good reasons to believe that in 
the online world journalism’s characteristics and problems may change and manifest 
themselves in novel and unexpected ways. Let us then see whether our conception of 
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5. THE DIGITAL FUTURE AND THE CONCLUSIONS 
 
As was maintained in the beginning of section 4.3., journalistic online work may well 
deserve targeted ethical deliberation on grounds of its potentiality to become the major 
journalistic outlet in the near future. Moreover, online work calls for procedures and ways 
of thinking that diverge from those adhered to particularly in established print outlets. In 
that way it may well serve as a plausible test environment for whether our approach to 
journalism ethics is also able to stand up the future challenges. 
 
Nevertheless, Ari Heinonen among others argues that as the conditions in which 
journalism is practiced change, so do the ideas of what comprises good journalistic 
practice (Heinonen 2010, 18; Singer 2007, 79-95; 2003, 139-163; Deuze 2007)
117
. At the 
same time Heinonen maintains that there also are constant, outlet-independent ethical 
issues, such as accuracy and truthfulness. Yet some of them may gain (or lose) in 
relevance. Such issues seem to be for example plagiarism and the blurring of borders 
between journalistic and non-journalistic content (Ess 2009, 169; Heinonen 2010, 19; 
2004, 22-23). Finally, there are issues that may not be thoroughly new, yet that may now 
become ushered from the margins into the focus of ethical deliberation. Powerful 
examples of these might be the increased demand for speed and the expanded time-span 
of online journalism. The latter refers to the fact that journalistic articles stay online 
“forever”. This in turn may cause problems, particularly in case some of the articles 
become modified long after their original publishing (Heinonen 2010, 19; Friend and 
Singer 2007, xviii-xxi). 
 
Heinonen then goes on to show how the coming of the Net Age has hardly left any traces 
yet in the European ethics codes, including the Finnish one (Heinonen 2010, 19-20; 
Karilainen 2008).This indeed is unfortunate, since in case the codes should give guidance 
as regards good journalistic practice, they too should change as the environment and 
conditions in which journalism is carried out alter. As was discussed above, codes can be 
helpful in detecting where the typical ethical problems of a respective profession may 
reside and in securing the minimum standard for some certain repeated measures. 
 
                                               
117
This way of putting it leaves at least partly open whether what should be hailed as good journalism is 
bound to alter, too. 
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But what is the place of virtue here? In a state of flux and under the conditions of hard 
online competition, is it advisable to develop either a deep reliance on, or repulsion from, 
virtue thinking?
118
 One could of course start by referring to what earlier became 
established: because there are no rules or codes of ethics for online work, at least on a 
national level in Europe, one has to rely on her practical wisdom by necessity. However, 
this would not help us greatly since the lack of codes is simply a contingent empirical fact 
which will find its remedy in the hands of journalistic organizations sooner or later.
119
 
Hence it might be more fruitful to turn to explicating the essential characteristics of online 
work and thereafter to carefully explore whether our virtue conception has relevance and 
distinctive power in the context. 
 
5.1. The Characteristics of Online Work 
 
Now, there unavoidably exist several ways to describe the essentials of journalistic online 
work. I however argue for a concise solution which I consider charged with productive 
and expressive power, partly because of its simplicity. It may be stated summarily as 
follows: by far the most dominant characteristic of online work is its potentiality for 
pauseless dissemination of news and other contents which readily transform into a 
(commercial) necessity to revise, ad infinitum and ex tempore.
120
In other words, in online 
work one can never remove the dead line. Above I actually already suggested that the 
deadline arguably is the most prominent single factor structuring journalists' work, even 
in the traditional print environment. Yet in the online environment the stress becomes 
considerably greater. One cannot settle to dwell on anything one has just accomplished. In 
case nothing new comes up one is supposed to revise again and again, even without a 
journalistic cause, in order at least to give an impression of novelty. Hence, one easily 
becomes submerged in, and convinced of the necessity of, pause-less-ness
121




                                               
118 Richard Volkman, e.g., argues that at least information ethics in general must begin with virtue ethics 
(2010, 380-401). 
119And there of course already exist plenty of rules of the house to lean on in every newsroom. How moral 
or morally inspired all these rules in the end are, however, is another issue. 
120See section 1.3. 
121In other words, the state of producing more and more in quantity, yet with less and less relevancy in 
content. 
122This, of course, also partly applies in traditional broadcasting, but there are some relevant differences, 
too. In broadcasting any station has traditionally been expected to break news only intermittently, 
according to a fixed time-schedule, a released program. Nonetheless, however deep or weak the 
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In addition I argue that the impact of the general characteristics of the digital media on the 
online journalism should also be taken into serious consideration. One of these features is 
how digital information is “greased”.
123
 By one single “click” the delivered information 
receives a potential audience of millions, whether or not we eventually want it to do so. 




The demand for speed causes problems as regards accuracy and truthfulness in particular. 
When there is “no time to think”
125
, it is difficult to verify and to take care of the 
relevancy of the disseminated information. Yet, all this matches up with print journalism 
and particularly with broadcasting, too. The difference between online and more 
traditional outlets however is revealed when one concentrates on the high number and the 
quality of mistakes made, and on the frequency of corrections published, under the 
disguise of revisions. Online revising actually frequently means only correcting the worst 
shortcomings in what was just published. And because of the continuous opportunity for 
immediate revision, there also lurks the temptation to make it a habit or a routine not to be 
so careful, not to think it over once more or to make one more call before publishing. The 
mistakes of the first items of a certain set of revisions, then, are more or less made on 
purpose, in full awareness of their proliferation and possibly substantial nature. 
 
In other words, an entirely new working-strategy is emerging or has emerged, a strategy 
that allows for considering the dissemination of news as a long series of corrections that 
successively add to the previous piece, and which may or may not have anything to do 
with what actually is taking place. Hence, the question arises whether the story can be 
called accurate and truthful merely on grounds that only its final version corresponds to 
the facts. Is this a new, transparent way of writing news-stories, which the audience also 
approves of or even demands, or is it a plain hoax, an excuse for bad working routines? In 
fact, it may well be both. The logic of online work admittedly and readily calls for 
immediate reporting and re-reporting and the readership seems to share the view. 
                                                                                                                                            
similarities between online work and broadcasting, the logic and imperative behind the causeless 
revisions is commercial, not journalistic. Hence, the goal of maximizing the sum total of visitors and the 
excellences that come with that goal seem to be at least partly external to and at odds with the practice 
of journalism. 
123The notion originates in James Moor (1997, 27). 
124Online privacy has been the subject of lively debate for some years now. See e.g. Floridi (2005, 185-
200), Tavani (2007, 1-22; 2008, 155-166) and Shoemaker (2010, 3-15). A firm general basis to rely on 
while consulting the information ethics specialists is Räikkä (2008, 534-546). 
125Rosenberg and Feldman (2008). 
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Nonetheless, knowing that one has to revise later hardly entitles one to negligence or 




The demand for speed, then, seems to be an issue strikingly hard to underscore, while one 
is considering the core characteristics of online journalism. As a matter of fact, one might 
even argue that while one is working online, time, at least in its standard linear reading, 
ceases to refer. Past is past, and one is hindered from waiting for any one future to take 
shape. It is now or never, all the time. The market logic invading the practice calls for 
maximization of the “clicks”, the number of the visits on the site which on its part is 
decisive for the site's commercial seductiveness. However, in addition to shortage of time, 
online journalism naturally gives novel meaning to many other characteristics which it 
shares with print and broadcasting, and in some cases they, too, relate to the time-issue. 
Plagiarism, as one example, saves time. In case some other online site breaks the news, it 
is far less time-consuming simply to copypaste or rewrite what is already available, rather 
than carrying out one's own research. And as regards old versions and mistakes, they stay 




What, then, might be those differences between the old and the new genres of journalism 
which are distinctively due to the digital nature of online work? Again, I opt for simplicity 
and take up merely three decisive and strongly related issues: convergence, greaseness, 
and globality (Ess 2009, 8-16; Moor 1997, 27-32). What were once distinct forms of 
information are now swiftly translated into a commonly shared digital form of 0's and 1's 
that makes possible one of the core distinguishing characteristics of digital media, 
namely, convergence. What convergence amounts to, can be (literally) seen in a rich 
webpage (online site) that contains text, still photos, video, and audio sources, as well as 
facilities for sending email, participating in social networking et cetera. Hence, formerly 
distinct kinds of information in the analogue world (photos, texts, music) now share the 
same basic form of information. Luciano Floridi even argues for the ongoing 
“..(H)omogenization of the processor and the processed” (Floridi 2005, 188-89). He 
maintains that the digital revolution has “reontologized the infosphere”, in other words, 
                                               
126It is of course clear that the journalistic pieces published via more traditional outlets also frequently call 
for correction or supplements. Where, however, the new strategy profoundly differs from the traditional 
one, is how deficiency becomes accepted as a routine or a standard, at least as regards the first versions 
of the online news stories. Nonetheless, one might also legitimately be concerned about the possibility 
of the new strategy also gaining ground within the traditional outlets. 
127See e.g. Heinonen (2010, 19). 
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that there is a qualitative break to be seen and lived in our (informational) Umwelt, not 
just a linear continuum of quantitative development in information and communication 




Digital media are “greased” to the effect that the information they capture and record may 
be transmitted further with the utmost ease, as anyone who has hit the send button on an 
email a little too quickly knows all too well. Further, it is not only the ease, but also the 
global circulation that is significant when online journalism is under consideration. The 
slip-aways may have very numerous audiences and audiences with substantially varying 
world-views and values. To appreciate this, one only has to recall the (in)famous 
Jyllands-Posten and Muhammad cartoons case in 2006.
129
 The nature of the digital world 
renders possible cross-cultural encounters online at a scope and speed unimaginable only 
a few decades ago. Here we meet the third key characteristic of digital media, namely, its 
global nature. However, although there would be much more to say about globality, for 
instance about the feature of interactivity, which also seems to have transformational 
potentiality in its own right, I now go on to address the moral and ethical implications of 
the characteristics of online journalism delineated above. 
 
How the characteristics of online work relate to virtues in general, and to the virtue 
conception of Adams in particular, is that the approach endorsed in this study makes it 
easier to distinguish expediency from moral soundness, particularly in circumstances of 
hurry. The name might make a piece on a local politician, suspected of speeding, juicier, 
but would it be relevant; and what would be the position if he is later found not to be 
guilty? There may be a rule urging one in cases like this to consider the social position of 
the politician and other relevant circumstances before publishing anything at all or, 
alternatively, the very name of the politician. The rule, then, calls for reasonableness and 
practical wisdom, perhaps also for benevolence. In any case, it reminds us, deliberately or 
not, of the importance of some key virtues, of the necessity to be for the good (of others), 




                                               
128 Floridi has actually proposed that we are on the verge of a fourth revolution in human self-
understanding, and he emphasizes the importance of making this transition as ethically smooth as possible. 
E.g. Michael Byron (2010, 135-147) however argues that the coming revolution will call for a sharp break 
in traditional ethical theorizing. 
129
See e.g. Ess (2009, 105-14). 
130 On decency see note 86, page 116. 
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Nevertheless, whatever may be the rules and the policy of a house, the above case 
discloses the input/output pattern prevailing in online newsdesks. An item comes up, via 
email, other online sites, TV-channels, phone calls et cetera, and the journalist on duty 
has to react, without delay. There may be some rules to lean on, and there certainly are 
some customary and shared ways of proceeding, but the real-life situations vary wi(l)dly. 
Rules spell out the qualifications of the acceptable standard performance, yet they say 
nothing of the countless, messy details of the particular cases faced by journalists. In 
Martha Nussbaum's words: “..(E)xcellent choice can't be captured in general rules, 
because it is a matter of fitting one's choice to the complex requirements of a concrete 
situation” (Nussbaum 1990, 71). Additionally, frequently there would be no time to 
consult the book of regulations in the middle of the heat of breaking news. Accordingly 
the “Ethics Guidelines” by The Canadian Association of Journalists stops short of listing 
rules as regards privacy and merely sums up: “..(E)ach situation should be judged in the 




As regards, then, the very nature of the digital, it simply adds to the “complex 
requirements of a concrete situation”. An online story can be spotted all over the globe
132
, 
but is it valued and understood in the same way everywhere? And, indeed, it is 
unnecessary to think only globally in order to be faced with the complexity: A car crash 
takes place. Where, and how bad is it? Does some other news site already know of it? 
How much, and in what way, can one borrow other sites' material? A cell phone 
photograph of the accident is sent via email by a reader, but did all the people in the photo 
actually consent to being photographed? Again, there may or may not be rules, but 
beyond doubt there is growing complexity and the need for high context as well as case 
sensitivity. The rules have their role in fixing some standards or principles, and 
consequentialist considerations on the relevancy of the potential pieces may also often be 
in place, but the particular, situation-sensitive moral choices inevitably call for practical 
wisdom. 
 
In sum, the very digital nature of online journalism is one major factor in how the practice 
on the one hand is susceptible to inflict and on the other hand able to face moral 
                                               
131 Ethics Guidelines by the Canadian Association of Journalists. Online at 
http://www.eagle.ca/caj/principles/principles-statement-2002.htm. Accessed on 16th October 2010. 
132
Online journalists writing in Finnish probably do not so much share the problem of globality, at least as 
regards their texts. 
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problems. Accordingly, following Shannon Vallor in his analysis of social networking and 
the virtues, I argue that 
 
 ..(T)he novelty, complexity and mutability of the moral dilemmas presented by 
such [developing information] technologies provide an exemplary illustration of 
the need for prudential wisdom, and the insufficiency of universal moral principles 
or of consequentialist calculations in the absence of the contextual sensitivity..to 
respond appropriately (Vallor 2010, 159). 
 
5.2. Virtues for Virtual World 
 
When in haste, it helps one to bear in mind that in order to be virtuous, or at least decent, 
one ought only to be for (others') good, or at the minimum to avoid making others' life 
worse. This might be the core advisory contribution one can extract from the virtue 
thinking of Adams.
133
 Particularly in hectic working circumstances, of which online desks 
are a good example, it certainly will help one to “keep it simple”. Yet, of course, in fact 
things frequently become complicated and are ambivalent. The goods one could or ought 
to be for, or the evils one ought to avoid, tend to abound and evade commensurability. 
However, the plausibility and strength of virtue ethics resides in the very fact that almost 
all adults, indeed, have repeatedly found themselves exposed to the complexity of human 
coexistence in at least one cultural setting since their childhood and, hence, have grown to 
know how, more or less successfully, to navigate in it. In other words, as an adult every 
journalist also, while entering her occupation, necessarily already has a good knowledge 
of what it is to be honest and benevolent and on the reasons why one should further (other 
humans') good. 
 
That said, what, then, might be the virtues particularly required in online work or in the 
digital world in general? Vallor discusses patience, honesty, and empathy in the context of 
social networking practices (Vallor 2010, 164-169). Social networking and online 
journalism of course diverge in many ways, yet I argue that the very virtues endorsed by 
Vallor, in stewardship of general practical wisdom, are the ones that should also guide the 
                                               
133 Section 2.3. 
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choices in online desks.
134
 Patience ushers one to deeper reflection and accordingly to 
fewer mistakes and higher relevancy in disseminated stories. Patience gives a chance for 
further thought and for another opinion. It makes visible the benefits of the trade-off 
between high speed and thorough spadework.  
 
Honesty, in turn, is part of the cement which glues professionals together to form moral 
communities and respective practices with their internal excellences (Borden 2007, 87-
103). If not honest, a journalist breaks the promise to help the readership to become 
knowledgeable in public affairs. As discussed above journalists routinely make use of 
certain privileges, for example concerning easy access to many kinds of information and 
events. Without honesty, the legitimation for the privileges dissolves. 
 
Empathy, finally, in addition to other warm virtues, such as benevolence, has an 
indispensable role in one's being for the good of others. Since online newsdesks tend to 
make working environments, in which traits such as competitiveness and aggressiveness 
predominate, empathy is badly needed to guarantee the minimum decency of online 
journalism. Without the empathy-filter to one's work, infringements upon privacy become 
more expected, as do general indifference towards “Others” and their cultural 
characteristics. The virtues of patience, honesty, and empathy eventually work together in 
the same direction to make one to hold on to a tiny but necessary mental check-list: is 
there sufficient substance and relevance in my piece for it to qualify as news? Would the 
publication be fair for all those involved (and almost everybody is “involved” in the days 
of online journalism)? Am I being honest to myself, to my colleagues, and to my readers 
while answering the first two questions and in disclosing this particular report of what is 
going on? 
 
To express it in more general terms, applying a virtue ethical framework to digital media, 
and to online journalism in particular, is to ask the perfectly natural and commonsensical 
question about what sorts of dispositions and habits should one cultivate in his working 
behavior that will foster his practical reason and thereby lead to greater harmony within 
oneself and with others. The resources for the answer reside in one's particular life-
                                               
134At the same time and in accordance with how virtue is seen in Adams, I do not regard the outlining of 
virtue lists of pressing importance. Virtue simply is being excellently for the good. For the purposes of 
illustration and application, however, the discussion on some particular virtues may very well be of 
some use. 
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history, the life-long succession of educative encounters which one and all of us have had 
with our own social environment(s) in general and with our nearest and dearest in 
particular. 
 
At the same time, as a practice online journalism has its own excellences, values, and 
rules, the origins of which reside both in more traditional genres of journalism and in the 
particular (technical and commercial) circumstances in which online work takes place. 
Nonetheless, good work at the online desk makes demands both on one's personal 
integrity and on the excellences of the profession. Without personal virtue, there would be 
no vantage point from which to keep an eye on whether the skills and excellences of the 
profession eventually serve people's knowledgeability in public affairs. In other words, 
patience, honesty, and empathy are needed not only to help one meet the multitude of 
single everyday choices but also to reflect the whole of the state of the art. Yet, without 
professional excellence, in turn, there would be no adequate tools to do good journalism, 
good in both professional and moral terms. 
 
Now, I have indeed made it seem very simple: one merely has to grow to be virtuous and 
to learn certain professional skills in order to become a good journalist.
135
 Not all 
philosophers and journalists agree, however, and there are many who neither trust in nor 
believe in (the existence of) the virtues enabling one to do the job.  Further, as discussed 
above, there are substantial challenges to meet while advocating virtue ethical approaches 
to (online) journalism or to the ethics of professions in general.
136
 However, without 
returning to the wholesale discussion on the subject, I merely address three issues that 
obviously gather relevancy particularly within online journalism. 
 
First, concerning the novelty of many of the applications of ICTs in general and of online 
journalism in particular, is it not, even typically, a situation where one cannot have 
sufficient experience merely or mainly to rely on practical wisdom and (other) virtues? 
Does one not need the support of rules and regulations particularly while becoming 
introduced to novelties? There is an edge to this argument, of course, yet I think that it is 
in no way fatal to the virtue approach. Rules or regulations are certainly needed to 
                                               
135Aristotle himself did write of virtues as skills, but for whether or not he really did mean that virtues, too, 
might be regarded as skills in the same way as e.g. carpentry and other crafts might, see e.g. Julia Annas, 
The Morality of Happiness (1993, 66-73). 
136 See sections 2.3. and 2.4. above. 
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demonstrate the standard performance in novel circumstances, but one cannot handle the 
growing number of variables and the increasing complexity of situations with the help of 
rules. Rather, the opposite is true. There is now more than ever demand for good personal 
judgment and choice, and at the same time there is less time for browsing through 
manuals, while on duty. Whether or not journalists or editors like it, they have to rely on 
the journalists' integrity more than ever while working in the constantly changing 
circumstances, i.e. while working online. 
 
Second, one might wonder whether virtue, particularly in my Adamsian reading of it, may 
eventually be totally out of place in a harshly competitive online environment. Is it not the 
case that in order to be a successful online journalist, one has to be clever and tough, even 
aggressive, in order to overcome other sites and to attract readers' attention? If virtues are 
to be called for in the first place, should not one prefer those such as wit and 
perseverance, yet certainly not benevolence or empathy? Or, all in all, would it not be 
preferable merely to concentrate on fighting for the scoop of the day and let the casual 
following of some basic rules suffice as regards matters of law and ethics -department? 
 
Now, this not uncommon line of thought clearly manifests the way in which professional 
and moral excellences frequently become mixed up and how indeed they, not infrequently 
also touch on each other. Expediency, however, should be seen apart from moral 
excellence or decency. Expediency and professional excellence of course almost 
invariably are conducive to helping people to become well-versed in public affairs on the 
one hand, and to helping journalists in keeping their promise to gather and disseminate 
relevant information on the other. Yet virtue is badly needed to monitor the degree to 
which the (general journalistic) promise becomes kept in a morally sustainable way. In 
case a journalist resigns himself for instance to lying or to invading to another's privacy in 
order to disclose interesting or important information, it may very well be that he can no 
longer be called virtuous or even decent. He may be for some good of readers, namely 
their becoming knowledgeable in public affairs, but he cannot be said to be morally 
excellently for that good. Hence, the rougher the times around the online desks become, 
the more journalists and readers alike have to rely on decency and virtue in order to retain 
journalism as a worthwhile occupation. 
 
There may also be ample reason to wonder how virtue ethics, with its emphasis on 
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particularity and partiality, might help one in the global (virtual) environment, where one 
has to face an infinity of differing, even opposing views and values. Would not more 
abstract, impartialist ethical approaches, such as consequentialism and deontology, 
furnish a more promising moral backing to finding one's way in such a digital jungle? 
Now, as Charles Ess suggests, many virtue-ethical approaches actually resonate with 
numerous non-Western views that also lay stress on becoming an excellent or exemplary 
human being in particular collectives (Ess 2009, 207-19; see also e.g. de Silva 1991, 58-
68). In Confucian ethics, for example, an exemplary individual is one who has shaped her 
character or dispositions through the practice of appropriate conduct and ritual propriety. 
In addition, the emphasis on emotions in ethical life brings virtue ethics closer to at least 
some of its non-Western counterparts, a feature which is harder to trace, or is thoroughly 
non-existent, in other major Western traditions. Hence, because of these and other 
similarities with non-Western ethical views, virtue ethics might at least tentatively be 
regarded as a promising counterpart in the development of more global (online) ethics, an 
ethics that works more or less successfully in both Western and non-Western cultures and 
traditions. 
 
In the heat of the online-desk even the virtuous, however, will make moral, in addition to 
other practical, mistakes. Virtue appears fragile and fragmentary. Yet, this is how Adams 
and I see virtues: one may only have some of them, and one may even occasionally lose 
grip of those one has. Virtue comes in degrees and discontinuity, yet it is real, and, in the 
end, all this gives our virtue conception particular relevance in online environments, too. 
It alone makes demands that less than fully-informed and busy persons can also meet, and 
that are proportionate to the findings of modern psychology. On the other hand, the bar 
for moral virtue is not set too low: to be virtuous, one has to be morally excellently for 
some good (of others). Thus, to return to the example of the speeding politician, 
manifesting total indifference to the interests and good of the suspect would also mean 
manifesting (at least minor) vice. 
 
Finally, to conclude the whole of the conversation I once more summarize the main 
goal(s) and subsequently the main findings of the study and then propose an agenda for 
future work within the field of virtue ethical journalism ethics. 
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5.3. What Remains to Be Done 
 
The point of departure for the study was the observation that what is meant by virtue, in 
much of the journalism ethics texts with a virtue ethical flavor, remains alarmingly vague. 
Frequently there is no discussion of the way in which the concept used relates to the long 
tradition of virtue thinking, nor of how the problems of defining virtue could or should be 
attended to or solved.  
 
In the Introduction, I summarized the aims of the study to be: (1) to show how a plausible 
and well-defined conception of virtue gives more credibility to the view that a virtue 
approach can also give good action guidance in the ethics of professions; (2) to argue that 
the virtue conception developed by Robert M. Adams carries the requisite characteristics; 
(3) to exemplify how earlier work on journalism ethics in general, and virtue-flavored or 
virtue-based work in particular, would have been more accurate and more nuanced with 
the help of Adams’ insights; (4) to test in preliminary fashion how virtue thinking in 
general and the virtue conception of Adams in particular succeed in journalistic online 
environments. In addition I strove to provide a general picture of the recent developments 
in virtue theory and normative virtue ethics in order to give greater credibility to virtue’s 
potentiality to take its share of ethical reflection and action guidance. The general 
discussion on virtue and virtue theory, however, was not intended to show either that (a) 
virtue theory is superior to other main ethics theories or that (b) the virtue conception of 
Robert M. Adams has its roots or could somehow be inferred from the presented 
theoretical literature. 
 
Accordingly, I discussed issues related to (1) and (2) theoretically in sections 2.3. and 
2.4., and in a more practical manner in Parts three, four, and five. The discussion in 2.3. 
and 2.4. revealed that a multi-dimensional and well-defined virtue conception can be 
developed in a plausible manner. It was also shown in sections 2.3. and 2.4., as well as in 
Parts three to five, that with the help of such a conception one can make many morally 
important distinctions more visible than is the case with an “old-fashioned”, one-
dimensional virtue conception which simply regards virtues as good, solid character-
traits. Examples of such morally relevant distinctions and issues are the difference 
between professional and moral virtues or excellences, and the insight that virtue 
manifests itself by degrees and is frail and fragmentary. Moreover, since virtue in the 
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Adamsian reading manifests itself in one’s being excellently for good (i.e. in doing 
something beneficial for someone in a morally sustainable way), the virtue conception of 
Adams also tends all the more firmly to support action guidance. And finally, the virtue 
conception of Adams was also shown to be capable of plausibly facing the challenges 
leveled against virtue ethics and even against the very existence of character traits (or 
other permanent inner dispositions) by in particular situationist social psychology.  
 
Part three is where I particularly discussed the earlier work in journalism ethics and 
showed how it would have benefited from the virtue ethical approach in general and from 
the virtue conception of Adams in particular. With the help of the Adamsian virtue 
conception there would have been less ambiguity in the texts, particularly where the 
authors are referring to professional or to moral virtues. Adams would also have helped 
the authors to analyze more clearly how a journalist should choose in a certain situation in 
order to be at least decent, i.e. simultaneously not to manifest either vice or (notable) 
virtue. Moreover, a broader and deeper virtue conception would have rendered many of 
the analyzes examined more nuanced and richer in detail, which in turn would have 
helped one to map out what actually is or was morally relevant in cases under discussion. 
 
The challenges of (4) I met mainly in Part five. I discussed the situation which finds 
journalism in a wild state of flux and the way in which journalists have been pushed into 
a corner by the demands of online work. I argued for the view that today’s restless digital 
work environment makes growing demands on journalists’ personal decision-making 
abilities and on their personal moral integrity. Instructions and rules proliferate, and are 
certainly needed, but they do not eliminate the growing pressure on one’s patience, 
honesty, and empathy, i.e. on one’s personal moral character. Hence, in circumstances 
where time is scarce and expedience tends to dominate, a virtue conception which on the 
one hand directs one to see the difference between technical and moral excellence, yet on 
the other hand also celebrates less than complete virtue, seems helpful and close to the 
average human condition and to day-to-day realities. It is of undoubted use not only for 
the one in action at online-desk but also for the one who analyses the situation from the 
outside. 
 
Yet, there still remains much work to be done. In the following I pick up only a few of the 
issues which I consider highly important and interesting, but which have been left without 
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sufficiently deep examination above. First, I did not show in any conclusive way that the 
virtue conception of Adams is compatible with neo-Aristotelianism or any other coherent 
virtue theory.
137
  Might our virtue conception, then, despite its analytical power in the 
ethics of professions, after all remain in isolation from other, more established work in 
virtue thinking? The discussion above suggests that not, but a more detailed analysis is 
needed. Second, while I was arguing for virtue and virtue theory I also maintained that 
obviously there is much to be learned from deontology and consequentialism; if that be 
the case, what could it mean in precise terms?
138
 In the ethics of professions it is indeed 
customary to rely on the concepts and insights of all the great traditions, but what are the 
legitimate ways to do so? 
 
Third, granted that virtue ethics and our virtue conception are powerful tools for the 
analysis of professionals' moral behavior, how might these virtues be inculcated? In other 
words, how well might virtue thinking eventually be welcomed in the newsrooms? I have 
concentrated in this study more on the analytical power of (one particular variety of) 
virtue thinking, leaving aside any substantive reflection on whether it could also be an 
attraction at newsdesks, and whether there are reasons to have faith in its potentiality to 
actually survive in journalistic environments, increasingly pressed by business-related 
goals and excellences. This issue, nonetheless, cannot be thoroughly explored without the 
aid of empirical experimentation. Hopefully there will also arise interest in such work. 
 
Finally, and maybe with the greatest urgency, the relationship between professional and 
moral excellence deserves yet more profound deliberation. The varieties of good(ness) 
indeed have for millennia interested both philosophers and laymen, but there is no 
evidence to the effect that the case is closed. Above we took the view that it is both 
important and possible to make the distinction yet that there is reason not to mark the 
boundaries between moral and non-moral too sharply. But how sharp is sufficiently sharp, 
and under precisely what circumstances can professionally excellent work be regarded as 
also morally excellent, i.e. virtuous? The relevance of the question, however, might on 
many occasions be revealed more clearly if it were put somewhat differently: under what 
circumstances may professionally excellent work nonetheless turn out to be morally 
                                               
137Whether there really are any such things may be controversial, but I leave the issue outside the confines 
of this study. 
138In particular on grounds of there being several kinds of consequentialist and deontological approaches. 
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dubious, or to manifest vice? And I am of course not referring here to the “professions” or 
crafts of bank-robbing and terrorism, but to those occupations and professions of whose 
services we and our near and dear routinely and daily take advantage, such as 
engineering, teaching and – journalism. In a world which increasingly opts for 
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